









Reading Science in Early Writings of Leopold Zunz and Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī: 
 























Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  



















































Elizabeth Eva Johnston 
All rights reserved 
ABSTRACT 
Reading Science in Early Writings of Leopold Zunz and Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī: 
On Beginnings of the Wissenschaft des Judentums and the Nahḍa 
Elizabeth Eva Johnston 
 
The dissertation is divided into two parts, each containing two chapters. Part I describes 
two nineteenth century movements and fields—the German Wissenschaft des Judentums 
(Science of Judaism) and the Arab nahḍa (Renaissance)—moving between what these 
developments are at their beginnings and what they have come to be through later developments 
and representations. I argue that both German Jews and Arabs were made to deal with 
Orientalism and colonialism in the nineteenth century, and that the different forms they 
encountered shaped how exponents of the Wissenschaft des Judentums and the nahḍa formulated 
their proposals for reform and their understandings of Europe and of Christianity.   
Part II turns to examine in greater depth two foundational literary and programmatic texts 
which initiate discourse of both movements: Leopold Zunz’s Etwas über die rabbinische 
Litteratur (1818), which lays out the foundation for the field; and Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
travel writing Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīz (1834). I take science as a departure point for 
reading these texts, because of the central role sciences play in each. This is not surprising given 
the post-Enlightenment milieu of which they are a part. From the time of Napoleon’s imperialist 
ventures, which deeply impacted Prussia as well as Egypt, education and science—whether the 
Wissenschaft of the philosophical disciplines, or the sciences that drive technology—become 
foundational for intellectual, spiritual, and/or technological progress. 
I read both texts as interventions, aiming to direct and impact their readers in particular 
ways. The programs they propose are a part of, and responses to, Western Europe’s modernity as 
it develops from the late eighteenth century into the nineteenth. Their formulations reflect what 
each writer proposes should be the relation between Europe and Christianity, as he seeks to 
either participate equally in a wider culture and academy (i.e., Zunz), or learn from Europe’s 
advances, particularly its technological and scientific ones (i.e., al-Ṭahṭāwī). Each posits a 
critique of Europe as it seeks to learn from and emulate what it takes Europe to be. Their 
interventions and effects, or lack thereof, contribute to narrating how Europe’s story came to 
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Unless otherwise noted, all translations in the dissertation are mine.  
 
For transliterations from the Arabic, I follow the system of the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES), with the exception that I use full diacritical notation for the names of 
persons and for the titles of published works. For Hebrew transliterations I follow the guidelines 
of the Library of Congress.  
 
All references from and to German texts throughout the dissertation preserve the spelling from 
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This dissertation began from the two founding and foundational texts I examine in Part II, 
namely Leopold Zunz’s Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur (Some remarks on rabbinic 
literature), first published in 1818, and Rifāʿ Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ al-ibrīz ilā talkhīṣ bārīz 
(The extrication of gold towards the summation of Paris), first published in 1834. These are 
literary and programmatic texts, which mark the beginning of discourse of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums (Science of Judaism) and the nahḍa (Renaissance) respectively. When reading them 
alongside each other I observed several meaningful shared motifs between these two pieces, 
written by non-Christians as they ruminate on their common predicament: What is and should 
“our”—whether addressing German Jews or those in Muslim countries—connection be with 
Europe? And what is Europe? In the face of its scientific advances and civilizational power, how 
can we assert our differences while emphasizing our commonalities? What is the role of sciences 
in the present milieu and how can these be made to facilitate collective transformation? In what 
ways is the present continuous with what preceded it and how does it break from what came 
before?  
The following will draw out meaningful connections between the two aforementioned 
texts and the wider contexts of which they are a part, without minimizing the significant 
differences between the authors’ environments and between the intellectual and technological 
sciences they describe and reckon with in their writings. 
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On Zunz’s Etwas, the Wissenschaft des Judentums, and science 
Leopold Zunz (1794-1886) is a German Jew, and founder of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums (Science of Judaism), a movement that begins in Berlin in the second decade of the 
nineteenth century. Zunz lays out its foundation, if not its name, in his Etwas über die 
rabbinische Litteratur (hereafter Etwas), written and published when he was a student at the 
recently established University of Berlin (1810).  
The founding of the University of Berlin marks the “crowning achievement” of the 
state’s educational reforms carried out during the so-called Prussian Reform Era (1806-1815), a 
period of increased centralization as the state absorbed and reorganized Church and educational 
institutions following its humiliating loss to Napoleon in 1806.1 In the wake of defeat, founding a 
“new university ‘in the German sense’” (to refer to one of Schleiermacher’s essays from the 
time) became “a form of subtle, spiritual retaliation” against French imperialism.2 This “new 
creation” built on ‘German Wissenschaft’ would enable the state to “replace with intellectual 
strength what it [had] lost in material resources.”3 It is significant that the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums develops among the first generation of German Jews to attend universities, and that it 
centers out of Berlin, the first German university, “at least in the formulations of its founders”—
                                                
1 Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 25. 
2 Thomas Albert Howard’s Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 150. On the founding of the new university, see Howard’s chapter “Theology, 
Wissenschaft, and the Founding of the University of Berlin” especially 148-152, which considers the events as 
responding to Napoleonic defeat; and 155-177, which discusses “Grundschriften” (founding treatises) by Schelling, 
Fichte, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and Steffens. 
3 “A new creation” were Fichte’s words on the new university, cited in Howard, 142. The latter citation is taken 
from the king’s alleged response to a proposal in 1807 to establish a new university in Berlin, cited in Howard, 149. 
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and statutes—“if not entirely in actual practice,” to sever “the centuries-old tie between 
confessionally defined Christianity and university education.”4 
From Zunz’s Etwas, the program he advocates is philological, influenced, in part, by the 
discipline identified with Philipp August Boeckh (1785-1867) and Friedrich Wolf (1759-1824), 
who were among Zunz’s professors at the University. When Zunz self-identifies with a tradition, 
he does so as a corrective to Hebraism, that is to Christian Hebrew Studies, which began in 
German universities from the late fifteenth century. Initially Hebraists focused on biblical texts, 
and used their studies to assist the Church’s efforts to convert Jews. Following the Reformation, 
this changed as Protestant theologians developed the field through their efforts to critique Church 
dogma. Significantly, from the early seventeenth century, post-biblical (i.e., “rabbinic”) Hebrew 
writings were brought into the university by Protestant theologians to help clarify the biblical 
material in their pursuit of the “Hebraica veritas,” that is “the accurate understanding of the 
biblical text.”5  
It should not be surprising that Hebraism served Christian interests, and made Judaism 
function “as the other whose negation confirms and even constitutes Christianity.”6 It is with this 
background in mind that Zunz writes his essay responding to Christians’ appropriation of 
rabbinic literature, and critiquing how over the past century “European [literature] gained in 
strength and identity by setting itself off against the [rabbinic].”7 As Zunz makes clear, 
                                                
4 Howard, 130. 
5 See Alfred Jospe, “The Study of Judaism in German Universities before 1933,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 27 
(1982):  296-99. 
6 Susannah Heschel, “Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger's Wissenschaft des Judentums as a Challenge to 
Christian Hegemony in the Academy,” New German Critique 77 (1999): 63. 
7 This citation is a modification of a statement by Edward Said in Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 2003), which 
very closely resembles one of Zunz’s arguments, with the substitution of “literature” for “culture” and “rabbinic” for 
“Orient.” Said writes (3) that Orientalism  “…tries to show that European culture gained in strength and identity by 
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Christians have been studying post-biblical Hebrew literature for centuries, for their own 
purposes, with deleterious consequences. And yet, it is only following the so-called “crisis of 
emancipation” (returned to below) that the Wissenschaft des Judentums develops, a consequence 
in no small measure of Jews’ admission into the German university following the Edict of 1812.8  
What explanations does Zunz give for why he proposes the program he lays out in 1818? 
He describes how the time now is especially ripe for Jews, as well as for all those committed to 
working for Wissenschaft, upon and for which the new German University is built, to investigate 
Jewish literature scientifically. His remarkable essay—discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and 
translated in full at the end of the dissertation—names science as the best solution for a twofold 
“crisis” currently facing German Jews.  
Zunz explains that developing this field is especially urgent, because German Jews are 
neglecting Hebrew and therefore, often without even realizing it, witnessing their literature’s 
death. While “Jewish literature”—an object whose parameters are shaped and reshaped through 
early writings of the Wissenschaft—references a multi-lingual, geographically and temporally 
diverse corpus of texts, Hebrew occupies a special place within it, as the language most widely 
understood by Jews across time and space, and as the people’s former collective language. If 
Jews lose their ability to read Hebrew texts, Zunz warns, the Jewish people will no longer exist 
in the present.  
                                                                                                                                                       
setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self.” Compare this to Zunz’s Etwas, 
reprinted in his Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin, Louis Gerschel, 1875), 4. See Appendix I, for a reprint of 
Zunz’s text alongside my translation. 
8 Though the Edict of 1812 allowed Jews entry to German universities and opened up the possibility of their future 
employment in the same, in 1822 the chance for the latter was closed by a King’s order, since this “could not be 
effected ‘without great disruption’ and should be withdrawn.” See Ismar Schorsch, “The Religious Parameters of 
Wissenschaft: Jewish Academics at Prussian Universities,” in From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern 
Judaism (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1994), 52, 62n6. For a discussion of the “Gans Affair” which led to 
the King’s order of 1822, see Hanns Reissner’s “Rebellious Dilemma: The Case Histories of Eduard Gans and some 
of his Partisans,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 2 (1957): 182-84. 
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The current crisis is not only existential, but political. Beginning in the late eighteenth 
century, the question of whether Jews can, should, and under what conditions be granted the 
same social and political rights as Christians have, becomes publicly and heatedly debated.9 
Zunz, along with other Wissenschaft practitioners, argues that biased knowledge about the Jews 
has resulted in inadequate and misguided proposals for Jewish reform and “improvement.” Were 
the Jews’ literature investigated scientifically and not theologically, so as to produce accurate 
knowledge about who this people is, then it may become possible to effectively and justly 
resolve “the complicated question of the fate of the Jews.”10 
A few words on Wissenschaft and science 
The term Wissenschaft, which, when translated, I render “science,” gained its modern 
currency among German idealist thinkers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.11 
It refers to what develops as human and philosophical sciences, and less so to natural or physical 
sciences. In the early nineteenth century Wissenschaft represents a rigorous systematic method of 
enquiry, and carries within itself a sense of “disciplinary holism,” at the same time that it 
represents “the embodiment of knowledge systematically united into a Whole.”12 These 
meanings are present in Zunz’s Etwas, where he calls for a vast encyclopedic program for “our 
                                                
9 On discourse on Jewish emancipation from 1781-1806, see Jonathan Hess’ Germans, Jews and the Claims of 
Modernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 
10 Zunz, Etwas, 4. 
11 Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel—all of who taught at the University of Berlin—were especially 
influential in developing Wissenschaft as an “academic ideology” in the early nineteenth century. See Howard, 137-
77.  
12 David N. Myers, “‘From Zion Will Go Forth Torah’: Jewish Scholarship and the Zionist Return to History,” Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1991, 6; citing the entry “Wissenschaft” in the Allgemeine deutsche Real-
Encyclopaedie from 1820. 
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science,” one which would view the whole literature of the Jews as its object of research, while 
situating this within a greater whole uniting the literatures of all peoples.  
The meanings of Wissenschaft change over the nineteenth-century. In his study 
Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University, Thomas Albert Howard 
describes how scholars from the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., Eduard Spranger, 
Rudolf Virchow, and Max Weber) differentiate the more “philosophical” idealist Wissenschaft of 
the first decades of the nineteenth-century, which emphasized the synthetic unity of the whole, 
from the more “scientific,” positivist Wissenschaft of the second half of the century, which came 
to refer to academic fields and empirical rigor. Howard argues, however, that this difference is 
exaggerated, for even though Wissenschaft changes in meaning and use over the nineteenth 
century, important continuities connect its early idealist and later positivist manifestations, even 
as emphases shift.13 He explains, for example, that ‘idealist’ Wissenschaft also calls for 
thoroughly and rigorously advancing one’s particular discipline, even while focusing on the 
organic unity of knowledge, just as later ‘positivist’ Wissenschaft still pursued unified, 
comprehensive knowledge even as it became increasingly focused on specialized academic 
work. 
Zunz’s program, which deeply and profoundly reflects the environment of German 
idealism but neither lacks positivist empirical rigor, illustrates Howard’s argument. Continuities 
and shifts in understandings of science are visible in debates and disagreements among 
practitioners of the Wissenschaft des Judentums over the course of the nineteenth century. 
                                                
13 Howard, 29-32. 
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On al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ, the nahḍa, and science 
Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801-1873) is an influential figure in nineteenth-century 
Egyptian and Ottoman contexts. His widely read and disseminated Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ 
Bārīz (hereafter Takhlīṣ) is al-Ṭahṭāwī’s account of his sojourn in Paris (1826-1831), as an imam 
and participant in the first large-scale Egyptian mission sent there by Muḥammad ʿAlī. The 
mission’s purpose was to study European sciences so as to reduce Egypt’s reliance on foreign 
instructors and facilitate the governor’s modernization projects.  
The Takhlīṣ is didactic, explaining the customs of Parisian society to its readers and 
teaching them about the sciences perfected there, as it advocates for Islamic lands to learn and 
import those sciences from Europe which would benefit them. It is comparative throughout, 
relating Cairo to Paris, and Islamic countries to Europe, moving between equations of sameness 
and difference as it describes the peoples, languages and sciences of the two regions. 
Unlike the “Wissenschaft des Judentums,” which is coined as the name for an academic 
field and then developed, the designation “nahḍa” is not used for the movement and era it would 
come to signify until its second generation. Thus there are no founders of the nahḍa, but 
“pioneers” of what would “come to be called” the nahḍa, by the late nineteenth century. Al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ marks the beginning of nahḍa discourse, because this text more than any other 
initiates a process of “translation and adaptation” of Western sciences, institutions, and thought, 
into Arabic that informs and characterizes what the nahḍa becomes.  
The concern underlying and connecting nahḍa writings over the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth centuries is the problem of how best to modernize in a world where Europe determines 
what is modern. The seeds of this ‘problem’ were planted in 1798 in Egypt with the French 
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invasion and occupation, as was the ‘solution’ nahḍa intellectuals developed, nurtured as they 
were by European Orientalists.  
Significantly, that mission of which al-Ṭahṭāwī was a part, connects in very direct ways 
to 1798. The school established in Paris for instructing the Egyptian students, the École 
égyptienne, was set up and directed by French Orientalist Edmé François Jomard, who himself 
had suggested a similar project as early as 1811 “for civilizing Egypt by means of education.”14 
Jomard had been a member of the Institut d’Égypt, founded by Napoleon in Cairo in 1798, as the 
scientific arm of the French occupation.  Of both institutions, Jomard wrote in 1840: “is [the 
École égyptienne] anything besides a continuation of the activities of the Institut d’Égypt?”15  
A few words on ʿilm and sciences 
Science and sciences are central to generating and developing the nahḍa. What sciences 
are however, to al-Ṭahṭāwī, and what this term means to the “Franks,”—the term al-Ṭahṭāwī uses 
most often when referring to non-Ottoman Europeans—differs, as chapter 4 will draw out. The 
Franks’ understanding impacts al-Ṭahṭāwī’s conceptions of ʿilm and ʿulūm, even as he shapes his 
perception of their view into a model that can be incorporated into and absorbed by his own. 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses several terms, which are not always—though they sometimes are—
distinguishable from each other. Further, some key words, such as “ʿilm,” have multiple, if 
connected meanings. ʿIlm, as an abstract substantive, can be translated as “knowledge,” in the 
                                                
14Alain Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France Under Muhammad Ali,” in Modern Egypt: Studies in 
Politics and Society, edited by E. Kedourie and S. G. Haim. (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1980), 5; 
idem., “Edme-François Jomard and Egytian Reforms in 1839,” Middle Eastern Studies 7.3 (1971): 312-313; Ronald 
T. Ridley, Napoleon’s Proconsul in Egypt: The Life and Times of Bernadino Drovetti (London: Rubicon Press, 
1998), 212, 346n42-43. 
15 Cited and translated in Shaden M. Tageldin’s Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in 
Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 111. 
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sense of true and universal knowledge of a thing. It often appears synonymous to maʿrifa, 
though al-Ṭahṭāwī prefers maʿrifa to represent “knowledge” when this is contrasted against 
“ignorance” (jahl).  
ʿIlm has a second sense in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ, namely as a science, in other words as 
the singular of ʿulūm (“sciences”), and as a method through which to better ascertain knowledge 
of an object, which often means knowing how to put that object to its best use. This meaning too 
is shared, at times, with arts (funūn) and crafts (ṣanāʾiʿ), although al-Ṭahṭāwī clarifies that this is 
not how the Franks use “science,” which for them is always distinct from “art.”  
Marwa Elshakry writes about the “ongoing epistemological reorientation of the word 
‘ʿilm,’ (the broadest word in Arabic for ‘knowledge’),” which took place over the second half of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which led to the emergence of the idea that ʿilm 
could refer to positive, experimental science.16 While ʿilm certainly means more than only 
positive science in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ, it also means, in some instances, science, or more 
accurately, a science. As chapter 4 shows, this early nahḍa text provides another avenue through 
which to consider how categories of knowledge are shaped from the first half of the century. In 
the case of the Takhlīṣ, this is can be seen through al-Ṭahṭāwī’s efforts to translate French 
concepts into Arabic in ways that his readers will understand.  
A few remarks on Orientalism and Colonialism  
The Wissenschaft des Judentums and the nahḍa are each impacted by Orientalism and 
colonialism. The nahḍa develops out of the assault by both at the same time, which occurs on 
                                                
16 Marwa Elshakry, “Knowledge in Motion: The Cultural Politics of Modern Science Translations in Arabic,” Isis 




this side of that post-Enlightenment Western European modernity that would make itself felt so 
forcefully and persuasively throughout the world. This modernity takes shape in the late 
eighteenth century and begins to work its havoc on the Near East from the Napoleonic invasion 
of Egypt in 1798. In Orientalism, Edward Said describes this event as “the keynote of the 
relationship” that would develop between the two regions, because this was “an invasion which 
was in many ways the very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another, 
apparently stronger one.”17  
Napoleon’s military and scientific expedition in Egypt signals the conjunction of colonial 
aggression and the civilizational mission, built upon, strengthened by, and furthering Orientalist 
knowledge, which together engulfed Egypt “by the instruments of Western knowledge and 
power.”18 Said’s three overlapping definitions of Orientalism are brought together and mobilized 
in this venture, which used knowledge of the Orient to dominate and exert authority over the 
Orient. The expedition’s team of scientists, even more so than its army, furthered France’s 
imperial interests in the region, and initiated a process of ruptural transformation, from which the 
nahḍa develops its varied responses, be these cultural, linguistic, literary, scientific, political, 
national, etc.  
The impact of Orientalism and colonialism on the Wissenschaft may be less manifest but 
is no less formative. Before “Orientalism” was made to serve imperial and economic interests of 
                                                
17 Said, Orientalism, 42 (emphasis added). 
18 Ibid., 79-86. It is worth noting that the French ‘civilisation’ as ‘the triumph of reason over irrationality in 
constitutional, political, moral, religious, and intellectual life’—used as a legitimizing force for French colonialism 
from the time of Napoleon—only gained this new resonance during the mid-eighteenth century amid Enlightenment 
struggles with the Church and Christianity. See Birgit Schaebler, “Civilizing Others: Global Modernity and the 
Local Boundaries (French/German/Ottoman and Arab) of Savagery” in Globalization and the Muslim World: 
Culture, Religion, and Modernity, ed. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2004), 8-9. In the German context Bildung develops simultaneously and acquires its sense of moral, spiritual, 
intellectual acculturation and formation. German intellectuals contrasted Bildung, and its closely related Kultur, as 




modern states, “Hebraism” served the interests of the Church and the Reformation, appropriating 
Jewish texts to convert the Jews, to counter Christian opponents, and to construct the degenerate 
rabbinic Oriental “Other” against and through whom the Christian establishes and empowers 
himself. This scholarly discourse is what precedes its transformation into the imperial institution 
Orientalism describes, and it is Hebraism that the Wissenschaft des Judentums reacts against and 
critiques.19  
The “colonization” of the Jews, however, begins from their emancipation. Jonathan M. 
Hess’ Germans, Jews and the Claims of Modernity shows how proposals by Christian biblical 
scholars regarding the civil status of the Jews, whether in favor of granting them citizenship 
(e.g., Christian Wilhelm Dohm) or against (e.g., Johann David Michaelis), were formulated as 
colonial projects.20 The question of “civic improvement” and whether the Jews can be 
“regenerated” and made into productive citizens able to contribute to the economy and self-
sufficiency of the secular state is a colonial question.21  
More significantly, Hess’ work illuminates that these political questions correspond with 
a shift from pre-modern Hebraism as a primarily theological discourse to modern Orientalism, as 
a secular and scientific enterprise that uses its intellectual authority to assert political authority 
over Jews and the Orient. He shows how both Dohm’s and Michaelis’ political proposals 
advising the “secular” state on how to deal with its Jews, connect to their scholarship on Jewish 
history and Mosaic law respectively. The shift to modern Orientalism is especially pronounced in 
                                                
19 Gil Anidjar, Semites, 49. I am indebted to Anidjar’s essay on “Secularism” for helping me to think through the 
transformation from “Hebraism” to “Orientalism.” 
20 See Hess, 27-43, 54-69. 
21 Daniel Boyarin uses Dohm’s treatise to show how the ideology of Jewish emancipation as formulated by liberal 
European Christians is “functionally akin to a colonization.” Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the 
Invention of the Jewish Man (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 280-81. Boyarin highlights this 
connection in order to consider and critique Herzl’s political Zionism as colonial mimicry.  
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Michaelis’s work, which effects a racial division separating the Oriental (Jew and Arab) from 
Christian Europe. The increasingly racist responses that subsequently develop within discourse 
on Jewish emancipation reveals that “distinctly modern forms of antisemitism” should be 
understood “not as a reaction to the Enlightenment but as an integral part of it.”22 In this way, 
Hess’ work illustrates how Christian patterns survive “reconstituted, redeployed, redistributed” 
in and through secular Enlightenment universalism, as Hebraism transforms into modern 
Orientalism.23  
It is thus significant, and not surprising, that German Jews only enunciate a program 
rebelling against the Christian Hebraism of the past several centuries after they have already 
begun to be “civilized” through processes of emancipation. Theirs may be a “revolt of the 
colonized,” but it is a rebellion bound and enabled by their colonization.24  
Figures of the Wissenschaft des Judentums embrace modernity so strongly at the same 
time that many of its proponents are anti-Christian.25 This separation is possible because of the 
perception of distance between Christian Hebraism and post-Enlightenment society. This 
dynamic differs from nahḍa intellectuals who faced the simultaneous and combined forces of 
Orientalism and Western imperialism. This explains why, at least initially, nahḍa figures more 
often embrace the European together with European modernity. It is not until the more 
devastating effects of twentieth-century colonialism that nahḍa exponents come to see the 
adversary in the European.  
                                                
22 Hess, 208.  
23 Said, 121. 
24 Susannah Heschel presents historians of the nineteenth-century Wissenschaft des Judentums as constructing a 
counterhistory of Christian counterhistory, which she calls a “revolt of the colonized.”  
25 This does not mean that these ‘anti-Christian’ Jewish Germans do not also “mimic” Christianity as they rebel 
against it. Chapter one will address this further. 
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Organization and structure:   
The dissertation is divided into two parts, each containing two chapters. Part I describes 
the Wissenschaft des Judentums and the nahḍa in the nineteenth century and discusses portrayals 
of both by scholarship over the twentieth. Chapters 1 (on the Wissenschaft) and 2 (on the nahḍa) 
move between narrating what each movement is and what they have come to be. I draw attention 
to the diversity of ways in which these fields and developments are described, note when 
significant shifts in their portrayals occur, and consider what these changes reflect and effect. I 
refrain from referring to chapter 1 in chapter 2 and vice versa, in an effort to avoid reading the 
Wissenschaft through the nahḍa and the nahḍa through the Wissenschaft, though I hope the 
reader may be compelled by the presentation to draw connections between the two.  
The choice of focus for chapters 1 and 2 connects to Part II of the dissertation where I 
focus on the two aforementioned works, Zunz’s Etwas (chapter 3) and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ 
(chapter 4). I chose these texts because of their founding and foundational status in narratives of 
the Wissenschaft des Judentums and the nahḍa respectively. Thus one of the aims of Part I will 
be to prepare the reader to consider if the texts I read in Part II warrant the foundational status 
they have been accorded. Do they foretell the movements who trace their lineage to them? Do 
they illustrate characteristics that typify the Wissenschaft and the nahḍa? 
I argue that both texts are literary and fictional objects, which are foundational because 
ruptural, by which I mean that both describe and aim to effect important transformations, and 
have been made foundational through how they are read. However, neither text nor figure 
founds, fathers or pioneers a “movement”—as each comes to be characterized. This is not only 
because, as I will show, the view of their relation with or within Europe differs from what is 
subsequently seen to develop, but neither text can be read apart from its efforts to engage, 
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understand, develop, and shape itself in relation to, or as part of, Europe. It is more useful to read 
these as beginning texts, rather than as founding ones. And what do they “begin” and how? I 
approach this question by taking “science” (ʿulūm and Wissenschaft) as departure points for 
considering what each text does and how it works.  
I chose “science” to begin my readings because of its central place and use in each piece, 
and because both Zunz’s Etwas and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ identify science(s) with what Europe 
currently is or is characterized by. “Sciences” also connect to questions mentioned above 
regarding the universality of Enlightenment rationality and responses to French imperialism. In 
Prussia, as in Egypt, education and science—whether the Wissenschaft of the philosophical 
disciplines, or the sciences that drive technology—are what modernizes. And in both contexts, 
the impetus for scientific development—be it intellectual, spiritual, and/or technological—was, 
at least in part, shaped by, and in reaction to, French imperialism. 
Chapters 3 and 4 highlight how differently Zunz and al-Ṭahṭāwī respond to Europe’s 
modern secular modernity. This variation is shaped by each non-Christian writer’s view of 
Europe’s Christianity as he seeks to either participate in a wider European culture and academy 
(i.e., Zunz), or learn from Europe’s advances, particularly its technological and scientific ones 
(i.e., al-Ṭahṭāwī). Despite the variation between them, both Zunz and al-Ṭahṭāwī engage and 
critique European science in their efforts to shape what Europe and their societies are to become. 
Their interventions and effects, or lack thereof, contribute to telling a part of Europe’s story as it 
unfolds in relation to its internal and external others.  
I include two appendices at the end of the dissertation. Appendix I contains my complete 
translation of Zunz’s Etwas, alongside the German taken from his Gesammelte Schriften. A 
partial translation exists in Paul R. Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz’s collection The Jew in 
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the Modern World. The most significant shortcoming of this published excerpt is that it includes 
a mere three of Zunz’s more than 80 notes. This omission has meant that many layers of the text 
have for too long been unavailable to the English reader: the scope of Zunz’s erudition; the 
expanse of the program he proposes; and, most importantly, his extensive commentary, critique, 
and reliance upon the already existent field of scholarship on rabbinic literature, built almost 
entirely by Christian scholars. I hope that others can benefit from the translation here. 
An excellent and much acclaimed English translation of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ by Daniel 
L. Newman was published in 2004. Newman’s An Imam in Paris is thorough, meticulously and 
extensively annotated, and admirably succeeds at rendering the different stylistic registers and 
genres of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Arabic into English. I can make no claims to improve upon his 
achievement. For this reason, Appendix II contains my translations only of those passages from 
Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ that I cite extensively in chapter 4. These are included alongside passages 
from the 1834 edition. I refer the English reader to Newman’s expert translation for the 
remainder of the work.
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CHAPTER 1  
The Wissenschaft des Judentums: Emancipation, Assimilation, Revolt 
 
 
The phrase Wissenschaft des Judentums (Science of Judaism) first appears in print in an 
essay from 1822, aiming to inspire readers to take up the task of building a Science of Judaism. 
Soon thereafter the term also comes to reference the nineteenth-century movement that shapes 
the field. Despite its singular name, the Wissenschaft des Judentums develops in different 
directions as exponents disagree over what practices best actualize the ideal of a Science of 
Judaism and how to bring the most benefit to society in general and German Jews in particular.1  
What the Wissenschaft des Judentums refers to is a contested matter, shaped by 
experiences, motivations and positions of those who appraise it. The treatment below illustrates 
this diversity. After reviewing twentieth-century translations and interpretations of the term I 
turns to reconsider the Wissenschaft’s beginnings and explore how and why differences within 
the movement take shape from the 1840s onward. After discussing some documents from the 
second and third decades of the nineteenth-century, I move to survey later trends in scholarship’s 
portrayals of the Wissenschaft’s motivations, characteristics and methodology. Throughout this 
review, I reflect upon disagreements, and call attention to areas of oversight. I conclude with a 
closer examination of two accounts of the movement from influential figures in the field of 
Jewish Studies: Gershom Scholem’s harsh denunciation of the movement and Susannah 
                                                
1 In this chapter, I use the English “Science of Judaism” to specify the new scientific discipline built upon the 
concept (see for example, the Immanual Wolf’s essay first published in 1822 “)Über den Begriff einer Wissenschaft 
des Judentums,” discussed below), and the German “Wissenschaft des Judentums” to refer to the movement and its 
practitioners who take up the task of building the new field. 
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Heschel’s more laudatory reappraisal. I present the positions of both and suggest how to 
productively read them together. 
Translations and Interpretations  
Translations and descriptions of what exactly the Wissenschaft des Judentums is vary 
across time and discipline, between writers and even among works by the same author or in a 
single text. The inconsistency in translation connects, in part, to challenges in interpreting and 
rendering both “Wissenschaft” and “Judentum.”   
From the mid-twentieth century, the nineteenth-century movement and field is often 
depicted as the beginning of “Jewish Studies”2 or “(modern) Jewish scholarship.”3 
“Wissenschaft” is frequently translated as “study” and qualified as scholarly,4 academic,5 or 
                                                
2 Alexander Altmann, “Jewish Studies: Their Scope and Meaning Today,” in Go and Study: Essays and Studies in 
Honor of Alfred Jospe, ed. Raphael Jospe and Samuel Z. Fishman (Washington D.C.: B’nai B’rith Hillel 
Foundations, 1980), 84; David R. Blumenthal, “Where Does ‘Jewish Studies’ Belong?” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 44.3 (1976): 541; Nahum N. Glatzer, “The Beginnings of Modern Jewish Studies,” in Essays 
in Jewish Thought (University: University of Alabama Press, 1978), 153; Susanah Heschel, “Jewish Studies as 
Counterhistory,” in Insider/Outsider: American Jews and Multiculturalism, eds. David Biale, Michael Galchinsky, 
and Susannah Heschel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 102. 
 Most of the above interpret the Wissenschaft des Judentums as what Jewish Studies resembled in the 
nineteenth-century. Christian Wiese, however, explicitly translates the Wissenschaft des Judentums as [the modern 
discipline of] “Jewish Studies.” Christian Wiese, Challenging Colonial Discourse: Jewish Studies and Protestant 
Theology in Wilhelmine Germany, trans. Barbara Harshav and Christian Wiese (Leiden: Brill, 2005). 
3 Ismar Schorsch, “Breakthrough into the Past: The Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden,” Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book 33 (1988): 3; Alfred Jospe, “The Study of Judaism in German Universities before 1933,” Leo 
Baeck Institute Year Book 27 (1982): 300; Bernard J. Bamberger, “The Beginnings of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 
Central Conference of American Rabbis 42 (1932): 209.  
4 Susannah Heschel, “Quest for the Aryan Jesus,” in Jews, Antiquity, and the Nineteenth-Century Imagination, eds. 
Hayim Lapin and Dale B. Martin (Bethesda: University of Maryland Press, 2003), 66. 
5 Ismar Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness in Modern Judaism,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 28 
(1983): 413; David Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), 124.  
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scientific.6 When rendered “science,” a note may be added to explain that the “Science” of the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums, in this context, means “scholarship” or “study.”7 “Judentum” too is 
translated in different ways, partially resulting from the wider meaning of the German term 
which may refer to “Judaism,” “Jewry,” and even some abstract “Jewishness.”8  
The perception that “Jewish Studies”9 or “Jewish scholarship”10 and the “study of 
Judaism” describe the same field is illustrated by the interchangeable use of these expressions 
across works by the same author, sometimes even in the same text.11 While a ‘Jewish study’ is 
not the same thing as ‘studying Judaism,’ this equivalence is not entirely unfounded. After all, 
the twentieth-century field of Jewish studies does have some roots in parts of the nineteenth-
                                                
6 Michael Maher, “The Beginnings of Wissenschaft Des [sic] Judentums,” in The Edward Hincks Bicentenary 
Lectures, ed. Kevin J. Cathcart (Dublin: University College Dublin, 1994), 168n1; David N. Myers, “‘From Zion 
Will Go Forth Torah’: Jewish Scholarship and the Zionist Return to History” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 
1991), v; Guiseppe Veltri, “A Jewish Luther? The Academic Dreams of Leopold Zunz,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 
7.4 (2000): 338. 
7 Such discomfort is found, for example, when Maher explains (168n1) that the Wissenschaft des Judentums is not 
easily translated, and that the English “Science of Judaism” is “translation English,” and he therefore suggests that 
“a more appropriate term might be ‘Scientific Study of Judaism.’” See also, Myers, “From Zion Will Go Forth 
Torah,” v; Mitchell Bryan Hart, Social Science and the Politics of Modern Jewish Identity (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 15; Nil Roemer, Jewish Scholarship and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Germany: Between 
History and Faith (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 3. 
8 Hart describes the evolving definition of “a science or scholarship of Judaism and Jewry (Wissenschaft des 
Judentums).” Hart, 15. Emphasis added. Cf. Michael A. Meyer, “Two Persistent Tensions within Wissenschaft des 
Judentums,” Modern Judaism 24.2 (2004): 105. 
9 For example, Susannah Heschel describes the Wissenschaft des Judentums as “Jewish Studies” in her “Jewish 
Studies as Counterhistory” and as “the scholarly study of Judaism” in her “Quest for the Aryan Jesus.”  
10 Ismar Schorsch describes the phrase as “modern Jewish scholarship” in his “Breakthrough into the Past” and 
translates it as “the academic study of Judaism” in both his articles “Emergence of Historical Consciousness” and 
“The Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” in From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism 
(Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1990), 158, 164. David N. Myers translates the Wissenschaft des Judentums as 
the “scientific study of Judaism” in his “From Zion Will Go Forth Torah” and presents it as “modern Jewish 
historical scholarship” in his Resisting History: Historicism and its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20. 
11 For example, Meyer translates the “Wissenschaft des Judentums” as “the modern critical study of Jews and 
Judaism,” which he then references as “Jewish Studies,” “Jewish scholarship,” “modern Jewish scholarship,” and 
“critical Jewish scholarship” throughout his article “Two Persistent Tensions,” 105-19. 
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century Wissenschaft des Judentums.12 However, not only are there significant distinctions 
between the fields, but eliding them in a developmental narrative obscures meaningful 
disagreements and debates within the Wissenschaft des Judentums, which will be elaborated 
below.  
One additional point regarding the variety of translations and interpretations deserves 
mention: Portrayals of the movement tend to emphasize it as historical, literary, or theological. 
The Wissenschaft des Judentums is commonly described as “Jewish historical scholarship”13 and 
identified in particular with the development of modern “Jewish historiography,”14 even though 
its founders rarely describe their work as history but as science.15 Others emphasize its method as 
historical-theological16 or as historical-philological,17 and describe its purpose as “the scientific 
                                                
12 Texts which present “Jewish Studies” at universities as achieving unrealized aims of the nineteenth-century 
Wissenschaft include: Jospe; Céline Trautmann-Waller, “Zunz and the Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des 
Judentums,” in the Yale Companion to Jewish Writing and Thought in German Culture 1096-1996, eds. Sander L. 
Gilman and Jack Zipes (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 199-204, esp. 204; Meyer, “Two Persistent 
Tensions”; Salo W. Baron, “Jewish Studies at Universities: An Early Project,” Hebrew Union College Annual 46 
(1975): 357-76. 
13 Myers, Resisting History, 20, 23; Roemer; Leon Wieseltier, “Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and 
the Inception of Modern Jewish Historiography,” History and Theory 20.2 (1981): 135. 
14 David Biale, Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 4; 
Shmuel Feiner, “Nineteenth-Century Jewish Historiography: The Second Track,” in Reshaping the Past: Jewish 
History and the Historians, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18-19, 39; idem, 
Haskalah and History: The Emergence of a Modern Jewish Historical Consciousness (Portland: Littman Library of 
Jewish Civilization, 2002), 61; Wieseltier, 135; Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor, Jewish History and Jewish 
Memory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), 84-85. 
15 Myers, Resisting History, 23. Cf. Yerushalmi, 84; Leora Batnitzky, How Judaism Became a Religion: An 
Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 34, 36. 
16 In her Foreword to Christian Wiese’s Challenging Colonial Discourse, Heschel presents two nineteenth-century 
disciplines—“Wissenschaft des Judentums” and “Protestant Theology”—alongside each other as parallel, 
comparable developments, suggesting one may read the Wissenschaft des Judentums as “Jewish Theology.” 
Throughout the piece she fluctuates between referring to its practitioners as “Jewish historians” and as “Jewish 
theologians.” 
17 Amos Funkenstein, Perceptions of Jewish History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 295. 
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investigation of Jewish history and literature”18 or less commonly as “Jewish literary studies.”19 
The dissertation aims to show that such distinctions were far from fixed, especially in writings 
from the first half of the nineteenth-century. Additionally, it will clarify how certain choices, 
such as qualifying the project as Jewish and detaching it from science, cannot be dissociated 
from later nationalist developments in the field of Jewish studies. Nationalist readings of the 
Wissenschaft tend to either overlook or disparage the movement’s early efforts to engage and 
shape science as a human universal, and not as an exclusively Jewish project.  
Beginnings: 
The Wissenschaft des Judentums begins in Berlin in the period 1818-1823. Leopold Zunz 
(1794-1886) launches its program with his Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur (Some remarks 
on rabbinic literature), a text hailed as inaugurating the Science of Judaism (though one which 
precedes the expression’s first use).20 Zunz was also a founding and active member of the Verein 
                                                
18 Max Wiener, “Jewish History and Historians,” Contemporary Jewish Record 7.3 (1944): 261. 
19 Kilcher provides an offset definition of the Wissenschaft des Judentums as “Jewish literary studies,” which he 
later qualifies as “secular.” Tellingly (as will become more clear throughout the discussion below), he makes this 
assessment by identifying the Wissenschaft des Judentums near exclusively with Leopold Zunz and Moritz 
Steinschneider. Andreas B. Kilcher, “‘Jewish Literature’ and ‘World Literature’: Wissenschaft des Judentums and 
its Concept of Literature,” in Modern Judaism and History Consciousness: Identities, Encounters, Perspectives, eds. 
Andreas Gotzman and Christian Wiese (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 301, 302. 
20 Blumenthal, 540; Ismar Elbogen, “Ein Jahrhundert Wissenschaft des Judentums,” in the Festschrift zum 50 
jährigen Bestehen der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Berlin: Philo Verlag, 1922), 107; Nahum N. 
Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz: An Account in Letters 1815-1885 (London: East and West Library, 1958), vii; 
idem, “Beginnings of Modern Jewish Studies,” 149; Maher, 141, 149; Alexander Marx, “Moritz Steinschneider,” in 
Essays in Jewish Biography (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1947), 112; Meyer, Origins of 
the Modern Jew, 162; Myers, “From Zion Will Go Forth Torah,” 4; Ismar Schorsch, “From Wolfenbüttel to 
Wissenschaft: The Divergent Paths of Isaak Markus Jost and Leopold Zunz,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 22 
(1977): 123; idem, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness,” 437; idem, “Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 
165; idem, “Breakthrough into the Past,” 18; Wiese, 79; Yerushalmi, 84; Wieseltier, 135. 
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für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden21 (Society for culture and science of the Jews, hereafter 
the Verein), an organization active from 1819-1824, among whose meetings and publications the 
term first takes shape.22 Due to the foundational status of Zunz’s Etwas, together with his 
involvement in the Verein and the high appraisal of his subsequent publications, from the second 
half of the nineteenth-century he is widely acclaimed as the founder of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums.23 
In 1823, the Verein published the first, and only, volume of the its journal, the Zeitschrift 
für die Wissenschaft des Judentums (Journal for the Science of Judaism), edited by Zunz.24 The 
                                                
21 Maher, 139-40; Michael A. Meyer, “Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums: The Positions of 
Zunz, Geiger and Frankel,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 16 (1971): 21; idem, The Origins of the Modern Jew: 
Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749-1824 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), 173; 
Schorsch, “Breakthrough into the Past,” 28; idem, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness,” 422; idem, “Ideology 
and History in the Age of Emancipation,” in The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays, by Heinrich Graetz, 
trans., ed. and introduced by Ismar Schorsh (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1974), 2; Sorkin, 
136; Max Wiener, “The Ideology of the Founders of Jewish Scientific Research,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social 
Science 5 (1950): 184-96; Yerushalmi, 83-84.  
22 Maher, 139-40; Michael A. Meyer, “Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums: The Positions of 
Zunz, Geiger and Frankel,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 16 (1971): 21; idem, The Origins of the Modern Jew: 
Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749-1824 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), 173; 
Schorsch, “Breakthrough into the Past,” 28; idem, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness,” 422; idem, “Ideology 
and History in the Age of Emancipation,” in The Structure of Jewish History and Other Essays, by Heinrich Graetz, 
trans., ed. and introduced by Ismar Schorsh (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1974), 2; Sorkin, 
136; Max Wiener, “The Ideology of the Founders of Jewish Scientific Research,” YIVO Annual of Jewish Social 
Science 5 (1950): 184-96; Yerushalmi, 83-84.  
23 Aḥad Ha-Am, “The Spiritual Revival,” in Selected Essays, trans. Leon Simon (Philadelphia: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1912), 275-76; Alexander Altman, “Zur Frühgeschichte der jüdischen Predigt in 
Deutschland: Leopold Zunz als Prediger,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 6 (1961): 4; Elbogen, “Ein Jahrhundert 
Wissenschaft des Judentums” 104; Alfred Gottschalk “Aḥad Ha-Am and Leopold Zunz: Two Perspectives on the 
“Wissenschaft des Judentums,” Judaism 29.3 (1980): 286, 293; Roemer, 10, 104-07; Gershom Scholem, “Mitokh 
Hirhurim ‘al Ḥokhmat Yisra’el,” in Devarim be-go: Pirke morashah u-teḥiyah (Tel Aviv: ʿAm ʿOved, 1975), 53; 
Gershom Scholem, “Wissenschaft vom Judentum Einst und Jetzt,” Bulletin of the Leo Baeck Institute 9 (1960): 10; 
Schorsch, “From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft,” 111; Moritz Steinschneider, Die Schriften des Dr. L. Zunz, des 
Begründers der jüdischen Wissenschaft, zu seinem 63.  Geburtstag (10 .Aug. 1857) zusammengestellt (Berlin: 
Friedländer’schen Buchdruckerei, 1857); Meyer Waxman, A History of Jewish Literature, Vol. 3 (New York: 
Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), 424.  
24 Three issues of the journal appeared—the first two in 1822 and the third bound together with the others in 1823. 
The Zeitschrift is available online at http://www.compactmemory.de.  
The first recorded use of “Wissenschaft des Judentums” appears in the Verein’s handwritten minutes, from 
a discussion of possible names for the Society during a meeting held May 27, 1821. Eduard Gans proposed “Verein 
zur Beförderung der Kultur unter den Juden und der Wissenschaft des Judentums” (Society for the Advancement of 
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Zeitschrift presents the earliest printed record of the phrase “Wissenschaft des Judentums,” both 
in its title and announced as the topic of its opening essay “Über den Begriff einer Wissenschaft 
des Judenthums” (“On the Concept of a Science of Judaism”), written by Immanuel Wolf 
(Wohlwill) and edited by Zunz. Shortly thereafter the Verein dissolved. That the Science of 
Judaism did not cease with the Zeitschrift’s disappearance and the Verein’s dissolution becomes 
credited to Zunz, the “soul”25 and “living spirit”26 of the Verein, who alone “rescued the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums…out of [its] ruins.”27 
Zunz’s Etwas from 1818 introduces the program for what the new science should entail, 
and his Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt (The Homilies of the 
Jews, Historically Developed), published in 1832, is the first work to put that program into 
practice.28 
Development and Dissension: Wissenschaft, Reform, Nationalism  
The historian Heinrich Graetz (1817-1891) is among the earliest writers to reflect on and 
appraise the Wissenschaft des Judentums. He is best known for his 11-volume comprehensive 
Jewish history Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart (History of 
the Jews from the most ancient times to the present), first published from 1853-1876. He has 
                                                                                                                                                       
Culture among the Jews and for the Science of Judaism). The chosen name of the society—Verein für Cultur und 
Wissenschaft der Juden—was accepted during a meeting on July 5, 1821. Ucko, 19. 
25 Elbogen, “Ein Jahrhundert Wissenschaft des Judentums,” 108. 
26 Scholem, “Mitokh hirhurim,” 386-87. 
27 Maher, 141. Cf. Ismar Elbogen, “Ein hundertjähriger Gedenktag unserer Wissenschaft,” Monatschrift für 
Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 66 (1922): 96; Reissner, “Rebellious Dilemma,” 193. 
28 Bamberger, “Beginnings of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 234; Gustav Karpeles, Jewish Literature and Other 
Essays (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1895), 333; Michael A. Meyer, “Wholly According to 
the Established Custom”?: The Spiritual Life of Berlin Jewry Following the Edict of 1823,” in Judaism Within 
Modernity: Essays on Jewish History and Religion (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2001), 174; Schorsch, 
“From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft,” 126; idem, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness,” 423; Waxman, 433. 
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himself been called “the most energetic, versatile, and durable practitioner of Wissenschaft des 
Judentums in the nineteenth century,” though he disparages the Berlin-centered Wissenschaft.29  
In 1870, Graetz publishes the eleventh volume of his History, entitled Die Zeit des 
wachsenden Selbstbewußtseins (The time of awakening self-consciousness), covering the years 
1750-1848. In this volume he differentiates and juxtaposes two concepts: the localized, 
apologetic, and elitist Berlin Wissenschaft des Judentums; and the more positive, national 
conception and practice that develops across German and Galician lands he calls jüdische 
Wissenschaft.30  
Graetz positively writes of how the Verein began from a desire to conspire against the 
Christian state and was driven by earnest ideals of science, freedom, and idealism. Its failure—as 
he sees it—connects to three errors: it was apologetic; it was pretentious; it misunderstood 
Judaism. The society was driven by “the false presupposition…that if the Jews would acquire 
solid education in the arts and sciences…then German hatred of the Jews would disappear all at 
once…and the state would not deny them equality” (439). “Its ostentatious wisdom was 
blinding,” and it could not see “what Judaism should mean” (442). These charges would be 
repeated by scholars over the twentieth-century, especially Zionist critics.31  
While the Verein should be credited with the aim of awakening “love for the Science of 
Judaism” (439) its leaders themselves “did not correctly know what this phrase meant, nor what 
                                                
29 Schorsch, “Ideology and History,” 1. 
30 Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart: Aus den Quellen neu 
bearbeitet, vol. 11 (Leipzig: R. Friese, 1870), 438 ff; further citations to this text will be given parenthetically above.  
These two phrases the Wissenschaft des Judentums (Science of Judaism) and jüdische Wissenschaft (Jewish 
science) both appear in nineteenth-century writings identified with the movement. Not all writers distinguish their 
meaning so clearly or significantly as does Graetz. 
31 The most well-known and oft-cited review is published by Gershom Scholem in 1944, a piece which will be 
returned to below. 
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they should do to cultivate and fertilize it” (447). Developing a meaningful enterprise required 
what Graetz calls “the Galician School,” whose development he traces to eastern central Europe, 
and in particular to two figures who wrote in Hebrew: Nachman Krochmal (1785-1840) and 
Salomon Yehudah Rapoport (ShIR) (1790-1867). Even though the Verein’s productions precede 
those coming from Galicia chronologically, Graetz argues that the “fruitful conversations 
between Krochmal and Rapoport” represent “the birth of Jewish science from its historical 
standpoint” (494). Counter to the work coming out of Berlin, their researches, undertaken with 
love and warmth, should be considered “as national acts and not as products of idle erudition” 
(495). He sees Krochmal and Rapoport as realizing authentic Judaism, which recognizes, 
understands, and preserves the national dimensions of Judaism alongside the religious. While he 
cannot but admire Zunz’s Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge, he mitigates praise for its author by 
highlighting the overwhelming influence of Rapoport upon the work (497).32 
Graetz’s antipathy towards the Berlin Wissenschaft connects to his aversion to Jewish 
Reform; after all “nothing could sprout forth from Berlin’s ground, silted [as it was] by [the early 
reformists] Friedländer and Jacobson” (447). Reform entails “the christianization of Judaism,” a 
process and program Graetz commits to fight against “to [his] last breath and with all the 
                                                
32 A commonly cited story of Zunz and Graetz’s first meeting illustrates tension between the two men: Graetz was 
introduced to Zunz, in the home of Michael Sachs, as the author of a Jewish history. Zunz asked pointedly “Another 
history of the Jews?” To which Graetz replied, “Certainly, but this time a Jewish history!” The earliest description I 
have found of this story is in an article by Philipp Bloch, “Heinrich Graetz: Ein Lebenbild” Monatsschrift für die 
Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 48.5 (1904): 314. 
 Graetz included a snub against Zunz in the preface to the first edition of the fifth volume of his Geschichte 
der Juden, which was removed from subsequent editions: “Dr. Zunz’ mehr verwirrender als aufhellender 
Notizenkram und dürre Nomenclaturen haben meine Arbeit nur wenig gefördert” (Dr. Zunz’s more confounding 
than illuminating pile of notes and dry nomenclatures have been of little help to my work). Heinrich Graetz, 
Geschichte der Juden vom Abschluss des Talmud (500) bis zum Aufblühen der jüdisch-spanischen Cultur (1027) 
(Magdeburg: A. Falckenberg, 1860), vi. 
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weapons at [his] command.”33 Graetz’s position against Reform shapes the whole of his lifelong 
work, and is directed most severely against another prominent figure of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums: Abraham Geiger (1810-1874).34 In Geiger’s hands, Graetz accuses, science was not 
an aim in itself, but rather “the means to empty Judaism of its content and its distinctiveness” 
(503).  
From the 1840s Zunz too, whose earlier writings buttress reform, came to severely 
criticize Reform’s “Wissenschaft,” on similar grounds. In an essay defending circumcision, at a 
time when some Reformers were advocating eliminating the practice, Zunz criticizes the 
renunciation of the Talmud and the Messiah, and likens abolishing circumcision to cutting the 
life of Judaism in two, adding “suicide is not reform.”35 The following year Zunz publishes his 
collection of essays Zur Geschichte und Literatur (1845). Towards the end of its first essay, “On 
Jewish Literature,” Zunz asserts that “our science should first of all emancipate itself from the 
[Reform] theologians,”36 because they make science into a handmaiden of theology, which is 
incompatible with the pursuit of truth. Though he does not publicly rebuke Geiger, in his private 
correspondence Zunz dismisses Geiger’s lengthy review of the 1845 work, since “party people 
lose judgment.”37 In another letter he describes a new Reform prayer book as “making a strange 
                                                
33 Schorsch, “Ideology and History,” 31, citing S. Unna, “Briefe von H. Grätz an Raphael Kirchheim,” Jahrbuch der 
jüdische-literarischen Gesellschaft 12 (1918): 320. 
34 Ibid. 
35 “Gutachten über die Beschneidung,” first published in 1844, and reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin, Louis 
Gerschel Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1876), 2: 199. Geiger writes a letter to Zunz inquiring about this essay and 
expressing his surprise and disappointment. That letter and Zunz’s reply are printed in Geiger’s Nachgelassene 
Schriften, 5:180-85. 
36 Leopold Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin: Veit und Comp., 1845), 20. 
37 From a letter to Philipp Ehrenberg in 1845, printed in Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 132. 
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impression on a Jew,” for it seems to him to be stamped with either “hidden or open 
Christianity.”38  
The debates and issues connected with Reform are too large to delve into here. However, 
by at least pointing to these, this section calls attention to the development of divergent positions 
among Wissenschaft practitioners, especially from the 1840s onwards. At the center of these 
differences is the question of what delimits and comprises the unity of Judaism as a singular 
historical phenomenon. What is Judaism and what should it be, to whom does and should this 
matter, and what can science say and do about it? For Graetz, as he lays out in an essay from 
1846 Die Construction der jüdischen Geschichte, the foundation and unity of Judaism is its 
national history; it is a social structure with religious and political dimensions.39 For Geiger, the 
progression and development of religious ideas and principles unify and circumscribe Judaism 
throughout its history. For Zunz, literature is the foundation and justification for the unity of 
Judaism, which sustains the Jews. 
A Note on the Language of Scholarship 
Graetz’s discussion of the German and Galician schools, both of which contribute to the 
development of “Jewish Science,” presents German and non-German scholarship in the 
nineteenth century as a unified collective enterprise, undertaken by and for Jews, though 
composed of different strands. Following Graetz, in the first half of the twentieth-century it is 
common to find Hebrew and German figures placed alongside each other, as builders of the same 
                                                
38 Letter to Philipp Ehrenberg, printed in Glatzer, Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 139. 
39 Ismar Schorsch has translated and introduced this work in a collection, The Structure of Jewish History and Other 
Essays (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1974). 
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Wissenschaft des Judentums (Elbogen 1922; Bamberger 1932; Waxman 1936).40 This trend 
shifts by mid-century, as scholarship emphasizes the role of German writers and texts as shaping 
and constituting the nineteenth-century Wissenschaft (Scholem 1944; Altman 1958; Glatzer 
1964; Meyer 1971, 2004).41  
It is not until the last quarter of the twentieth-century that Hebrew and German 
nineteenth-century writings are separated, and the relation between them theorized. For example, 
Ismar Schorsch (1974, 1983) distinguishes between Hebrew (e.g., Rapoport in Galicia and 
Samuel David Luzatto (ShaDaL) in Italy) and German scholarship, identifying the former as part 
of the haskalah (Enlightenment), a development beginning from the mid-eighteenth century by 
the figure and followers of Moses Mendelssohn, and the latter as a break from it, shaped by the 
extended process of partial emancipation which influenced and shaped nineteenth-century 
German-Jewish scholarship in particular.42 Shmuel Feiner (1994, 2002) likewise distinguishes 
between the two, though refutes the position that the Wissenschaft des Judentums represents an 
innovative break from the more traditional haskalah.43 Rather, he argues, that the Wissenschaft 
des Judentums and the haskalah represent two developmental fronts for “modern Jewish 
                                                
40 Elbogen, “Ein Jahrhundert Wissenschaft des Judentums,” 108ff; Bamberger, “Beginnings of Modern Jewish 
Scholarship”; Waxman. These accounts emphasize three writers in particular: Nahman Krochmal and Solomon 
Yehudah Rapoport in Galicia (as described by Graetz above) and Samuel David Luzatto (ShaDaL) (1800-1865) in 
Italy. 
41 Altman, “Jewish Studies”; Glatzer, “Beginnings of Modern Jewish Scholarship”; Meyer, “Jewish Religious 
Reform”; idem, “Two Persistent Tensions.” 
Scholem, intriguingly, chooses the Hebrew term “ḥokhmat yisrael” to refer exclusively to nineteenth-
century German-Jewish scholarship, from which he excludes the writings of Nahman Krochmal. Scholem, “Mitokh 
hirhurim,” 389-90. His essay will be discussed below. 
42 Schorsch, “Ideology and History”; idem, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness.”  
43 In particular, Feiner identifies the birth of modern historical consciousness, if not historiography, from the 
haskalah (in his Haskalah and History, 2002) and describes the eighteenth-century maskil as “the modern, secular 
Jewish intellectual” (in his “Seductive Science and the Emergence of the Secular Jewish Intellectual,” Science in 
Context 15.1 (2002): 121-135).  As will be described below, both innovations (i.e. historical consciousness and a 
secular approach to texts) are most often credited to the Wissenschaft des Judentums.  
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awareness,” responding to different ideologies: the haskalah first developed in German circles, 
among those who were struggling for internal reforms in Jewish society; the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums was born several decades later among German Jews, whose struggle was then 
emancipation.44 The latter were, for the most part, trained in the Prussian universities and not in 
the beit midrash as were the maskilim (the Enlighteners), and correspondingly for them the 
language of scholarship was German, and not Hebrew. Both Schorsch and Feiner emphasize how 
neither the haskalah nor the Wissenschaft des Judentums developed in isolation from the other 
and that Hebrew and German scholars read and responded to works in both languages.  
David Myers (1991, 2003) adds to the discussion by offering a corrective to scholarship 
from the early- and mid-twentieth century, which designated nineteenth-century German and 
Hebrew research by the same long-standing Hebrew term ḥokhmat yisra’el (“the wisdom of 
Israel”).45 He argues that nineteenth-century Hebrew scholarship from Galicia and Italy should 
be distinguished as ḥokhmat yisra’el, whose roots are in the haskalah and in earlier Jewish 
writings, in contrast to the German Wissenschaft des Judentums, which responds to the particular 
crises of emancipation and assimilation affecting German Jews in the nineteenth-century.46 
Myers contends that the Wissenschaft des Judentums is a unique development responding to the 
“age of anxiety” afflicting German Jewry as it struggled to obtain equal rights while preserving 
                                                
44 See his “Nineteenth-Century Jewish Historiography” (1994), where Feiner describes the contemporary 
coincidence of two different tracks within modern Jewish historiography: the “high” or “higher” German elite 
scholarship of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, and the Hebrew historiography of Eastern (primarily Galician) 
maskilim (the Enlighteners). 
45 This term will again appear in the discussion below of Gershem Scholem’s 1944 essay “Mitokh Hirhurim ‘al 
Ḥokhmat Yisra’el,” to which Myers’ critique responds. Scholem’s idiosyncratic use of ḥokhmat yisrael 
encompasses only nineteenth-century German scholarship, and excludes Hebrew writings of that century. 
46 Myers, “From Zion” 1-51; idem, Resisting 20-21. 
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Jewish identity, and that contemporary Hebrew (i.e. ḥokhmat yisra’el) writings, belong to a 
different context and tradition.  
This dissertation treats only German scholarship as part of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums, which is not to discount the connections and influences between writers and texts in 
Hebrew and in German, during the nineteenth-century. It is important to realize that most 
Wissenschaft leaders were able to write in Hebrew and used Hebrew for certain texts and 
contexts. That the Wissenschaft des Judentums chose to write in German, and not in Hebrew, or 
another “Jewish” language, reflects its aim to reach an audience including non-Jews. Those who 
would conflate Hebrew and German scholarship under a single Wissenschaft des Judentums or 
ḥokhmat yisra’el, overlook or diminish the significance of Wissenschaft efforts to engage non-
Jewish society, regardless of the effectiveness and outcomes of such endeavors. 
From the Verein’s Founding (1819) to the Science of Judaism (1822) 
The first recorded use of the term “Wissenschaft des Judentums” is from May 1821, in 
the Verein’s minutes.47 In 1822 the new concept and science appears in print, announced to the 
public in the article opening the inaugural issue of the Verein’s journal, Immanuel Wolf’s 
“Ueber den Begriff einer Wissenschaft des Judenthums” (“On the Concept of a Science of 
Judaism”). 
The discussion below begins from a speech delivered by Joel Abraham List in 1819, at 
the meeting that founds the Verein. His address illustrates concerns motivating those who would 
build the new field a few years later. The Verein formalizes its aims and activities in 1821, with 
the approval of its statutes. One can view these as a bridge connecting List’s idealistic speech to 
                                                
47 Ucko, “Geistesgeschichliche,” 19. See 21-22n24 above. 
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Wolf’s programmatic essay. The section below concludes by examining “the concept of a 
Science of Judaism,” as articulated by Wolf.48 
On the 7th of November, 1819, Joel Abraham List delivers a speech to six young 
university-educated men in his apartment.49 He calls this group together to found a society, in 
order to avert an existential crisis threatening the Jews’ survival.50 He describes this danger as a 
consequence of transformed relations between the state and its Jewish subjects who now seek to 
become its citizens, and between Jews and non-Jews. He traces this development to the 
Enlightenment, and to increased interactions between Jews and non-Jews. List views these 
changes as “a natural outcome of the development of reason” and one which is positive—so long 
as the nation’s “ancient uniformity (altes Einerlei) dissolves into a rational multiplicity 
(vernünftiges Vielerlei).” He fears the transformation underway may cause the collectivity to 
disappear. To prevent this loss, the nation needs to integrate in a manner that preserves itself 
among others.  
Throughout his speech List uses the collective first person and addresses the Jews as “our 
nation.” He searches for the essential bond which creates and sustains the nation, so that this may 
be protected and nourished. List explains how this cannot be “our venerable religion” (unsere 
ehrwürdige Religion), even if this was once one of the elements which held the nation together.51 
This is because all positive religions err, and especially because the severity of its laws are 
                                                
48 There are many significant parallels and connections between the “Science of Judaism” Wolf articulates in 1822 
(in a piece edited by Zunz, as mentioned above) and what Zunz advocates in 1818 (see chapter 3 of the dissertation) 
and calls “our science.” However, if one is to speak of the first self-conscious articulation and introduction to the 
“Science of Judaism,” this must begin from Wolf’s piece, where it is named. 
49 The seven founding members were: Isaac Levin Auerbach, Dr. Eduard Gans, Joseph Hillmar, Isaac Marcus Jost, 
Joel Abraham List, Moses Moser, and Leopold Zunz. Ucko, 5. 
50 This is printed in Ucko, 9-11. All citations here are from 10-11. 
51 No where does List refer to this religion as Judaism, or Jewish. 
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destructively divisive. On one hand there are those who stubbornly adhere to the law, and on the 
other, those who frivolously and violently cast it off. This has caused a schism within the nation 
and even the real defection of some. Without intervention, conversion, he predicts, will only 
become more common and striking with time.  
After explaining that religion cannot be the bond, List arrives what this has always been 
and what it can now only be: “[W]e feel and we recognize that what is particular to our nation is 
our pure nationality (unsere reine Nationalität), not mere fruit of the times, not a passing 
phenomenon.” Preserving the nation requires developing awareness of its nationality and 
dissociating and detaching this from religion, especially from “rabbinism.” Accordingly, List 
enunciates two goals for society: First, it must spread the “true idea of our inner unity” and 
actualize this.52 Second, it must topple rabbinism (Rabbinismus), which “disfigures and 
degenerates the nation.”  
List’s proposal portrays the present as a transformative moment, which requires Jews to 
become what they have always essentially been—a nation, held together by feeling, sentiment, 
and awareness of itself as a nation. He distinguishes nationality, as internal and permanent, from 
religion, as external and transient. Aside from “toppling Rabbinism” the content to the changes 
he seeks are vague, and the method absent.  
List’s cofounders share his idealism, his concern with effecting the Jews’ proud 
integration with and simultaneous distinction from non-Jewish society, his antipathy towards a 
legalistic Judaism disparagingly referred to as “rabbinism,” and his preference for describing the 
                                                
52 He mentions (Ucko, 11) the intellectual, industrial, and civil improvement of the Jews (à la Dohm) as secondary 
aims, which the Society need not address for these are concerns of all of humankind and the duty of governments 
under which Jews live. 
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Jews’ particularity as national and not religious.53 Still, it would not be until 1821 that its 
members work out the organizational form and activities the society should take. From Eduard 
Gans’ assumption of its presidency in March of 1821, through the last quarter of 1823, the 
Verein puts its ideas into action. The destructive aim of toppling Rabbinism is replaced by the 
constructive goal of educating Jews through scientific—and decidedly non-religious—
educational activities.  
Minutes from a meeting held on December 22, 1821 speak to this development. Isaac 
Levin Auerbach proposes that “religion” should be taught as a subject in the Verein’s school. 
Members present statements in favor and against the proposal before it is brought to a vote. 
Arguments supporting teaching religion focus on the need to counter conversion, by responding 
to the appeal and abuse of Christian writings and showing that Judaism can be as rational and 
philosophical as Christianity. Nowadays Jewish youths usually read only Christian writings on 
such subjects as God, immortality, determination, etc., whereas they should know that “their 
religion” also solves these problems. As more Jews are becoming baptized, it is especially 
important for the school to teach a pure, national Judaism. The main arguments against the 
measure are voiced by Zunz, who emphasizes that teaching religion is impossible because Jewish 
religion cannot be taught in a classroom, but only instilled though one’s upbringing at home. The 
school’s focus must be on purely scientific instruction, which precludes religion.54 The proposal 
is narrowly defeated. In the end general agreement is reached that the “Jewish character” of the 
school would be secured by introducing Hebrew as a subject.55 It is worth emphasizing that those 
                                                
53 On the Verein and views of its founding members, see Schorsh, “Breakthrough into the Past,” esp. 10-17. 
54 Ucko prints this discussion from the protocol,  17-19. 
55 Ucko, 17. 
 
33 
who advocate teaching “religion” (e.g., Wolf, Schönberg, and Marcus), are driven by a two-fold 
ambition: the need to guard against the appeal and abuse of Christian writings, which leads to 
conversion; the desire to show that Judaism can be as rational and philosophical as Christianity.  
The Verein’s statutes confirm that its activities are to be limited to the “purely scientific” 
(das rein wissenschaftliche).56 These were published in 1822 and enunciate the society’s self-
conception as well as its outlook and goal. The Verein represents itself as a select group of 
educated Jews who have taken it upon themselves to work towards the idealistic and pragmatic 
goals of bringing the Jews “into harmony with the age and the states in which they live.” They 
open by emphasizing the Jews’ separation from Europe and calling on them to integrate. In order 
to lead Jews to “the same standpoint that the rest of the European world (die übrige europäische 
Welt) has reached,” the Verein urgently demands “a complete reworking of the peculiar 
education and life’s purpose (eigenthümlichen Bildung und Lebensbestimmung) that still endures 
among the Jews.” It seeks reform and works towards this goal through the following activities: 
operating a scientific institute, at which lectures are presented; maintaining an archive for 
correspondence pertaining to Jews and Judaism; operating a school for poor Jewish boys; and 
publishing a journal. The latter’s aim is threefold: to enlighten the Jews about their 
circumstances and needs; to exert a reforming influence upon the proper study of these; and to 
prescribe, in general, the direction through which to better strive for Jews and Judaism. 
The inaugural issue of the Verein’s journal, the Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des 
Judentums, appears later in 1822. As mentioned above, this marks the earliest appearance in 
print of the expression “Wissenschaft des Judentums.” Zunz’s editorial foreword introduces its 
                                                
56 The Verein’s statutes are reprinted in their entirety in Edith Lutz, Der “Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der 
Juden” und sein Mitglied H. Heine (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1997), 273-83. 
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lead article as a first attempt “to state what such a science means.”57 From the opening sentence 
of Wolf’s essay, he brings the concern of clarifying what “Judaism” is to the fore: 
When speaking of a Science of Judaism, it is self evident that here the word “Judenthum” 
is taken in its most comprehensive meaning, as comprising the whole relations, 
particularities and achievements of the Jews, in reference to religion, philosophy, history, 
legal system, literature in general, civil life and all human affairs—but not in that more 
limited sense, in which it means only the religion of the Jews.58   
Wolf reinforces what the Verein began articulating: Judaism, which defines the Jews, 
encompasses something far greater than what is presently understood as “religion.” Two aims are 
at work in this passage. First, Wolf dissociates Judaism from religion and makes it able to outlive 
religion. In the current post-Enlightenment age of reason, rational knowledge is distinguished 
from and elevated above religious beliefs. As described by List above, now that all positive, 
which is to say revealed, religions are known to err, “religion” cannot be what makes the Jew a 
Jew, less the foundation for his existence be faulty. Second, because “science” now supercedes a 
thing called “religion” as the means to ascertain truth, it falls to Wolf to prove that Judaism is an 
entity suited to be made into the object of a science. By emphasizing its “comprehensive 
meaning” which encapsulates all human affairs, he begins laying the groundwork for his case. 
 More than half of Wolf’s essay describes and explains Judaism, justifying it as an object 
worthy for treatment by science. He produces Judaism’s central precept—“the idea of the 
absolute unity in the universe (die Idee der unbedingten Einheit im All)”—and emphasizes that 
its presence throughout world history and influence upon human civilization are indisputable (2-
                                                
57 Zunz writes (iii): “One has attempted to state what such a Science [of Judaism] means in the essay which opens 
this present volume; gradually, however, complete insights will consider that which is given [in this essay] as 
approximations and as attempts.”  
58 Immanuel Wolf, “Ueber den Begriff einer Wissenschaft des Judentums,” Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des 
Judentums (1823): 1; further citations to this essay will be made parenthetically in the text above.  
 An English translation was published as “On the Concept of a Science of Judaism (1822),” trans. Lionel E. 
Kochan, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 2 (1957): 194-204. All translations here are my own. 
 
35 
3). Through this idea, Wolf credits Judaism with realizing the philosophical base of universalism, 
an honor which confirms its suitability to science, for “the essence of science is universality (das 
Wesen der Wissenschaft ist Allgemeinheit)” (21). 
 Wolf clarifies that the central idea of absolute unity has carried and sustained Judaism 
throughout its development, though this is not all that Judaism represents. Judaism is also “an 
idiosyncratic, independent whole” (2), which has existed since the Jewish people first lost its 
external autonomy and found “its own inner independence, its nationality,” in its peculiar 
religious world (5). Jewish religion became an expression of its national life, once the people’s 
political sovereignty ended. Wolf suggests that this dual dimension of Judaism, which connects it 
to the human spirit in general and to the Jewish people in particular, justifies the new field of the 
“Science of Judaism.”  
Judaism needs to be investigated from the standpoint of science. Until now, it has been 
treated theologically, by both Jewish and Christian scholars. Regardless of intention, theology is 
biased, whereas science is objective. Science aims at nothing other than revealing its object as it 
is. Unlike theology “it needs to serve no use other than itself.” The human spirit needs and 
pursues it because it works for the truth. Paradoxically, every science—including the Science of 
Judaism—exerts “the most meaningful influence not only on other sciences, but also on life” 
precisely because science is unswayed by external influences (17-18). 
 Wolf describes two ways in which the Science of Judaism may benefit the living: The 
first of these pertains to Europe’s relation to the Jews. Because “science alone is elevated above 
the partisanship, passions and prejudices of ignoble life,” the outcomes of the Science of 
Judaism—namely the acquisition of “scientific knowledge of Judaism” (die wissenschaftliche 
Kunde des Judenthums)—is what must adjudicate on the merit or demerit of the Jews, on their 
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capacity or incapacity to be positioned and valued the same as other citizens (23). Only science 
can be trusted to discern the truth regarding Judaism’s essential nature, and consequently it is 
what is needed to effectively address the issues surrounding Jews’ citizenship and rights. 
 The second benefit this Science will serve, pertains to the Jews themselves and their 
relation to and within Europe. Wolf claims that Judaism’s central idea is again striving to 
develop itself in accord with the spirit of the times. This can only happen through the means of 
science, for “the standpoint of scientificity (der Standpunkt der Wissenschaftlichkeit)” is the 
characteristic of the present age. The Jews must elevate themselves together with their principle 
through the Science of Judaism. This will facilitate their incorporation into European society, for 
“science” is “the standpoint of the European life” (der Standpunkt der Wissenschaft…ist der 
Standpunkt des Europäischen Lebens). He closes the essay with a statement of great optimism 
for a future unified through the progress of the universal: “If a bond is to wrap around the whole 
of humankind, it will be the bond of science, the bond of pure rationality, the bond of truth” (24). 
List’s speech from 1819 identified a crisis but not a program. Wolf’s essay announces the 
“Science of Judaism” as the solution needed to facilitate the Jews’ productive transformation. 
The Science of Judaism will enable Jews to integrate with Europe (and Europe with the Jews), 
without sacrificing their particularity, because it can reveal Judaism and the Jewish people’s 
development for what they truly are, and thereby correct errors and eliminate discord. Further, it 
will demonstrate Judaism’s longstanding influence upon Europe, showing how the Jewish is 
integral to what the new Europe is yet to become. Wolf describes the present as a changing time 
for both the Jews and Europe and it is science that promises to progress both together. In a post-
Enlightenment Europe, science is the only truly objective method, able to generate consensus 
and arrive at truth. A theological method is antiquated, inaccurate, inherently biased and 
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consequently divisive; it could never arrive at a suitable response to the matter of Jewish 
emancipation.59 
Recounting Motivations of the Wissenschaft des Judentums:  
The following two sections turn to consider aspects of how the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums has been portrayed, referring largely to writings by twentieth-century American 
academics in the area of Jewish Studies. 
Most narratives of the emergence of the Wissenschaft des Judentums mention it as a 
reaction against the rising tide of anti-Jewish sentiment and action which surfaced in Prussia 
following Napoleon’s defeat in 1815.60 It is less common to explore its deep roots within the 
intellectual milieu of the new German University, even though Ismar Schorsch has called it “a 
direct offshoot” of that University.61 Recently, Leora Batnitzky has called attention to the 
significance of the movement’s birth in Prussia, where emancipation was a long drawn out 
process over the course of five decades, during which social and civil rights granted to Jews were 
                                                
59 As Steven Schapin and Simon Schaffer have shown, “solutions to the problem of knowledge are embedded within 
practical solutions ot the problem of social order,” and vice versa, for “the problem of political order always 
involves solutions to the problem of knowledge.” “Science” as the means to arrive at “true knowledge” of a thing, is 
powerful not because it reveals things as they are, but because it does so in such a way that establishes consensus 
around “matters of fact.” Leviathan and the Air-Pump (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 15, 21.  
60 Ismar Schorsch describes the revocation of rights over the first half of the nineteenth-century following the 
Restoration, particularly as these connect to university employment. Ismar Schorsch, “The Religious Parameters of 
Wissenschaft: Jewish Academics at Prussian Universities,” in From Text to Context (Hanover: Brandeis University 
Press, 1994), 51-70. 
 A ubiquitous event across accounts of the Verein’s founding is the Hep Hep! riots of 1819, used to illustrate 
anti-Jewish violence shaping the Wissenschaft des Judentums’ apologetics. 
61 See his “Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 161. 
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partial and precarious.62 This differs, for example, from France where Jews were granted full 
citizenship rights in 1791 and from eastern Europe where the modern state did not yet exist.63 
Scholem, Myers, Schorsch and others emphasize how the Science of Judaism was a tool 
to pursue equal rights, in an age when German Jews sought emancipation.64 This period 
generated a crisis or search for identity, as Jews reevaluated what characterized themselves as 
Jews, while seeking to integrate with Europe.65 “Assimilation” is a common trope alongside 
emancipation, as the path trod by Wissenschaft practitioners en route to their ultimate goal: the 
acquisition of equal rights.66 Others claim precisely the opposite, arguing that the Science of 
Judaism sought “to stem the ignorance of the ‘assimilationist.’”67 As mentioned in the preceding 
section, the Verein was driven in part to prevent Jewish baptisms. Nonetheless, literature 
describing the society disparages its commitment to Judaism, often illustrated by calling 
attention to the conversion of several of its members following the society’s dissolution.68 
                                                
62 Schorsh also emphasizes the importance of this dimension of the Prussian context for shaping the Wissenschaft’s 
program and development, in his “Ideology and History.” 
63 Batnitzky, 5. 
64 Biale, Gershom Scholem, 18-19; idem, “Confessions of an Historian of Jewish Culture,” Jewish Social Studies, 
New Series, 1.1 (1994): 42; Hart, 15; David N. Myers, “The Ideology of Wissenschaft des Judentums,” in History of 
Jewish Philosophy, eds. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (New York: Routledge, 1997), 629; Schorsch, 
“Ideology and History,” 54; idem, “From Wolfenbüttel to Wissenschaft,” 123. 
65 Blumenthal, 540; Hart, 15; Steven M. Lowenstein, The Berlin Jewish Community: Enlightenment, Family, and 
Crisis, 1770-1830 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 145; David N. Myers, Re-inventing the Jewish Past: 
European Jewish Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 19; 
Wiener, “Ideology and History,” 187; Wieseltier, 144. 
66 Robert J. Baird, “Boys of the Wissenschaft,” in Judaism Since Gender, ed. Miriam Peskowitz and Laura Levitt 
(New York: Routledge, 1997), 88; Salo W. Baron, “I. M. Jost the Historian,” Proceedings of the American Academy 
for Jewish Research 1 (1928-1930): 12; Biale, “Confessions of a Historian of Jewish Culture,” 42; Scholem, 
“Mitokh hirhurim,” 402; Yerushalmi, 85. 
67 Jospe, 300. 
68 See Graetz’s discussion of the “Culturverein” in his chapter “Reform and Young Israel”; Meyer, “Emergence of 
Modern Jewish Historiography,” 171; Myers, Reinventing the Jewish Past, 18. 
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What this science is and why some German Jews in the 1820s argue it provides the best 
method to investigate Judaism can be explored more deeply. It is not only a tool to achieve equal 
rights, but it is the tool of choice. The Wissenschaft’s program, at least initially, connects to the 
desire to engage and shape non-Jewish society, so clearly present at its founding. Later critics 
disregard or discredit this drive as apologetics,69 and connect it to the overused and 
underinterrogated charge of assimilation. Assimilation, as it is generally employed, implies a 
problematic sense of authenticity that not only essentializes peoples, but which deters a 
meaningful consideration of what “assimilation” is. Instead, efforts by Jews (and non-Jews) to 
direct what Europe would become are overlooked, and scholarship presumes a fixity to both 
Europe and the Jews which may not have then been present, nor pass undisputed. Jews are 
imagined to face two options: either stay who they are and remain apart from the rest of Europe 
or relinguish their distinct nature and become European. This assumption is a teleological, 
nationalist one. The practitioners of the Wissenschaft des Judentums at least imagined something 
else could be possible.  
Characteristics and Methodology of the Wissenschaft des Judentums 
In the first half of the twentieth-century, the Science of Judaism becomes hailed as 
entirely innovative: “The new Wissenschaft des Judentums…was not an improved form of 
Jewish science, but a completely new beginning.”70 It is “an attitude which in itself was a new 
                                                
69 Altman, “Jewish Studies,” 84, 90; Graetz, 439; Maher, 140; Meyer, Origins of the Modern Jew, 174; Scholem, 
“Mitokh hirhurim, 396-97; Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness,” 419. 
70 Fritz Bamberger, “Zunz’s Conception of History: A Study of the Philosophic Elements in Early Science of 
Judaism,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 11 (1941): 6. Original emphasis. 
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stage in historical development.”71 It “represents a break with the old knowledge (Wissen) for it 
demands a fundamental difference in method.”72 Appraisals such as these understand the field 
and movement as illustrating historical rupture. Jewish science may have existed before 1822, or 
1818, but what that “science” was is seen as entirely different from what develops out of the 
Verein and over the nineteenth-century.  
The Wissenschaft’s method reflects what Michel Foucault describes as the birth of 
historical philology in the modern episteme.73 Its practices are distinguished as historical and 
philological, which are inseparable from each other in the first decades of the nineteenth-century. 
The new science of philology inspired how the Wissenschaft sought to systematically and 
comprehensively gather and read texts, for suddenly any text referencing any Jewish matter, 
whatever the topic and whomever the author, becomes a historical source.74 This view of 
literature differentiates it from “traditional” scholarship which maintained a distinction between 
sacred and profane texts, and read them differently.75 From the Wissenschaft, texts were 
collected and made into a literature, namely Jewish literature, an object used to historicize the 
Jewish people and Judaism,76 and situate both within “world history.”77  
                                                
71 Wiener, “Ideology of the Founders,” (1950), 184. 
72 Elbogen, “Ein Jahrhundert Wissenschaft des Judentums,” (1922), 104. Cf. Maher, 139. 
73 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). 
74 Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness.”  
75 Schorsch, “Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,”161, 163; idem, “Ideology and History,” 6; Yerushalmi, 86. 
76 Altmann, “Jewish Studies”; Bamberger, “Zunz’s Conception of History”; Biale, Gershom Scholem; Roemer; 
Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness”; Wieseltier; Yerushalmi. 
77 Altman, “Jewish Studies,” 89; Bamberger, “Zunz’s Conception of History,” 6, 14; Biale, Gershom Scholem, 16; 
Feiner, “Nineteenth-Century Jewish Historiography,” 17; Hart; Roemer; Schorsch, “Ethos of Modern Jewish 
Scholarship,” 162; Cf. Ismar Schorsch, “History as Consolation,” in From Text to Context: The Turn to History in 
Modern Judaism (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1994), 337; Perrine Simon-Nahum, “Wissenschaft des 
Judentums in Germany and the Science of Judaism in France in the Nineteenth Century: Tradition and Modernity in 
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Its focus on science and on historicization became interpreted from the mid-twentieth 
century as secular and effecting secularization.78 However, disagreement exists over what the 
Wissenschaft secularizes, be it “Jewish history,”79 “the Jews,”80 or “Judaism.”81 This confusion 
connects, in part, to the meaning the term “secular” has come to have and its implied 
oppositional relation to “religious.” 
Michael Meyer critiques the view of the Wissenschaft as secular. He highlights the irony 
that the Wissenschaft des Judentums, “for all its novelty and even iconoclasm,” was, “for most of 
its history,” a “predominantly…religious enterprise.”82 This statement, which he defends by 
pointing out how most of its practitioners were rabbis who used the Science of Judaism to 
construct their theological positions, implies that the “religious” represents continuity and 
excludes the iconoclast. Comparing Jews and non-Jews, David Myers focuses on the religious as 
something new, and juxtaposes it not against the secular but against the national. Whereas “their 
non-Jewish contemporaries,” focused on building the national community, Myers describes how 
nineteenth-century German Jews used the Science of Judaism to set the boundaries of “the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Jewish Scholarship,” in Jewish Emancipation Reconsidered: The German and French Models, eds. Michael 
Brenner, Vicki Caron, and Uri R. Kaufmann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 39; Wieseltier, 137-38; Yerushalmi.  
Cf. Funkenstein, Perceptions, 295. 
78 Bamberger, “Zunz’s Conception of History,” 7-8; Biale, Gershom Scholem, 10; Blumenthal, 543; Wieseltier, 138-
39; Schorsch, “Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 163.  
Uncomfortable with how the Wissenschaft is derogatorily described as “secularization” for destroying the 
“normative character of Jewish tradition” (7), Bamberger attempts to adjust this appraisal. He asserts that it “is not 
secularism as such [?] which characterizes the innovation in Zunz’s Science of Judaism. Zunz’s secularization is 
historization.” “Zunz’s Conception of History,” 8. 
79 Schorsch, “Ideology and History,” 5; Yerushalmi. 
80 Myers, “From Zion Will Go Forth Torah,” 337n5, citing Max Wiener’s Die jüdische Religion im Zeitalter der 
Emanzipation. 
81 Ucko, 17, 19-20. 
82 Meyer, “Two Persistent Tensions,” 105. 
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Religionsgemeinschaft—a community defined by religious affiliation.”83 Batnitzky explains how 
this came to be. She calls attention to the seemingly paradoxical observation that even if the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums initially “sought to free the study of Jewish history from the 
authority and self-understanding of Jewish tradition…[and to] secularize Judaism,” in practice it 
worked to help “crystallize Judaism’s new standing as a religion.”84 Her work argues that the 
secular and the religious are two sides of the same particularly modern coin. Premodern Judaism 
and Jewishness encompassed religion, nationality, and culture. It is only with the onset of 
modernity, which Batnitzky defines as “the acquisition of citizenship rights for Jews,” that 
German Jews make Judaism into a “modern religion in a Protestant sense,” through their efforts 
to demonstrate its compatibility with the requirements of the modern nation-state.85 
It is worth noting that in her discussion of the Wissenschaft des Judentums, Batnitzky, 
like Meyers, focuses only on rabbis. She does not include two important figures from the 
Wissenschaft’s first and second generation, namely Leopold Zunz and Moritz Steinschneider 
(1816-1907). Both men were prolific and influential, though neither’s works illustrate the 
arguments of Meyer, Myers, or Batnitzky. Their object of research was the history of Jewish 
literature and they agreed the university was the only appropriate setting for Jewish studies, not 
exclusively Jewish institutions whose main function was training rabbis. Both too expressed 
great reservations regarding Reform, in the German-Jewish debates of the nineteenth century. 
Here then, one sees part of what differentiates those who depict the Wissenschaft as a “religious” 
                                                
83 Myers, Re-inventing the Jewish Past, 19. 
84 Batnitzky, 36. 
85 Batnitzky, 2-6. Compare with Wael Hallaq’s presentation the sharīʿa, which he argues meant something entirely 
different, and far more comprehensive—encompassing legal, moral, cultural and economic practices—to premodern 
Islamic societies, that is, before it became fundamentally transformed through its defeat at the hands of the modern 
nation-state. See his “What is Shariya?” in the Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2005-06), esp. 151-56.  
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enterprise from those who present it as a “secular” one, namely the choice of which figures 
represent the movement and field. When Zunz and Steinschneider are highlighted, then it 
appears as “secular.” If viewed through the careers of Graetz and Geiger, it appears “religious.” 
A second factor connects to whether one contrasts it against its predescessors or its successors. In 
comparison to what came before, it appears “secular” in opposition to the “religious” view of 
earlier Jewish scholarship. On the other hand, when looking at what comes after, it appears 
“religious” against the “nationalist” view of Zionist scholarship. 
One final note should be made regarding the term “secular.” This descriptive misreads 
Zunz and Steinschneider’s method and criticism, because the term as presently understood has 
come to imply an opposition to the religious: These figures do not oppose religion. They are 
critical of theology, and argue that theology and science are incompatible methods for reading 
texts and building a literature capable of sustaining a people. They dispute Reform’s revisioning 
of Judentum, and reject the theological approach to the study of history and literature of their 
predescessors and contemporaries. 
The Wissenschaft des Judentums: Towards Whom and What Is It Directed? 
The efforts of early exponents to solicit non-Jews’ involvement in and support for the 
Science of Judaism were largely ineffective and efforts to incorporate the new field into the 
German University unsuccessful. This certainly speaks to limitations and obstacles its 
practitioners faced, though what later Wissenschaft practitioners are able to accomplish should 
not direct how those earlier limitations are understood. In other words, praising or deriding 
earlier efforts because these are presently viewed as successes or failures, produces teleological 
readings of past events. Such readings inform the identification of the Wissenschaft’s 
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“institutional stage” as progress and a positive move forwards. Against the early Wissenschaft’s 
“failure” to achieve institutional support from the state’s universities, German Jews transformed 
the obstacles they faced into advantages. They achieved their own “success” by founding 
independent institutions to provide the support they were denied by the state. A speech delivered 
at the dedication of a new building for the [Reform] Lehranstalt [Hochshule] für die 
Wissenschaft des Judentums86 in 1907 reads the past in just this way. Sigmund Maybaum, a 
founder of the rabbinical society of Germany and lecturer of homiletics at the Hochshule, 
explains how fortuitous it was that the Science of Judaism was not incorporated into the German 
university, because, as is now known, this field should be built by and for Jews alone, free from 
the compromising and corruptive influence of state supervision.87  
Maybaum’s celebratory strategy conceals ways Wissenschaft was pressed to transform 
itself into a program practiced by and for Jews alone, when this was not the aim of its founders 
nor some of its later exponents. It also diverts attention away from questioning why certain goals 
were not achieved, by suggesting these were originally misguided or illegitimate.  
Alfred Jospe replicates, in certain ways, Maybaum’s interpretation of success and failure, 
as well as his preference for a Jewish studies that strives to better the Jewish community over 
and above the wider academic one, from which it is separated. In his “Study of Judaism in 
German Universities before 1933” Jospe describes a bifurcation “in the definition of the goals 
and purposes of Jewish studies at the university,” which first appears among Zunz and his 
                                                
86 The name of the “Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums” (founded in 1872), was changed by 
government order to the “Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judentums” from 1883-1923, and again from 1933-
1942. Unofficially, among German Jews, the institution continued to be referred to as the “Hochschule.” 
87 Sigmund Maybaum, “Die Wissenschaft des Judentums,” Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des 
Judentums 51 (1907): 653-54. Minister von Ladenberg’s lengthy rejection of Zunz’s 1848 proposal for a chair in 
Jewish history and literature at the University of Berlin is included as an addendum to the printed speech, 654-58.  
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contemporaries.88 He explains this division through a heavily weighted question: “Should Jewish 
studies be pursued solely as a pristine scholarly enterprise, or should they also serve the practical 
needs of the community?”89 His inclusion of the word “also” implies that by aiming “solely” at 
the scientific ideal, one necessarily disregards the community’s needs, whereas Jewish studies 
should aim at both. The question is misleading, for Jospe presents Zunz as an example of one 
committed to only the pristine scholarly enterprise,” even though a page earlier he cites Zunz’s 
statement that “the social and political equality of the Jews will emerge from the equality 
accorded to the Wissenschaft des Judentums.”90 Thus it would seem that Zunz, at least, believes 
in a fundamental correlation between the scholarly ideal and the community’s practical 
circumstances. The wording of Jospe’s question, however, dismisses Zunz’s view as 
disingenuous or inaccurate.  
Jospe’s discussion of bifurcation also repeats Maybaum’s emphasis on failure, and as a 
consequence overlooks the meaningful contrasts between different proposals to incorporate 
Jewish studies into the university. For example, he presents Zunz’s call (in 1848) for a chair in 
“Jewish history and literature,” as representing detached scholasticism and Geiger’s call (1836-
38) for a faculty in “Jewish theology,” as illustrating his commitment to also meeting the Jewish 
community’s needs. Jospe describes how both attempts failed to incorporate the same “Jewish 
studies” into the university, which leaves the substantive disagreement between the two 
uninterrogated. Each man is committed to both the scholarly enterprise and the community. 
Where they disagree is regarding what field would best serve both interests: a position in Jewish 
                                                
88 Jospe, 301, 305. 
89 Ibid., 301. 
90 Ibid., 300. This is the closing sentence from Zunz’s essay “Die jüdische Literatur” (1845). 
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theology through which rabbis would receive modern training and thereby become better able to 
lead the community; or a position in Jewish history and literature, which, by integrating the 
Science of Judaism into the German university, would lead to the equalization of Jews in 
society.91  
Denunciation and Regeneration: Two Critiques 
This section takes two widely divergent accounts of the movement as a case study for 
illustrating how and considering why the nineteenth-century field can be portrayed so 
contrastingly. The first is from a dominating figure in the field of twentieth-century Jewish 
Studies, Gershom Scholem (1897-1982). His damning essay Mitokh Hirhurim ‘al Ḥokhmat 
Yisra’el (Some thoughts on the wisdom of Israel), first published in 1944, is cited in nearly every 
portrayal of the Wissenschaft which follows.92 It was not until the 1970s that responses began to 
                                                
91 Geiger’s first call for the establishment of a “Jewish theological faculty” is presented in his “Die Gründung einer 
jüdisch-theologischen Facultät, ein drigendes Bedürfniß unserer Zeit,” Wissenschaftliche Zeitung für jüdische 
Theologie 2 (1836):1-21. Two years later he publishes a second call in the 22-page pamphlet Ueber die Errichtung 
einer jüdischen-theologischen Facultät (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Niedel, 1838). For a discussion of Geiger’s proposal 
and the support it generated see Baron, “Jewish Studies at Universities.”  
 Zunz’s “proposal” takes the form of letters, which he submits directly to the government. Ludwig Geiger 
reprints three letters (from 1840, 1843, and 1848) in his article “Zunz im Verkehr mit Behörden und Hochgestellten,” 
Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 60 (1916): 261-62, 323-24, 335-36. It is only in 
Zunz’s third letter that he explicitly proposes establishing a full-professorship for “Jewish history and literature” at 
the Berlin University. His proposal generates a faculty commission and report, which the Minister of Education and 
Religious affairs, Minister von Ladenberg, uses to reject Zunz’s proposal. The text of the faculty report is printed in 
Geiger’s “Zunz im Verkehr,” 337-41, and von Ladenberg’s response to Zunz is printed in Maybaum, “Die 
Wissenschaft des Judentums,” 654-58. 
 At the time of Geiger’s proposals, Zunz refrained from commenting on the popular topic of a “Jewish 
theological faculty.” However, in his personal correspondence he articulates his opposition to any such proposal on 
the grounds of it being a theological faculty, and thus a compromised one which cannot be “purely scientific.” 
Letters referencing this subject are contained in Glatzer’s two collections: Leopold and Adelheid Zunz, 102-3; and 
Leopold Zunz, 199-200. 
92 Gershom Scholem, “Mitokh Hirhurim ‘al Ḥokhmat Yisra’el,” Luah Ha-Aretz (1944): 94-112; reprinted in 
Gershom Scholem, Devarim be-go: Pirke morashah u-teḥiyah (Tel Aviv: ʿAm ʿOved, 1975), 385-403. Translated 
as “Reflections on Modern Jewish Studies (1944)” by Jonathan Chipman in On the Possibility of Jewish Mysticism 
in Our Time and Other Essays, ed. Avraham Shapira (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997), 51-71. 
Translations here are my own. References to the text will be parenthetically cited above. 
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temper and attenuate its criticism. The second comes from Susannah Heschel, a distinguished 
professor of Jewish Studies currently teaching at Dartmouth College, who refutes Scholem’s 
denunciation and presents a compelling counterargument. Both scholars’ depictions make 
important and founded arguments about how the Wissenschaft can and should be understood, 
even as they disagree fundamentally over what it was. 
Dancing Among the Graves: Scholem’s Condemnation 
In Mitokh Hirhurim ‘al Ḥokhmat Yisra’el Scholem uses ḥokhmat yisra’el to refer to the 
German Wissenschaft des Judentums, but which he extends to include twentieth-century Zionist 
scholarship to his day.93 His choice to use ḥokhmat yisra’el and not the more literal Hebrew 
mada‘e ha-yahadut (in use at the time) connects to his vision of and for the field. Scholem aims 
to impact the direction and orientation of contemporary Hebrew research through his critique of 
nineteenth-century German scholarship. 
On what grounds does he critique ḥokhmat yisra’el? Scholem highlights three inner 
conflicts which together caused “its grotesque visage” in the nineteenth-century (387). These are: 
1. the contradiction between its repeated declarations about “pure science” (mada‘ ṭahor) and 
objectivity, and “the blatancy of the political mission” it sought and came to fulfill (387); 2. the 
tension between its foundations in the rationalist enlightenment and in romantic science, which 
confused its “men-of-science” (anashe ha-mada‘) such that they did not know whether to build 
or dismantle the Jewish people and the Jewish nation (388); and 3. the central conflict between 
its preservative and destructive tendencies, which are bound together—a dialectic Scholem 
                                                
93 Such is accepted by Chipman who consistently translates “ḥokhmat yisrael” as the “Science of Judaism” when it 
references nineteenth-century figures and works, but more often uses “Jewish studies” or “Judaic Studies” for 
twentieth-century scholarship. Scholem’s use of a single name emphasizes continuity over the two centuries. 
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explains historical criticism cannot avoid. The natural and conspicuous function of historical 
criticism is destructive, however, it also holds the potential to free data that may transform entire 
perspectives, turning traces of the past into signs of wonderful life—understanding this duplicity 
is what gave the scholars of romantic science their greatness. And yet, how awful was the 
paradoxical position of ḥokhmat yisra’el, whose scholars did not realize or understand how to 
work within this dialectic: their historical consciousness did not permit them to realize the 
positive use hidden in its method, with the result that their productions appear as “a terrifying 
burial rite” (389). 
Scholem mentions one exceptional text from the nineteenth century: Nahman Krochmal’s 
Moreh Nevukhe ha-Zeman. Identifying this anomaly, he asserts that those writers who identify 
Krochmal as having impacted the development of ḥokhmat yisra’el in his day are entirely 
mistaken—his work affected nothing in the nineteenth century.94 Scholem insists: “Rabbi 
Nahman Krochmal was not influential because his brilliant book was not at all suited…to the 
interests of ḥokhmat yisra’el in those generations. Only with the change in atmosphere did the 
brilliance of the hidden treasure also sparkle” (390). Scholem addresses this problematic case 
because it resonates in the present. He extracts it from the nineteenth-century in order to deny his 
Zionist reader the chance to absolve himself through redeeming any aspect of nineteenth-century 
ḥokhmat yisra’el.  
                                                
94 Scholem’s choice to reference nineteenth-century German scholarship and twentieth-century Zionist scholarship 
by the same term—ḥokhmat yisra’el—forces him to address the work of Nahman Krochmal. Had he presented the 
nineteenth-century ḥokhmat yisra’el as “Wissenschaft des Judentums,” or even as mada‘e ha-yahadut, then there 
would not be the same need to excise Krochmal’s Hebrew work from the nineteenth century for it could be located 
in a different tradition (i.e., ḥokhmat yisrael). Scholem accepts this limitation in order to emphasize a particular 
lineage through which to critique the scholarship of his own day. 
Scholem makes no mention of the well-known fact that Krochmal’s posthumous work was introduced and 
edited for publication by Zunz, as requested by Krochmal himself. He likewise overlooks its appraisal as 
foundational by Graetz. Ismar Schorsch, “The Production of a Classic: Zunz as Krochmal’s Editor,” Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book 31 (1986): 281-91. Graetz, esp. 495-96. 
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Scholem specifies three men in whom the cythonian aspect of ḥokhmat yisra’el is 
powerfully visible: Zunz, Steinschneider, and Geiger. His depicts the first two far more 
ambivalently than the third, distinguishing Zunz and Steinschneider (who, he admits, have 
always attracted him) from among their contemporaries as “truly demonic figures” (391)—a 
characterization which in Scholem’s use is not exclusively or necessarily negative, as suggested 
by his description of the dialectics of history and historical criticism described above. However, 
Zunz and Steinschneider’s destruction faced inward towards productive despair, for they knew 
only how to memorialize the dead and not how to build life-generating constructions through 
their historical method. They are unique in their nihilism and their complete lack of 
sentimentality. Scholem describes their “matter-of-factness”—which can be irritating and 
gloomy, refreshing and restrictive—as amazing (391-92). Their writing is dry and cold. And at 
other moments, their books encircle the dead, and the authors themselves seem to dance among 
the graves while seeking redemption (392). They are sparks of very great souls from “the world 
where life and death are mixed up together” (392). Scholem admires their learning and their 
scholarly rigor, though their drive towards only destruction is frightening, for it leads to death 
and memorial, whereas ḥokhmat yisra’el must direct its forces towards construction and 
generating life. 
Scholem describes Geiger quite differently. His words reek of (Christian) priestly 
hypocrisy (tsevi‘ut galḥit), and the ambition of a bishop. Unlike Zunz and Steinschneider, with 
whose breadth of knowledge he cannot compete, Geiger was extremely talented at building great 
historical constructs. He has “a sovereign power, which produces the great historian, to rape the 
facts for the sake of [his] construction, and to clarify contexts through historical intuition” (392-
93). Scholem explains this intuition is a dangerous creative power, one found also in Graetz, and 
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entirely absent in Zunz and Steinschneider (393). Geiger’s is a liberalism that is not liberal at all, 
but a kind of “deistic papism” (apifyorit de’isṭit), and “woe to the annals of Israel humiliated by 
this priestly-liberal philosophy of history!” (393). Geiger’s construction destroys by creating 
something that would seem to be more Christian than Jewish. 
Towards the end of the essay, Scholem’s damning account of nineteenth-century German 
scholarship turns to critique the current state of ḥokhmat yisra’el, which he argues has yet to 
effectively rebel against its forebears:  
All of these afflictions [of the nineteenth-century] have now put on a national dress. We 
cultivated a national homiletics and a national rhetoric in science in place of the religious 
homiletics and the religious rhetoric. In both cases, the real forces that worked in our 
world, the real “demonic,” remained outside of the picture we have created. (402) 
Twentieth-century Zionist scholarship has yet to fully understand the errors of its forebears and 
consequently has so far been unable to effectively excise them. Clearly, Hayim Nahman Bialik 
was mistaken when he identified the “original sin” of ḥokhmat yisra’el as its alienation of the 
Hebrew language, for, Scholem argues, the language of scholarship was never its problem 
(395).95 Sentimentality, superficiality, distorting the past by refusing to explore what Scholem 
calls “the real ‘demonic,’”—these foundational sins are all replicated in the present. In fact, 
nineteenth-century ḥokhmat yisra’el’s most “fundamental, original sin which outweighs all 
others” was its removal of the irrational and the demonic from Jewish history by means of an 
exaggerated theologization and spiritualization (396). Contemporary Hebrew scholarship has 
inherited this, and only dressed it in national garb, replacing the nineteenth century’s emphasis 
on Judaism’s rationality, with the current Zionist nationalist rhetoric of science. Scholarship then 
                                                
95 His criticism of Bialik here refers to an “Open Letter” Bialik published to the editors, in the Hebrew journal Devir 
1 (1923): viii-xiii.  
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and now, in German and Hebrew, excises the irrational, distorts the past, and consequently 
produces a flawed construction.  
Scholem’s especially bitter treatment of Geiger connects to his leading role in what 
Scholem identifies as ḥokhmat yisra’el’s “original sin.” Geiger, the theologian-historian who 
fathered Reform Judaism, may be responsible more than any other for making Judaism into a 
religion of spirit, belief, and theology, and eliminating practices and rituals deemed unsuitable to 
post-Enlightenment rationality. Ḥokhmat yisra’el worked to hide any elements from the Jews’ 
history that could be considered disturbing by non-Jewish society, whose acceptance it sought. In 
this way, its apologetic agenda can be seen as an anti-Jewish one, even if, Scholem admits, it was 
also anti-Christian. 
Counterhistory and Revolt: Heschel’s Reappraisal 
In her article “Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger’s Wissenschaft des Judentums as 
a Challenge to Christian Hegemony in the Academy,” Heschel responds to Scholem’s attacks on 
the Wissenschaft des Judentums.96 She argues that as a proponent of Zionist historiography, 
Scholem’s view of the Diaspora colors and limits his evaluation of the movement’s motivations 
and accomplishments. Second, his focus was on internal Jewish self-understanding, and he did 
not engage the wider context of German Protestant theological scholarship. This prevented him 
from recognizing “the subversive quality of the Wissenschaft des Judentums,” which she argues 
is directed at “undermining the configurations that mark the history of the Christian West” (70).  
                                                
96 Susannah Heschel, “Revolt of the Colonized: Abraham Geiger’s Wissenschaft des Judentums as a Challenge to 
Christian Hegemony in the Academy,” New German Critique 77 (1999): 67-70. Throughout this section, citations to 
this article will be included parenthetically in the text above. 
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Heschel analyzes Abraham Geiger’s work and the reactions it elicited from Protestant 
theologians. She contrasts the markedly different reception of two of his works. In 1833, Geiger 
published a text on the origins of Islam: Was hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthume aufgenommen 
(What Muhammad borrowed from Judaism). By comparing rabbinic literature alongside 
Muhammad’s revelation, Geiger demonstrated that the Quʾran’s variations of biblical stories 
stemmed from midrashic material. This publication was hailed throughout Europe as an 
important work of scholarship (70-71).  
Such was not the case 30 years later when Geiger published Das Judentum und seine 
Geschichte (Judaism and its History). This text reconstructed Christianity's origins through a 
similar method. Geiger used early Christian and rabbinic texts to depict the life and religion of 
Jesus. Geiger became the first scholar and Jew to claim Jesus was a Pharisee, whose views 
reflected common rabbinic teachings of his day. Christianity’s origins belong to Paul, who 
corrupted Judaism’s monotheism (as taught by Jesus) in order to create a religion more palatable 
to the pagans to whom he proselytized (72-73). Heschel argues that Geiger made Christianity, as 
he had done to Islam before, into a “handmaiden of Judaism,”97 asserting Judaism as the one 
original and universal religion of the three.  
Liberal Protestant theologians’ reactions were vitriolic and condemnatory. They could 
not, however, deny that Jesus was a Jew, so they countered Geiger’s arguments by distinguishing 
Jesus ever more sharply from “repugnant” first-century Judaism. Heschel reads the outrage 
Geiger’s scholarship elicited as evidence of his rebellion. She instructs that Geiger’s writings on 
                                                
97 The parallel between the two works as depicted by Heschel is not entirely analogous. Geiger’s work on Islam 
portrays revelation as originally rabbinic, suggesting Islam is derivative of rabbinic Judaism. On the other hand, 
Geiger presents Christianity as a corruption of Judaism and argues that Jesus is more Jew than Christian. He thereby 




Christian origins “should be understood not as an effort at assimilation, but…as an attempt to 
subvert Christian hegemony and establish a new position for Judaism within European history 
and thought” (64).  
The term Heschel uses to describe Geiger’s historiographical argumentation is 
“counterhistory,” a genre she claims has existed since antiquity, but was only identified as such 
in the works of Amos Funkenstein and David Biale.98 Her definition comes from Funkenstein, 
who describes counterhistory as “a form of historical narrative (and, eo ipso, action) 
which…consists of the systematic exploitation of the adversary’s more trusted sources against 
their grain…[Its] aim is the distortion of the adversary’s self-image, of his identity, through the 
deconstruction of his memory.”99 This genre has long since characterized “Christian theologies,” 
which revised Jewish sources as theological promises of the coming of Jesus and used them to 
illustrate “the degenerate state” of post-exhilic Judaism (64-5).  
Counterhistory, she argues, is similar to European Orientalism as described in by Said, 
because Christian studies of Judaism were used to control and manipulate Jews to the Church’s 
advantage. Similar to the role the Orient, or later East, would come to play in the nineteenth-
century Orientialist’s imagination, “Judaism came to function in Christian theology as the other 
whose negation confirms and even constitutes Christianity” (63). She suggests that Christian 
theologians’ use of Jewish texts foretells how modern colonialism would use knowledge over the 
Orient to subjugate those it colonized. Geiger, as “the first Jew to subject Christian texts to 
detailed historical analysis from an explicitly Jewish perspective,” wrote the first Jewish 
                                                
98 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 36-37. Biale, Gershom Scholem.  
99 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 36. 
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counterhistory of Christian origins.100 Heschel calls Geiger’s counterhistory a “revolt of the 
colonized,” because of the substantial similarities between the Christian theologian and the 
modern orientalist. Based on this parallel and overlap she asserts that the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums “is one of the earliest examples of postcolonialist writing.”101 
She closes her essay on Geiger’s “Revolt,” by addressing an important question: why was 
Geiger, and others from the Wissenschaft des Judentums, so fascinated with Christianity’s 
origins? Why not dismiss or ignore Jesus and the gospels? She explains that Jewish theologians 
chose this path because their own project of Jewish self-definition required destroying the image 
of Judaism that Christian theology had constructed. They chose this path because Christian 
theology built a mythology that oppressed Judaism and the only way to destroy a myth’s power 
and subvert its meaning is to enter the very world that produced it and attempt to rewrite it (83). 
What she finds most interesting in Geiger’s work is not only that he criticizes Christian anti-
Jewish myths, but how he reclaims them and empowers the Jewish victim of Christian 
persecutions through his Jewish retelling of the Christian story (84).  
Some Closing Remarks on Modernity, Assimilation, and Revolt 
Scholem and Heschel’s appraisals can be made to compliment each other, even if they 
cannot be reconciled into a single answer or way out of modernity’s confines. Their 
disagreements resonate with material from the rest of this chapter, and connect to broader 
questions the dissertation explores. 
                                                
100 Susannah Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2. 
101 Heschel, Abraham Geiger, 3. 
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The most problematic dimension of Scholem’s analysis is not what he writes, but how his 
piece has been read. As David Myers points out, Scholem’s article received “a certain canonical 
status” and his judgments over nineteenth-century “European-Jewish scholarship” became 
widely accepted as “statements of facts rather than polemical assertions.”102 Through this, the 
very scholarship Scholem’s piece aimed to presently impact and change extricated itself from his 
judgment.  
Scholem’s essay is not only, nor arguably even primarily, a critique of the Wissenschaft 
des Judentums, but of the confines of a modernity where Jews’ desire to become citizens of a 
secular (i.e. scientifically-oriented and non-theological) nation-state, led them all too willingly—
whether in nineteenth-century German or the Hebrew of the twentieth—to sacrifice themselves 
in the process. Scholem argues modern Jewish scholarship has so far failed to navigate the 
challenges of modernity in an authentically Jewish way. Paradoxically, the search for 
authenticity is itself a symptom of the modernity, from which Scholem seeks to free Jewish 
Studies. This is why the path he arrives at (i.e., returning the irrational and the demonic to Jewish 
history), while astute and significant as an attempt to critique the particular rationalist conception 
of knowledge dominating European modernity, remains unable to effectively liberate.  
Heschel’s work contributes an important dimension to the critique of “Jewish Studies,” 
by emphasizing how writers of the Wissenschaft challenged Christian hegemony. However, this 
does not mean that they do not also fashion Judaism and their revolt into a mold that subjugates 
them. This is the bind of a Jewish counterhistory of Christian counterhistory. Heschel twice 
admits (66, 76, citing Funkenstein: 48) that “the forger of a counteridentity of the other renders 
his own identity to depend on it.” Because of the political power of the Church, its counterhistory 
                                                
102 Myers, Re-Inventing the Jewish Past, 168; cited in Heschel, “Revolt of the Colonized,” 67n19. 
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did not subjugate itself to the Jews; it only made Christianity dependent on the Jews’ continued 
existence, and invested in their degenerate survival. A counterhistory by the “colonized,” 
however, faces far greater restrictions: by approximating the values of that counterhistory 
oppressing itself, it participates in the very structures that continue its subjugation. When Geiger 
uses the figure and faith of Jesus the Pharisee to argue that Judaism holds a more legitimate 
claim to originality and universality than Christianity (and Islam), his construction affirms Jesus 
as the embodiment of ethics and means to illustrate the universal ideal. When Heschel proclaims 
Geiger did not try “to Christianize Judaism,” but rather sought “to Judaize Christianity,” she 
highlights this interdependence.103 Likewise, when Scholem attacks Geiger, he voices opposition 
to the destruction implicit in Geiger’s counterhistory.104  
Counterhistory is something to be examined and theorized, but not necessarily celebrated. 
Heschel’s important contribution is to demonstrate how Wissenschaft writings attempt to subvert 
Christian hegemony, even as they authorize and aggravate it. Scholem’s critique arguably still 
stands: the Wissenschaft was apologetic, rationalizing, and was responsible, at least in part—as 
Heschel acknowledges (61-2)—for developing Judaism in mimicry of Christianity.  
Instead of arguing that Geiger’s research into Christian origins should be understood as 
subversive instead of as assimilationist, it is important to ask why Geiger’s revolt looks a lot like 
Christianity, even if—and this is important—it is also expressly anti-Christian. The Wissenschaft 
des Judentums fights back against the Christian character of modernity, but does so in a way that 
reinforces what it aims to overthrow.  
                                                
103 Heschel, Abraham Geiger, 3. 
104 Graetz too reacts against this, when he calls Reform “Christianization.” However, despite this similarity, 
Scholem and Graetz fundamentally disagree over what the Judaism is that Geiger destroys. 
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Assimilation itself needs to be rethought. While Jewish nationalists may have once 
monopolized this weapon against their critics, political Zionism, as Daniel Boyarin convincingly 
argues, can be seen to represent the most complete form of Jewish assimilationism.105 Any 
movement claiming to speak for what Judaism is or the Jews are, can be seen to further or use 
some variety of assimilation. The question that remains, then, is why do the range of Jewish 
efforts to construct collective identity from the time of Emancipation appear assimilationist?  
                                                
105 See Daniel Boyarin’s chapter on “The Colonial Drag: Zionism, Gender, and Mimicry” in Unheroic Conduct, for 
a convincing discussion of Jewish nationalism as the ultimate form of assimilation and colonial mimicry.  
 
58 
CHAPTER 2  
The Nahḍa: Modernity and Loss 
 
 
This chapter illustrates how a presumably understood term—nahḍa—is far more 
equivocal than generally taken to be. It begins by looking at ways the term has been translated 
and qualified, and draws out the multiple connected objects it designates, as movement, period, 
and outlook. Following this it examines one of the earliest Arabic accounts of the nahḍa’s 
development, from one of its prominent exponents—Jurjī Zaydān (1861-1914). It uses Zaydān’s 
account to illustrate some of the nahḍa’s characteristics before turning to consider subsequent 
portrayals of the nahḍa as movement and how it reflects the paradox of modernity in non-
European societies. By retracing its beginnings and appraisals the chapter highlights the 
centrality of the “impact of the West” motif in narratives of the nahḍa’s emergence and shape, 
though scholarship increasingly disputes the degree and manner of Western influence. After 
discussing more recent efforts to revision the dynamics between East and West, and to correct 
earlier Eurocentric biases by emphasizing the agency of the East—which, by extension and 
necessity, alter perceptions of the nahḍa—the chapter closes by reconsidering the significance of 
1798 and the relation between modernity, colonialism, Orientalism and nahḍa. 
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Translations and Definitions: Limitations of a Problematic Term  
The developments that came to be called al-nahḍa, describe a literary, political, cultural 
movement and period in the Arab world, spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This 
name was not in use before the late nineteenth century.1  
The nahḍa’s most common English-language equivalent is ‘renaissance,’ presented 
parenthetically,2 or offset by commas.3 Often, either (or both) “nahḍa” or “renaissance” is placed 
in scare quotes, intimating that the translation is not without qualification, though reasons for 
                                                
1 Thomas Philipp traces the nahḍa’s first printed use in the sense of “renaissance” or “revival” to an article 
published in al-Muqtaṭaf, in 1888, titled “Nahḍat al-Ṭibb fī Miṣr” (The revival of medicine in Egypt). Because the 
article makes no attempt to explain this new use for a long-existing word, Philipp suggests its new meaning was 
understood by that time. Thomas Philipp, Ǧurǧī Zaidān: His Life and Thought, Beiruter Texte und Studien 3 
(Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1979), 6-7. Cf., J. Brugman, An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in 
Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 9-10n3.  
 Neither Lane’s Lexicon nor Buṭrus al-Bustānī’s dictionary Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ, both from the mid-nineteenth 
century, define nahḍa as pertaining to any collective movement, revival, or renaissance. Both describe it as an 
individual’s single act of rising, motion, or movement, or abstractly as ability and strength. Edward William Lane, 
An Arabic-English Lexicon, derived from the best and most copious eastern sources, vol. 8, ed. Stanley Lane-Poole 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1893), 2860; Buṭrus al-Bustānī, Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 2 (Beirut: 1867), 2137. 
2 Tariq el-Ariss, “Tracing the Nation in French and Arabic Travel Narratives from Late Eighteenth to Mid 
Nineteenth Century” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2004), 17; M. M. Badawi uses an equation sign within 
parentheses, explaining “an-Nahḍah (=renaissance),” in his “Introduction I,” in Modern Arabic Literature, ed. M. 
M. Badawi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1; Burcu Gürsel, “Invasive Translations: Violence and 
Mediation of the False-Colonial, France and Ottoman Egypt (1780-1840)” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 
2008), 246; Pierre Cachia, “Introduction II,” in Modern Arabic Literature, ed. M. M. Badawi (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 287; Marwa Elshakry, “The Gospel of Science and American Evangelism in 
Late Ottoman Beirut,” Past and Present 196 (2007): 175; Roxanne Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and 
Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 90; Saree Makdisi, 
“‘Postcolonial’ Literature in a Neocolonial World: Modern Arabic Culture and the End of Modernity,” Boundary 2 
22.1(1995): 90; Daniel L. Newman, An Imam in Paris: Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian Cleric (1826-
1831) (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 11; Abdulrazzek Patel, “Language Reform and Controversy in the Nahḍa: Al-
Shartūnī’s Position as a Grammarian in Sahm,” Journal of Semitic Studies 55.2 (Autumn 2010): 509; Jeffrey Sacks, 
“Futures of Literature: Inhitat, Adab, Naqd,” Diacritics 37.4 (2007): 37. 
3 Mona Abaza, “A Commentary on Tanwir and Al-Manar al-Jadid in Egypt,” Orient 41.2 (2000): 303; Brugman, 9-
10; Richard Jacquemond, “Towards an Economy and Poetics of Translation from and into Arabic,” in Cultural 
Encounters in Translation from Arabic, ed. Said Faiq (Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2004), 118; Anouar Louca, 
“Introduction,” in L’Or de Paris: relation de voyage, 1826-1831, by Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī, trans. Anouar Louca 
(Paris: Sindbad, 1988), 11. 
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these vary.4 For example, in his An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in 
Egypt (1984), J. Brugman expresses reservations at the phrase “Arabic renaissance” because its 
parallel to “the European Renaissance” is “inaccurate.”5 Echoing the incomparability of the two 
movements Nada Tomiche, in her entry on “Nahḍa” (1993) in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
explains that “renaissance” is “a problematic translation, for it refers implicitly to 16th-century 
Europe and to the movement of return to the Greco-Roman past.”6 Both Tomiche and Brugman 
maintain the European Renaissance as paradigmatic. Their commentary neglects or discounts 
how and why many nahḍa exponents intentionally built connections between the European and 
Arabic renaissances, especially as they came to also designate Europe’s as a nahḍa, at least from 
the early-twentienth century.7 Further, views like Brugman’s and Tomiche’s maintain the 
European as an authentic revival, when what a renaissance births is never a return to a past that 
was. There are important differences between the European and Arabic renaissances, but to 
suggest these are rooted in authenticity and imitation obfuscates the matter.  
                                                
4 Roger Allen, “Rewriting Literary History: The Case of the Arabic Novel,” Journal of Arabic Literature 38 (2007): 
250-52; el-Ariss, 17; Gürsel, 246; Lisa Lital Levy, “Jewish Writers in the Arab East: Literature, History, and the 
Politics of Enlightenment, 1863-1914” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2007), 48; Shaden M. 
Tageldin, “One Comparative Literature? ‘Birth’ of a Discipline in French-Egyptian Translation, 1810-1834,” 
Comparative Literature Studies 47.4 (2010): 427. Cf. Allen and Levy, note 2 above. 
5 Brugman, 9-10. 
6 Nada Tomiche, “Nahḍa,” in The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New York: Brill, 1993), 900.  
7 Phillip explains that “nahḍa,” in “its modern abstract meaning” is translated as “renaissance,” and notes how “[t]he 
Arabs themselves came to designate the European Renaissance with the same term,” citing two issues of al-
Muqtaṭaf from 1917 and 1946 as illustration. Thomas Philipp, “The Role of Jurjī Zaidān in the Intellectual 
Development of the Arab Nahda from the Beginning of the British Occupation of Egypt to the Outbreak of World 
War II” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971), 7. 
 Jurgī Zaydān refers to the Europeans’ Renaissance as their nahḍa as early as 1914 in his Tārīkh ādāb al-
lugha al-ʿarabiyya, vol. 4 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥilāl, 1957), 144. 
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Others critique “renaissance” on entirely different grounds, rejecting the term’s requisite 
acceptance of a preceding period of decline, which recent historical scholarship has refuted.8 
Scholars using post-colonial theory, such as Stephen Sheehi and Joseph Massad, explain how 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century nahḍa figures themselves came to describe their present 
as a renaissance because they internalized Arab-Islamic history as taught by European 
Orientalists. They view this internalization as one the nahḍa’s problematic foundations, upon 
which it built and replicated a developmental narrative of universal history where Europe sets the 
standard for progress and modernity, legitimizing the West’s colonial projects.9 Such 
interventions are important, especially given the longstanding narrative of Ottoman decline and 
decadence which plagued presentations of the Orient throughout much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and legitimized (and continues to do so) Western imperialism. However, 
arguing that the nahḍa’s “renaissance” is flawed because it legitimizes European domination, 
                                                
8 For example: Peter Gran, The Islamic Roots of Capitalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979); Kenneth 
Cuno, The Pasha’s Peasants (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Afaf Marsot, Women and Men in 
Late Eighteenth Century Egypt (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995); Jane Hathaway, The Politics of 
Household in Ottoman Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Nelly Hanna, In Praise of Books: A 
Cultural History of Cairo's Middle Class, Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2003); idem, Artisan Entrepreneurs in Cairo and Early Modern Capitalism (1600-1800) (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2011); Jane Holt Murphy, “Improving the Mind and Delighting the Spirit: Jabarti and the Sciences 
in Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Cairo” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2006); Dana Sajdi, Ottoman Tulips, 
Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); Alan 
Mikhail, Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt: An Environmental History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
9 Stephen Sheehi, “Failure, Modernity, and the Works of Hisham Sharabi: Towards a Post-Colonial Critique of Arab 
Subjectivity,” Critique 6.10 (1997): 39-54; idem, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity (Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 2004). Cf. Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), esp. the 
introduction and chapter 1. See also: Makdisi, “‘Postcolonial’ Literature,” 88-90; and Reinhard Schultze, “Mass 
Culture and Islamic Cultural Production in 19th Century Middle East,” in Mass Culture, Popular Culture, and Social 
Life in the Middle East, ed. Georg Stauth and Sami Zubaida (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 190-92;  
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does not necessarily get at the root of the problem. Afterall, as Partha Chatterjee suggests, how 
could it have been otherwise?10  
Uncomfortable with how the nahḍa was not really a renaissance, alternatives exist which 
aim towards greater accuracy of meaning. Among the most common are “awakening” or “rise” 
because such alternatives “would be closer to the sense of the root [n-h-ḍ] and therefore more 
satisfactory.”11 Nonetheless, “Renaissance” (either capitalized or in lower case) remains the 
nahḍa’s most common English-language designation, though it frequently appears alongside 
“revival,” “rebirth,” and/or “awakening” as alternatives, reminding the reader that the translation 
is approximate.12 Not only are multiple-yet-imprecise versions presented, these are also qualified 
by a wide range of adjectives, such as Arab, Arabic, literary, cultural, modern, national, 
scientific, intellectual, etc., reflecting diverse and divergent developments all of which “come to 
                                                
10 Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
11 Tomiche, 900. Additional examples which clarify the term based on the root’s meaning include: Philipp (“Role of 
Jurjī Zaidan,” 7-8), who states that “awakening” or “rise” would be a more appropriate translation than “revival,” 
“rebirth” or “renaissance,” because the former would preserve the “original meaning of the word [nahḍa]”; likewise, 
Brugman (9-10) explains how “the Arabic word for this Renaissance, nahḍah, …means not so much ‘rebirth’ or a 
related notion, as ‘rising up’”; Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab follows her first use of “Nahḍa” with the parenthetical 
“(meaning ‘rise’),” though she subsequently renders it “the Arab Renaissance” in her Contemporary Arab Thought: 
Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 13. Cf., Samah Selim, 
The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt, 1880-1985, (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 234n2. 
12 Roger Allen, “The Post-Classical Period: Parameters and Preliminaries,” in Arabic Literature in the Post-
Classical Period, ed. Roger Allen and D. S. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 14; Allen, 
The Arabic Novel, 11, 19; Elliot Colla, Conflicted Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania, Egyptian Modernity 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 126; Waïl S. Hassan, Immigrant Narratives: Orientalism and Cultural 
Translation in Arab American and Arab British Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13; Daniel 
L. Newman, “Myths and Realities in Muslim Alterist Discourse: Arab Travellers in Europe in the Age of the 
Nahḍa,” Chronos 6 (2002): 9; Birgit Schaebler, “Civilizing Others: Global Modernity and the Local Boundaries 
(French/German/Ottoman and Arab) of Savagery,” in Globalization and the Muslim World: Culture, Religion, and 
Modernity, ed. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 24; Samah Selim, 
“The People’s Entertainments: Translation, Popular Fiction, and the Nahḍah in Egypt,” in Other Renaissances: A 
New Approach to World Literature, eds. Brenda Deen Schildgen, Gang Zhou, and Sander L. Gilman (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 35; Shaden Tageldin, Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in 
Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 102; Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of 
Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain and the Mastery of the Sudan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 
11, 76, 195.  
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be called” al-nahḍa. This diversity accounts for how the same word “al-nahḍa,” can be defined 
as a “literary renaissance of the Arabs in the nineteenth century,”13 parenthetically explained as a 
“cultural and scientific renaissance”14 and presented as an expression for “the project of national 
renaissance.”15  
Another interesting feature of the term, is that English-language texts which do not 
mention the nahḍa have become authoritative descriptions of it. In fact, the nahḍa’s “main 
reference,”16 which “has long been considered the authoritative book on the subject,”17 is Albert 
Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (1962), a work which neither uses 
“nahḍa,”18 nor claims to focus on a movement of revival or renaissance.19 Hourani once 
mentions “the literary renaissance of the Arabs,” though this is a subject of no more than a few 
pages and cannot be equated to “nahḍa,” nor, if it were, would it justify the work’s appraisal as 
the main text on the subject.  
                                                
13 This is the definition for “Nahḍa” in the glossary to the English translation of Abdallah Laroui’s La Crise des 
Intellectuels Arabes (1974). The French version “was originally intended for Arab readers” and contains no 
glossary. Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism? trans. Diarmid 
Cammell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), vii, 180. 
14 Makdisi, “‘Postcolonial’ Literature,” 90.  
15 Selim, The Novel and the Rural Imaginary, 4. 
16 Kassab, 20. 
17 Levy, 58n49. 
18 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (New York: Cambridge University Press).  
19 Additional texts which cite Hourani’s work as a foundational description of the nahḍa include: Hosam Aboul-Ela, 
“Is There an Arab (Yet) in This Field? Postcolonialism, Comparative Literature, and the Middle Eastern Horizon of 
Said’s Discourse Analysis,” Modern Fiction Studies, 56 (2010): 748-49n8; Ami Ayalon, “Private Publishing in the 
Nahḍa,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 40 (2008): 562n1; Waïl S. Hassan, Tayeb Salih: Ideology and 
the Craft of Fiction (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 4-5; Makdisi, “‘Postcolonial’ Literature,” 89n8; 
Tetz Rooke, “The Influence of Adab on the Muslim intellectuals of the Nahḍa as reflected in the Memoirs of 
Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953),” in The Middle East in a Globalized World: Papers from the Fourth Nordic 
Conference on Middle Eastern Studies (Bergen: Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 2000), 196n10, 197n11; 
Myriam Salama-Carr, “Negotiating Conflict: Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭawi and the Translation of the Other in Nineteenth 
Century Egypt,” Social Semiotics 17.2 (2007): 216; Selim, The Novel and the Rural Imaginary, 234n2. 
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Two additional texts cited as describing the nahḍa, though neither claims to do so, are 
George Antonius’ The Arab Awakening (1938), a study of “the Arab national movement,” and 
Hisham Sharabi’s Arab Intellectuals and the West (1970). Sharabi even differentiates “the Arab 
awakening,” which aimed at “cultural rebirth and modernization” and is the focus of Arab 
Intellectuals, from al-nahḍa, a term he mentions only once as a parenthetical translation for 
“enlightenment.”20 He writes, “the enlightenment (al-nahḍa) was the main rationalizing force 
within Christian intellectualism” (54), linking the nahḍa to Christians and separating it from 
Muslims.21  
Aspects of all three of the above-mentioned works reflect paradigmatic views of the 
nahḍa, from Hourani’s dating and emphasis on Western influence, to Antonius’ focus on the 
development of Arab nationalism, to Sharabi’s distinction between Christians and Muslims in 
the Ottoman Empire and the former’s affinity to European thought. Even though these texts do 
not claim to speak of the nahḍa, they have been made to do so, and in this sense reflect important 
characteristics of what the term has come to mean.  
One last clarification deserves emphasis: The nahḍa is not only a renaissance movement, 
be it cultural, literary, religious, national, etc. It also refers “to a finite era” dated from 
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 and ending at some point in the early- to mid-twentieth 
century, and has even become “coterminous with the whole of Arab modernity as a set of 
                                                
20 “Nahḍa” appears twice in transliterated Arabic titles in Sharabi’s footnotes, both of which he translates as 
“Renaissance,” a term absent in the text itself. What he means by “nahḍa” is unclear, though it is certainly not 
equivalent to what he describes as “the Arab awakening,” nor is it a central focus of his text. 
21 “Christian intelletuals” are one of the four populations Sharabi focuses on in his study. The other three are all 
Muslim: traditionalists, reformists and secularists. For a critique of Sharabi’s fallicious distinction between 
Christians and Muslims, see Sheehi’s “Failure, Modernity, and the Works of Hisham Sharabi,” esp. 47-50.  
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historical potentialities,” as Samah Selim points out.22 Selim is one of the few contemporary 
scholars who clarifies its multiple uses, distinguishing between the “historical nahḍa,” which 
refers to the Arab world’s translation of European “liberal thought” (à la Hourani), and its second 
sense as “a continuing historical project of constructing a national culture.”23 When one speaks 
of “nahḍa” this could refer to a renaissance or movement, as well as an outlook, a national 
awakening, or even the whole of (Arab?) “modernity” itself.  
Describing the Nahḍa: A Pioneering Account 
Unlike the term Wissenschaft des Judentums, which was coined by those who founded 
the new field, the nahḍa is a retrospective name. Thus, men such as Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801-73) 
in Egypt, Khair al-Dīn (ca.1825-1889) in Tunis, and Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883) in Syria, did 
not describe or theorize the movements they would later be seen to have pioneered.  
Jurjī Zaydān24 (1861-1914), one of the nahḍa’s “second generation,” is “the most 
eminent of the pioneers to speak of Nahḍa.”25 The fourth and final volume of his Tārīkh Ādāb al-
                                                
22 Selim, “The People’s Entertainments,” 35. 
23 Selim, Novel and the Rural Imaginary, 234n2. Two other recent writings which explain how the nahḍa may 
reference different concepts are Ami Ayalon’s “Private Publishing,” which separates the “cultural” nahḍa from the 
“political” one. He focuses on the former, which relates to “the upsurge of literary, linguistic and journalistic 
creativity primarily through the medium of print, which took place in Arabic-speaking provinces toward the end of 
the Ottoman era” (562). Samir Kassir, a Lebanese academic, journalist and activist assassinated in 2005, presents a 
view somewhat closer to that of Selim above. He differentiates between the nahḍa “as a historical moment and 
expression of nationalism,” which ended by the close of World War I, and the nahḍa “as an attitude and an outlook 
on the world” which “continued to inspire Arab struggles for emancipation.” See his Being Arab, trans. Will Hobson 
(New York: Verso, 2006), 52-53. –Together these examples (i.e., Selim’s, Ayalon’s, Kassir’s) illustrate how even 
when disentangled, variations persist regarding the precise characteristics of what multiple objects the term 
represents. 
24 Jurjī Zaydān was a prolific writer, authoring twenty-three historical novels—a genre he developed in modern 
Arabic literature—as well as several multivolume histories of Arabic literature and Islamic civilization. He was born 
in Beirut, and emigrated to Cairo in 1883. In 1892 he founded the literary and cultural journal al-Hilāl, an important 
nahḍa periodical. The most extensive English-language study of Zaydān is Philipp’s Ǧurǧī Zaidān. 
25 Tomiche, 900.  
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Lugha al-ʿArabiyya26 (The history of Arabic literature), published in 1914, focuses on the 
literary and historical epoch Zaydān calls al-nahḍa, and offers “explicit statements of the new 
creed.”27 
Zaydān divides the volume into two parts: The first describes “the most important 
characteristics of this nahḍa,” (16) detailed in nine sections: 1.Modern schools (17-35); 2. The 
Arabic press (43-50); 3. Arabic journalism (51-64); 4. Personal freedom (65-66); 5. Literary and 
scientific societies (67-93); 6. Libraries (94-134); 7. Arab Museums (135-137); 8. The Arab 
theatre (138-143); and 9. The Orientalists and the Arabic language (144-163). The second half 
surveys literature of the nahḍa and provides biographies of those who contributed to and 
participated in it (164 ff). Zaydān traces the dawn of the nahḍa to the translation of “modern” or 
“foreign sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-ḥadītha also referred to as al-ʿulūm al-dakhīla) from “foreign 
languages into Arabic,” which began in the first half of the nineteenth-century (164).28 He 
provides information about these sciences and those men—“Franks”29 and “Easterners”—who 
emerged as translators, writers or editors. After describing this initial stage, Zaydān continues to 
                                                
26 Jurjī Zaydān, Tārīkh Ādāb al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, vol. 4 (Cairo: Dār al-ḥilāl, 1957). References to this text will be 
made parenthetically throughout this section of the chapter. 
Zaydān explains he “aspired to write literary history as Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte of the Arab people,” 
and not mere “political history.” For only “the history of science and [of] literature (tārīkh al-ʿilm wa-l-
adab)…interpret history (shārih li-l-tārīkh), as they refer historical events to their real causes (yu‘allil al-asbāba wa-
l-hawāditha bi-‘ilālihā l-haqīqiyya).” Cited in Nadia al-Baghdadi, “Registers of Arabic Literary History,” New 
Literary History 39.3 (2008): 445.  
Al-Baghdadi’s “Registers” provides a useful discussion of the term ādāb, before and after “Arabic literary 
studies” came to emulate Western European models. Zaydān’s use employs aspects of both its “classical” and 
“modern” forms. 
27 Pierre Cachia, “Modern Arabic Literature,” in The Islamic Near East, ed. Douglas Grant (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1960), 289. 
28 Zaydān further distinguishes between those sciences that were translated and developed in the first half of the 
nineteenth-century (the natural sciences, mathematical sciences, military sciences, and religion) and those translated 
and developed over the second half (judicial sciences, economic sciences, and literature and poetry). Tārīkh Ādāb, 
165. 
29 Zaydān calls peoples of Europe “Franks” (a designation that includes French, German, Austrian, Dutch, English, 
and Russians), and their shared civilization as “European.”  
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survey the poets, writers and journalists from the second half of the nineteenth-century, who 
belong to “the most recent nahḍa.”  
It is worth calling attention to how Zaydān uses nahḍa differently in this text, than in one 
he published a decade earlier—his two-volume Tarājim Mashāhīr al-Sharq fī Qarn al-Tāsiʿ 
ʿAshar (1902-03) (Biographies of those Eminent in the East in the Nineteenth Century)—
because his use reflects changing and expanding meanings of the term.30 The first volume of 
Tarājim contains biographies of the khedival family, rulers, administrators, and political figures 
in “the East,” as well as “men of deeds and people of piety and reform.”31 The second volume 
focuses on “men of science and literature,” which Zaydān divides into four categories: 1. Pillars 
of the scientific nahḍa (arkān al-nahḍa al-ʿilmiyya); 2. Founders and Writers of the Newspaper; 
3. Men of the Pen; and 4. Poets.32 
What he refers to as “the scientific nahḍa,” in his Tarājim describes only the nahḍa’s 
introductory stage in his later work, where al-nahḍa becomes the designation and characteristic 
of the entire modern age. In Tārīkh Ādāb, when Zaydān qualifies nahḍa, it is most often 
“literary” (adabiyya) or “the most recent” (al-akhīra). His survey of those who shaped it includes 
figures from the entire second volume of his Tarājim Mashāhīr, as well as from the “men of 
deeds and people of piety and reform,” of the first volume. Common to both works is Zaydān’s 
presentation of a movement and period that includes “people of the East” (Arab and non-Arab) 
                                                
30 Tarājim Mashāhīr al-Sharq fī Qarn al-Tāsiʿ ʿAshar, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥilāl, 1910-1911). 
31 Included among the “rijāl al-aʿmāl wa-ahl al-birr wa-l-iṣlāḥ” are Muhammad ʿAbduh (d.1905), Muṣṭafā Kāmil 
(d.1908), Qāsim Amin (d.1908), and ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Kawākibī (d.1902), all of who come to be important nahḍa 
figures. The second edition was updated to include biographies of those who died in the first years of the twentieth-
century. 
32  Zaydān details eight “pillars of the scientific nahḍa,” naming Europeans, Arab and non-Arab Easterners: Doctor 
Clot Bey; shaykh Nāṣīf al-Yāzijī; Rifāʿa Bey al-Ṭahṭāwī; Buṭrus al-Bustānī; ʿAlī Pasha Mubārak; Doctor Cornelius 
Van Dyke; al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī; and al-Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. Tarājim Mashāhīr, 2: 1-74. 
 Zaydān explains that when figures were active in more than one field, he places them into whichever 
category they participated in most. Tarājim Mashāhīr, 2: iii. 
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as well as “Franks who helped the East and who spent most of their lives in it as if they were its 
children,” optimistically portraying the nineteenth-century nahḍa, in Egypt and in Syria as a 
movement and a period when science and literature in Arabic were harmoniously shaped by East 
and West alike.33  
In the final volume of Tārīkh Ādāb Zaydān focuses entirely on the nahḍa, and portrays 
this period, still underway, as one of dramatic transformation for the Arab world, during which it 
responds to and emulates Europe. He dates its beginning (9) to “the departure of the French from 
Egypt in 1801,”34 describes its cultivation during Muḥammad ʿAlī’s reign when “Egypt began 
adopting the means of attaining modern civilization,” and proclaims its maturity under Ismāʿīl’s 
rule, such that one then said: “Truly [Egypt] is a part of Europe even though it is in Africa” 
(13).35 
When he describes its beginnings, Zaydān differentiates between Bonaparte’s three-year 
military campaign in Egypt from 1798 and the “scientific campaign” (ḥamla ʿilmiyya) that 
accompanied it. He has no kind word for the French army, though he respectfully describes how, 
during moments of calm, French scholars and artisans found institutions to meet their needs, 
such as French schools, newspapers, a theatre, and an Egyptian scientific academy, (i.e., the 
Institut d’Egypte). They made some of their resources available to Egyptians, such as their 
                                                
33 Tarājim Mashāhīr, 2: iii. 
34 This date is reflected as well in the volume’s subtitle which reads: “Part IV, encompassing the history of literature 
of the Arabic language from 1216 h. (1801) to the beginning of the twentieth-century.” The second half of the text 
(164ff.) offers a modified periodization. There, Zaydān divides the nahḍa into three periods, based upon ruler: The 
first begins not from 1801 but from 1805 (i.e., from to start of Muḥammad ʿAlī’s rule) to the beginning of Ismāʿīl’s 
reign; the second runs from the rule of Ismāʿīl (1863) until the British occupation in 1882; and the third from the 
British occupation to the beginning of the twentieth century. Tārīkh Ādāb, 164. 
35 When describing the practices through which Muḥammad ʿAlī began “adopting the means of attaining modern 
civilization” (iqtibās asbāb al-madanīya al-ḥadītha), Zaydān describes his new organization of the army, training 
doctors and administrators, developing industry and modern schools, and sending missions to Europe for education. 
Under Ismāʿīl’s rule, Zaydān describes how schools, presses, and newspapers multiplied and foreigners flocked to 
Egypt. Tārīkh Ādāb, 13. 
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reading room, which contained many valuable Arabic books. He admires how the French are 
devoted to studying every science and favorably recounts how they would invite Egyptians to 
observe the foundations of French civilization, by showing them books, images, and scientific 
instruments (11-12). 
Zaydān lists the Franks’ interest and engagement in Arabic literature as one of the 
distinguishing features of this most recent nahḍa (16). He credits their studying, spreading, and 
investigating Arabic books as a primary factor facilitating the revitalization (iḥyāʾ) of literature 
in the Arabic language (144). He devotes 20 pages to describing Orientalists, their translations of 
Arabic works, and their interest in the languages and writings of the East (144-163). He observes 
how they are not drawn to recent Arabic literature but, rather, their attention “turns to the Middle 
Ages, before their last Renaissance (nahḍatihim al-akhīra),” which he credits with giving rise to 
their modern civilization (144). By emphasizing Orientalists’ care for Arabic medieval literature, 
and his choice to term their Renaissance a nahḍa, Zaydān implies a parallel or correspondence 
between the European Renaissance and the current nahḍa.  
As is typical of nahḍa presentations of Arab-Islamic history, Zaydān’s account employs 
the narrative arc of a Golden Age (Abbasids), followed by Decline (Ottoman/Mamluk reign), 
and finally, Renaissance (nahḍa). He compares the current nahḍa to the time during the Abbasid 
Empire when the ancients’ sciences were translated into Arabic and likewise moved that 
civilization.36 There the similarities between the two periods ends. Zaydān describes how during 
                                                
36 The Abbasid model is frequent across nahḍa writings, from Buṭrus al-Bustānī to Muḥammad ʿAbduh. It appears 
as early as al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ (1834). Stephen Sheehi argues that its pervasiveness and use reflects nahḍa 
intellectuals’ effort to inscribe themselves into the (Hegelian) notion of universal history centered on progress. This 
use confirms Europe as source and standard for the “universal” in two ways: First, it legitimizes the importance of 
the Abbasids based on their appraisal and use by Europe. Second, it identifies the Abbasids as preservers of Greek 
science, and not as the producers of original science. Sheehi’s critique of European intellectual hegemony implies 
that, were the Arabs, or any other colonized people, to have found a native non-European origin through which to 
assert their historical precedence, they would not have participated to their own subjugation by Europe, as they did 
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the Abbasid era “the Arab empire was in the season of its development and its activity,” and 
could thus digest and transform the sciences of other nations, coloring them with its “Islamic-
Arab color.” This is entirely different from its relative position at the outset of the most recent 
nahḍa, when, instead of shaping others’ sciences it became transformed by them, and “the 
current of modern civilization gained ascendancy over its inhabitants,” and compelled them “to 
move along with it” (15).37  
This observation would seem to suggest that “modern civilization” (al-madanīya al-
ḥadītha) is other than “Islamic civilization,” a view reinforced by Zaydān’s description of what 
distinguishes the current nahḍa from all earlier epochs in Arabic literary history. He describes 
how, since the advent of Islam up until the start of the nineteenth-century, Arabic literature 
remained entirely “within the domain of Islamic civilization” (14). However, from the nahḍa’s 
inception, the Arab world (al-ʿālim al-ʿarabī) began moving in an unprecedented way and 
developing the characteristics of “modern civilization” (5-6, 14-15), the most distinguishing 
feature of which, he notes, is “the influence of European civilization on it” (14). And yet, Zaydān 
is explicit that what the Arab world is becoming remains within the parameters of Arab-Islamic 
civilization. Though its literature is now “colored” by European civilization, it does not become 
European, as assured by and reflected in the Arabic literary revival.  
Zaydān’s narrative is developmental, cyclical, and comparative. Whichever civilization 
currently masters sciences determines the standard for what is considered “modern,” in the sense 
of the newest and most advanced. Today this is Europe. A thousand years ago it was the Abbasid 
                                                                                                                                                       
when they came to accept Orientalists’ values and telling of their own history. Orientalists are taken to have replaced 
the Arabs’ self with a corrupted subjectivity, as though such identities and entities had long since existed. It 
supposes the mistaken origin is what subjugates the self, and not the privileging of it or search for it. Foundations of 
Modern Arab Identity, 25-40. 
37 “lākin al-daula al-ʿarabiyya kānat yaumaʾidhin [fī ṣadr al-daula al-ʿabbāsiyya] fī ibān takawwunihā wa-nashāṭihā 
fa-haḍamat mā dakhala ʿalaihā min ʿulūm al-umam al-ukhrā wa-ṣabaghathu bi-ṣībghatihā al-ʿarabiyya al-islāmiyya. 
Amā fī hādhihī al-nahḍa fa-ghalaba tayyār al-madanīya al-ḥadītha ʿalā abnāʾihā fa-uḍṭarū ilā al-sair maʿahu.” 
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Empire. According to Zaydān, sciences may be developed by any people, in any location and 
spread to others who may likewise develop them in accordance with their means and needs. For 
Zaydān, the origins of the nahḍa-as-modernity lie in the earlier “scientific nahḍa,” when 
sciences most recently advanced in Europe were translated into Arabic. Arab-Islamic civilization 
became reinvigorated during the nineteenth-century because of the importation and translation of 
sciences, and was led to becoming, once again, a modern civilization. 
The Nahḍa and the Paradox of Modernity  
In many ways Zaydān’s account is representative of what the nahḍa is and comes to be. 
Most centrally, comparison with Europe, which set the standards for progress and modernity, 
pervades its outlook.38 Nahḍa exponents worked to decipher keys to Europe’s advancement  and 
causes for their own lands’ relative backwardness. This comparative outlook soon led many to 
question the place and role of religion in modern civilization: Did Christianity help or hinder 
Europe’s progress? Does Islam have a different relation to modernity than Christianity?39  
While the West provides models for how the Arab (or Arab-Islamic) world can realize its 
own potential, nahḍa writers did not seek to only emulate Europe. Their approach can be 
described as “selective integration”; they would adopt and adapt only those European sciences 
and practices that facilitate advancement without threatening the distinct character of the Arab-
Islamic world.40 Nahḍa intellectuals’ efforts to revive or preserve Islamic and/or Arab identity 
                                                
38 Badawi, 11; Makdisi, “‘Postcolonial’ Literature,”  89; Tomiche, 901.  
39 Kassab, 20-22. 
40 Cachia, “Introduction II,” 24; Hassan, Immigrant Narratives, 39, 97; Jacquemond, 119.  
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were intimately connected to their calls for reform and modernization.41 And yet, even while its 
contributors sought to protect and preserve their cultural identity against European incursion—
military and ideological—its revival was significantly shaped by Europe’s Orientalists, who 
taught Arabs their literature and history.42 Zaydān’s account highlights this influence, which he 
positively imagines as productive literary and cultural exchange. 
The nahḍa’s two primary aims—that of emulating aspects of Europe so as to progress 
while preserving or reviving Arab-Islamic culture—are seen to reflect the dilemma of 
(post)colonial modernity, which strives for both assimilation and separation, that is, for 
universalism (Europeanization) and particularism (nationalisms). This “problem” marks or 
plagues nahḍa writings,43 whose “paradoxical strategy of cultural revitalization” reflects its 
exponents’ central preoccupation: how can we become like Europe, while also remaining true to 
ourselves?44  
Following Hourani’s analysis of Arabic thought in the “Liberal Age” (1798-1939) one 
typically distinguishes two stages in the nahḍa’s development: its earliest generation of pioneers, 
beginning from Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī, display an optimism and openness to Europe illustrative of 
                                                
41 Hassan, Tayeb Salih, xi; Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity, 34ff.  
42 Kamran Rastegar discusses the “modern resurrection” of 1001 Nights, which was shaped by European fascination 
with the text. See his Literary Modernity Between the Middle East and Europe: Textual transactions in nineteenth-
century Arabic, English, and Persian literatures (New York: Routledge, 2007), 55-65. See also, al-Daʿmi’s text, 
which provides numerous examples of Orientalists constructing Arab-Islamic history. Their accounts were then 
taught to, and accepted by, Arabs, albeit with certain modifications. Muhammad al-Daʿmi, Arabian Mirrors and 
Western Soothsayers: Nineteenth-Century Literary Approaches to Arab-Islamic History (New York: Lang, 2002). 
The second chapter of Said’s Orientalism, remains critically relevant for exposing and exploring ways in which 
nineteenth-century European Orientalists shaped the Arabic canon and perceptions of Arab-Islamic history, and, by 
extension, the Orient itself. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 113-97. Cf. Zaydān, 
Tārīkh Ādāb, 144 ff.  
43 Selim, “The People’s Entertainments,” 40; Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity, 78.  
44 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 4-5.  
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their “precolonial” milieu.45 Though the British effectively occupy Egypt from 1882, their 
presence does not initially diminish this openness, as visible in Zaydān’s account. However, 
following the realization of England and France’s betrayal in the wake of World War I, 
colonialism revealed its true colors and showed the Arabs that the West is an adversary and 
cannot be a trusted teacher. The nahḍa’s relation to the West then transformed, as did Arabs’ 
views of the nahḍa itself.46  
From the interwar period and especially after World War II, due to Arab countries’ 
forced participation in the War and the establishment of Israel which followed, the nahḍa, when 
invoked, became a more explicit and focused Arab nationalist project, displaying increasing 
hostility towards “the West.” This change leads to the distinction between the nahḍa as a 
movement from the mid-nineteenth century through the first decades of the twentieth, when it 
was marked by optimism and openness to the West, and the nahḍa as it continued on after World 
Wars I and II in the spirit of a pan-Arab anti-colonial nationalist endeavor.47 The devastating 
Israeli defeat of 1967 brought about the collapse of Arab nationalism and with it the final demise 
of the nahḍa project.48  
                                                
45 el-Ariss, 9-10. Colla, 273. Hassan, Tayib Saleh, 1-2. Jacquemond, 119. Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab 
Identity, 6-7. 
46 Kassir, 52. Hassan cites two essays by Gibrān Khalīl Gibrān to illustrate Arabs’ turn against the nahḍa after 
World War I. The first was published during the War and the second in 1923. In the former, Gibrān imagined 
“French colonialism to be not only benevolent but ‘the architect of our new house. France will help us become a 
living nation.’” After the war Gibrān charges that the “Arab renaissance was no more than slavish mimicry of 
Western thought and tastes, a superficial veneer of modernity.” Demonstrating the turn towards nationalist rhetoric 
and the reframing of the “nahḍa,” Gibrān anticipates that “the true renaissance” will become “embodied in 
economic cooperation among Arab countries and their political unity and independence.” Hassan, Immigrant 
Narratives, 70; citing Khalīl Gibrān, nuṣūṣ khārij al-majmūʿa, ed. Antoine al-Qawwal (Beirut: Dār Amwāj, 1993), 
228, 235-36, 239.  
47 Sabry Hafez, The Genesis of Arabic Narrative Discourse: A Study in the Sociology of Modern Arabic Literature 
(London: Saqi Books, 1993), 42-44.  
48 Hassan, Tayeb Salih, xi, 6. Selim, The Novel and the Rural Imaginary, 234n2.  
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Partha Chatterjee’s discussion of Nationalist Thought in the Colonial Age is relevant 
here. Chatterjee argues that the problem of nationalist thought in the non-European world—
namely, that it has no historical alternative other than “to try to approximate the given attributes 
of modernity” even though that approximation means its continued subjection under a world 
order that sets its tasks for it—challenges the very universality of the rational and the scientific.49 
Thought dominates long after military rule ends, and as early nahḍa writings suggest, can 
dominate without military rule, to which it may lead. “Nationalist thought” is not the only object 
of Chatterjee’s critique, and the implications of his study reach far beyond colonial and post-
colonial nationalisms. The core of the problem he identifies is “the bourgeois-rationalist 
conception of knowledge, established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual 
history.”50 The nahḍa, as well as the nationalisms which develop after, alongside, as well as with 
and through it, regardless of whether they are “open” or “closed” to the West, are all “seduced, 
apprehended, and imprisoned” by a universal ideal of Enlightenment.51 Not only is this ideal 
unattainable because its realization would destroy itself, but its maintainance requires the 
preservation of dichotomies between the self and the other, the West and the colonized rest, 
because the ideal exists through asserting its sovereignty over the Other. In other words, 
modernity’s paradoxical appearance is a consequence of the hegemony of one particular 
universalism, which requires those with less power to willfully participate in their own 
subjugation.  
                                                
49 Chatterjee, 10. 
50 Ibid., 11. 
51 Ibid., 17. 
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The Nahḍa: Returning to Beginnings 
The “two leading intellectual centres of the Nahḍah” in the nineteenth century were 
Greater Syria (al-Shām, hereafter translated as Syria) and Egypt.52 By the late-nineteenth century 
the nahḍa converged in Egypt, especially following the emigration of a large number of Syrians, 
which secured “the region’s cultural center…on the banks of the Nile.”53  
The date of the nahḍa’s end varies dependent upon which nahḍa one describes, as well as 
whether a writer views Arab nationalism as a stage of its development or the response to its 
failure. Its beginning is far less equivocal. The nahḍa develops as a consequence of 
reverberations emanating from the first modern colonial invasion of an Ottoman territory: 
Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt from 1798-1801. The French military campaign, along with the 
accompanying scientific Institut d’Egypte, influenced the region through different but connected 
mechanisms: the former demonstrated the superiority of Napoleon’s modern army while the 
latter presented France’s sciences to Egypt’s inhabitants as the means to advance themselves, at 
the same time that Orientalists affirmed the value of Arabic language and literature.54 The 
combination of these factors contributed to the shape of what would develop soon after as al-
nahḍa. 
                                                
52 Badawi, 12. Cf. Ayalon, 561; Amin, Arab Nation, 30; Brugman, 12; Hafez, 45-48; Zaydān, Tārīkh Ādāb, 6. 
53 Ayalon, 561. Cf. Roger Allen, The Arabic Novel: An Historical and Critical Introduction (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1982), 25-26; Hafez, 46; Newman, “Myths and Realities,” 10. 
Several factors impacted this migration, including: violence in Mount Lebanon and Damascus in the late 
1850s and 1860 and continued instability in the region thereafter; the increasingly restrictive censorship policies 
under Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909); and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Many Syrian emigrants 
relocated to Cairo.  
54 Frequently Napoleon’s military and scientific campaigns are separated and described differently, the former 
presented as an agent of imperial aggression, the latter as one which bestowed advantages upon the region. Hassan, 
Tayeb Salih, 1.  Jurjī Zaydān’s portrayal in Tārīkh Ādāb (11-12) described above illustrates this tendency. 
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One of the most immediate and significant consequences of the three-year occupation, 
was that it enabled Muḥammad ʿAlī to come to power.55 The interrelated policies he instituted—
sending students abroad for education; reforming and developing new schools to educate army 
officers; and supporting the translation and publication of European military, geographical, 
scientific, and historical texts—facilitated the nahḍa’s development, even if this was far from the 
governor’s intention.56  
Muḥammad ʿAlī dispatched the first large-scale organized mission of students in 1826, to 
the École égyptienne in Paris.57 This school itself was set up by Edmé François Jomard58 (1777-
1862), best known as the editor of the Description de l’Egypte.59 The French Orientalist had 
suggested a similar project as early as 1811, when he submitted a plan to the French Consul in 
Egypt, Bernadino Drovetti, “for civilizing Egypt by means of education.”60 Jomard describes 
how Muḥammad ʿAlī rejected the proposal on the grounds that “his subjects were too ignorant to 
                                                
55 Badawi, 6; Brugman, 11-12; Cachia, “Modern Arabic Literature,” 284-85. 
56 Until recently Muḥammad ʿAlī was extolled as “the nationalist father and founder of Modern Egypt.” It is now 
more widely accepted that his policies and ruling strategy were driven primarily by his desire to maximize Egyptian 
autonomy (within the Ottoman State) and establish himself and his family as its rulers. With this reappraisal, his role 
in the nahḍa’s development is recognized as an unintentional or precursory one. Khalid Fahmy, All the Pasha’s 
Men: Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt (New York: American University of Cairo Press, 
2002). 
57 This was not the first time individual students were sent to study in Europe from Egypt or the Ottoman empire, 
though the École égyptienne was the first institution set up for this purpose. On students trained abroad in the 18th- 
and early nineteenth-century, see Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission,” 2-6. 
58 Jomard first arrived in Egypt in 1798 with Napoleon’s expedition, was a member of the Institute d’Egypt and 
worked as one of the fourteen engineer-geographers who surveyed and mapped the Nile Valley in 1799. 
59 The twenty-volume Description de l’Egypte on ancient and contemporary Egyptian civilization was compiled by 
those scientists and artisans who accompanied Napoleon’s expedition. Jomard spent over 20 years editing the work 
before its completion in 1829. Its contents are available online at http://descegy.bibalex.org/index1.html. 
60Alain Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France Under Muhammad Ali,” in Modern Egypt: Studies in 
Politics and Society, edited by E. Kedourie and S. G. Haim. (London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1980), 5; 




benefit from European travel.”61 About six years later Jomard “[begged] the Viceroy to 
reconsider” his earlier proposal, this time through Osman Nourreddin once he returned to Egypt 
after studying in France, which was again rejected.62 However, by 1826, due to the high cost of 
employing foreign instructors in Egypt, Muḥammad ʿAlī agreed to establish a mission abroad. 
The Egyptian governor followed Consul Drovetti’s advice and chose to send his students to 
France instead of Italy.63  
Jomard was devoted to the École égyptienne. He single-handedly built its curriculum, 
taught geography there, and co-directed the school—all of which he did for no salary, but only 
because of “the benefit [it serves] to both countries.”64 In his entry on the Institut d’Egypte in the 
Encyclopédie des Gens du Monde (1840), Jomard draws a direct line from the school for 
Egyptians in Paris to the activity of France in Egypt three decades earlier, when he asks the 
rhetorical question in its closing paragraph: “This dispatch of a colony of 120 Egyptians [i.e., the 
École Égyptienne], entrusted to France to study in its womb, is it anything besides a continuation 
of the activities of the Institut d’Égypt?”65 Jomard, the link between both institutions, connects 
the aims and actions of the three-year French occupation to the five-year course of study of 
                                                
61 Silvera, “Edme-François Jomard,” 212. 
62 According to Jomard, Muḥammad ʿAlī responded to Noureddin with the statement: “Now that you’ve acquired all 
that learning abroad, why don’t you create a school of your own right here with the means at your disposal? When 
your students have attained a certain level of proficiency I shall send them to Paris.” In accord with this request, 
Noureddin established the preparatory school of Qasr al-ʿAini. Silvera, “Edme-François Jomard,” 212-13. Cf. 
Ridley, 346n42-43. 
63 Ridley, 206-08. 
64 Ronald T. Ridley, Napoleon’s Proconsul in Egypt: The Life and Times of Bernadino Drovetti (London: Rubicon 
Press, 1998), 208, 213.  
65 Cited and translated by Tageldi, in her Disarming Words, 111. The French text is taken from the second part of 
the 14th volume of the Encyclopédie, 761: “Et cet envoi d’une colonie de cent vingt Égyptiens, confiés à la France 
pour s’instruire dans son sein, qu’est-ce autre chose que la continuation des travaux de l’Institut d’Égypte?” 
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Egyptians. Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī, “the most eminent member of the [Egyptian] Mission”66 and 
its only student to have left a record of his experiences at the school, reflects upon Jomard’s 
leadership, and the sincerity of the Frenchman’s devotion to Egypt’s betterment. He describes 
Jomard as enamored both externally and internally with Egypt, and emphasizes how he exhibits 
“a deep concern for Egypt’s interests,” “as if he were among the sons of Egypt who are devoted 
to her.”67 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī, “the great revivalist of the nineteenth century,” is the earliest of the nahḍa’s 
“pioneers.”68 Narratives of his foundational role begin from his participation in the mission to 
Paris from 1826-1831, and tend to emphasize the major impact his European sojourn had upon 
the modernization of his political and social thought.69 In his studies in Paris he specialized in 
translation from French into Arabic. After returning to Cairo in 1831 he became the foremost 
force behind the extensive translation movement developed during Muḥammad ʿAlī’s reign.70 
                                                
66 Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission,” 17. 
67 Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī, Takhlīṣ al-ibriz ilā takhlīṣ bāriz (Bulaq, 1834), 209, 20, 207. 
68 Brugman, 24. 
69 On Muḥammad ʿAlī’s missions to Europe see Alain Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France 
Under Muḥammad ʿAlī,” in Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society, eds. E. Kedourie and S. G. Haim 
(London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd, 1980); Newman, An Imam in Paris, esp. 15-28. On the roles of Jomard and 
Bernadino Drovetti in the Egyptian mission see Ridley, 206-214, which cites numerous letters from Jomard to 
Drovetti contained in Drovetti’s Epistolario.  
 Al-Ṭahṭāwī was sent to accompany the mission as its imam, not as a student. However, at the last minute a 
decree was issued which allowed him to participate in its course of study and to specialize in translation. Jamāl al-
Dīn al-Shayyāl, Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī 1801-1873, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1980), 26.  
70 When al-Ṭahṭāwī returned to Cairo he first worked as a translator at the medical school, then the artillery school. 
While at the artillery school he submitted a proposal to Muḥammad ʿAlī to found a school for training translators 
and undertaking translations. In response, the school of languages (madrasat al-alsun) was founded in 1835 and al-
Ṭahṭāwī was made its director in 1837.  
On the history of translation in Egypt in the nineteenth-century see Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, Tārīkh al-
Tarjama wa-l-Ḥaraka al-Thaqāfiyya fī ʿAṣr Muḥammad ʿAlī (Port Said: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2000), 
esp. 38-44 (on the school of languages) and 120-158 (on al-Ṭahṭāwī and his roles and activity in the translation 
movement). Appendices 1 and 2 list translations from the school of languages. See also Jāk Tājir’s Ḥarakat al-
Tarjama bi-Miṣr Khilāl al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ ʿAshar (Miṣr: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1945), esp. 29-39. 
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From 1837 he directed the School of Languages (madrasat al-alsun), where he supervised 
hundreds of translations and trained a generation of translators.71 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s name is “particularly prominent” in studies of the nahḍa, a position 
justified through the centrality of translation (of texts, ideas, and institutions) to the nahḍa’s 
endeavors.72 “Inextricably linked with the cultural Renaissance (nahḍa) of Egypt, in which he 
was one of its driving forces,”73 he is “recast as the harbinger of the ‘nahḍa’”74 and described as 
its “emblematic figure.”75 From among the nahḍa’s pioneers, he is one of the few to whom 
different and divergent strands are traced, because his writings and activity are considered 
foundational for social, political, religious, and literary reform.76 The account of his stay and 
studies in Paris, Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī [ilā] Talkhīṣ Bārīz (1834), is hailed as the text that initiates 
nahḍa discourse.77  
                                                
71 Most accounts describing translation into Arabic and Turkish during the nineteenth-century, whether in Arabic or 
European languages, highly praise al-Ṭahṭāwī and the school of languages he directed. However, one exception to 
this, contemporary with the language school, deserves mention. As described above, Jomard took a great interest in 
Egyptian (and African) policies and reforms. In a confidential report to the Muḥammad ʿAlī, sent in 1839 on the eve 
of escalating tensions between the Egyptian army and the Sublime Porte, Jomard offers advice to the governor on 
how Egypt should reform its economy, agriculture, and educational institutions. He critiques the many vocational 
schools recently founded, and has particularly harsh words for Sheikh Rifāʿa’s work and leadership at the translation 
school. Silvera, “Edme-François Jomard,” 315-16n40. 
72 Allen, “Rewriting Literary History,” 251. 
73 Newman, An Imam in Paris, 11. Cf. Tageldin who writes that he “catalyzed what liberal nationalist historiography 
would call Egypt’s intellectual ‘renaissance’ in this period.” Tageldin, “One Comparative Literature,” 428. 
74 Gürsel, 246. 
75 Jacquemond, 118-19. Cf. Louca, (11) who identifies al-Ṭahṭāwī as the very symbol of the Nahḍa: “Le nom du 
jeune cheikh, Rifāʿa at-Tahtāwī (1801-1873), sera le plus célèbre du contingent, et le symbole mēme du mouvement 
de la Renaissance qui s’engage, la Nahḍa.”  
76 For example, Najjar notes how both “the religious-reform movement” and “the liberal-secularist movement” are 
traced to al-Ṭahṭāwī. Fauzi M. Najjar, “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement,” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 31.2 (2004): 196. Cf. Abaza, 302. 
77 Naṣr Abū Zayd, al-Marʾa fī Khiṭāb al-Azma (Cairo: Dār al-Nuṣūṣ, 1994), 47; Badawi, 16; Hassan, Tayeb Salih, 1; 
Kassab, 22; Kassir, 45; Salama-Carr, 215. 
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 This view of al-Ṭahṭāwī and the role of the West in awakening him, has not passed 
unchallenged. The work of Peter Gran has been influential in this regard. Beginning with the 
publication of his Islamic Roots of Capitalism in Egypt 1760-1840 in 1979, Gran refutes the 
interdependent narratives of the region’s centuries-long “decline” and its sudden entry into 
“modernity” impelled, as is so often claimed, by the arrival of French troops. 
Gran presents a vibrant cultural revival underway in Egypt from 1760 to 1790, 
demonstrating rapid and vast economic and social transformation in the decades preceding 
Napoleon’s invasion. He shows how both the “so-called neoclassical period” and the “counter-
impulse toward linguistic simplification and utilitarianism” preexisted Western incursion by 
several decades.78 Likewise, al-Ṭahṭāwī’s “progressive intellectual outlook” was due to the 
education he received before he ever set foot outside of Egypt, and in particular to the instruction 
and influence of his mentor Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār.79 Paris, Gran argues, is wrongly credited with 
enlightening him.  
Missionaries in Syria: Transmitting and Translating Secularism  
The impact of Muḥammad ʿAlī’s reforms and leadership were felt in Greater Syria, 
especially through the dissemination of Arabic and Turkish books printed on the government 
                                                
78 Gran, Islamic Roots, xiii-xiv; Cf. 57-75. A. L. Tibawi, a historian of nineteenth-century Syria, similarly refutes the 
significance given to 1798 as the the point when the West awakened of the East, beginning its turn towards 
modernity. Instead, Tibawi emphasizes continuity in place of rupture, arguing that “the movement variously 
described as reform, modernization, or renaissance” is evident prior to 1798 just as “medieval” ideas continued well 
beyond then. A. L. Tibawi, “Some Misconceptions about the Nahḍa,” Middle East Forum 47 (1971): 21. 
79 Gran, Islamic Roots, 159-63, 185. Cf. Gran, “Ṭahṭāwī in Paris” Al-Ahram online, January 2002, 10-16. 
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press in Bulaq from 1822.80 These became widely available, especially from the time of 
Muḥammad ʿAlī’s nine-year occupation (1831-40), when his son Ibrāhīm Pasha governed the 
region. However, the beginning of the nahḍa in Syria is not only, and sometimes not even 
primarily, seen as a consequence of Napoleon’s and Muḥammad ʿAlī’s occupations, nor the 
latter’s modernizations. It remains, nonetheless, like the situation in Egypt, described as a 
consequence of, or response to, the West’s impact. In Syria this is traced to the influence of 
Christians, Christianity, and missionaries.  
George Antonius’ The Arab Awakening (1938) emphasizes the unique role of Jesuit 
(French) and Protestant (American) missionaries in the region’s development, and credits their 
efforts with facilitating its awakening.81 In particular he praises the Protestant mission, whose 
labors generated “the intellectual effervescence which marked the first stirrings of the Arab 
[national] revival.”82 Later scholars temper Antonius’ adulatory appraisal by emphasizing how 
competition between the Protestants and Jesuits drove both missions’ educational activities far 
more than philanthropy.83 Such emendations argue that the nahḍa is better viewed as an indirect 
outcome of missionary activity, and one that was shaped by Arab Christians themselves.  
                                                
80 On printing in the region and the influence of the press in Bulaq, see J. Heyworth-Dunne,“Printing and 
Translations under Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt: The Foundation of Modern Arabic,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society 3 (1940): 325-249; Shayyāl, Tārīkh al-tarjama. 
81 Antonius’ text would be better read as a illustration of the developing Arab national movement (as his foreword 
suggests) than as a description of the nahḍa. However, much like Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
Antonius’ text has been made into a history of the nahḍa, which has also contributed to shaping nahḍa. 
82 Antonius emphasizes in particular how the Protestant schools “gave the pride of place to Arabic” and vigorously 
took up the task of “providing an adequate Arabic literature.” Antonius, 41-43. Cf. Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern 
History of Lebanon (New York: Caravan Books, 1977), 146. 
83 Cachia, “Modern Arabic Literature,” 285-86. Cf. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to 
the Present, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1962), 453. 
 Examples of such activities include their competing Arabic bible translations and the founding of new 
schools for elementary and higher education. The crowning achievements of the latter are the still operative (Jesuit) 
Université Saint-Joseph, founded in 1875, and the Syrian Protestant College, founded in 1866 (later renamed the 
American University of Beirut). 
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Christians’ participation and influence in the nahḍa’s developments is repeatedly 
distinguished from that of Muslims, regardless of whether missionaries are mentioned. This 
results from their affinity to Europe, which Muslims do not share. Such informs Arabic literary 
scholar Pierre Cachia’s confident assertion in 1960 that “naturally, Christian Arabs everywhere 
were more receptive than Muslims to European ideas and ideals.”84 Three decades later, in a 
section titled “The Christian Contribution” in his introduction to the Cambridge History of 
Modern Arabic Literature (1992), Cachia qualifies his earlier assertion, explaining that 
“Christian Arabs—mainly Syrians—were in fact to make disproportionately large contributions 
to several aspects of the Nahḍah in its early stages, if only because (at a time when group 
loyalties were formed on religious rather than national or ethnic axes) they found it easier than 
did the Muslims to accept ideas originating in, or transmitted by, Christian Europe.”85 This 
emendation replicates the underlying premise of his earlier statement, which takes for granted a 
distinction between Christians and Muslims that divides these populations from each other, at the 
same time that it brings Christian Arabs closer to Europe, positioning them to serve as conduits 
for transmitting Europe’s thought into the region. 
Similar to Cachia, M. M. Badawi, the literary scholar who edited the Cambridge volume, 
presents only Muslims as experiencing a crisis of modernity, for the question of “how to 
westernize or modernize while remaining Muslims,” did not “of course,…arise in the case of 
Christian Arabs.” He clarifies and illustrates his statement by explaining how some Christians, 
“like al-Shidyāq [!], adopted an anti-clerical stance or even advocated secularization, like Shiblī 
                                                
84 Cachia, “Modern Arabic Literature,” 285. 
85 Cachia, Introduction II, 26. 
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Shumayyil (1860-1917) and Faraḥ Anṭūn (1874-1922).”86 Badawi’s statement uses “secular 
thought” to stand in for what modernity and the West are, and implies that the idea of a Muslim 
modernity is inherently paradoxical, because, unlike the Christian, the Muslim cannot be secular, 
and what is modern must be secular.  
This view of Christians as the transmitters of a particularly Western modernity to Syria 
increasingly has its critics. Historian A. L. Tibawi disputes the view that missionaries initiated or 
inspired the nahḍa in Syria, and he emphasizes the participation of Muslims alongside Christians 
in its development.87 He argues that the “fantastic claim” that “the missionaries were 
instrumental in the ‘rediscovery’ of the Arabic literary heritage” is a distortion of the facts, which 
disregards “entirely the prior revival in Egypt” and neglects “outstanding Muslim literary 
figures” in Syria during this period.88 He explains that these erroneous allegations have been 
propagated primarily by missionaries and their Protestant admirers, as well as by Lebanese-
Christian nationalist historians, and he explicitly incriminates both Antonius and Hourani.89 At 
                                                
86 Badawi, 11. Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi (141-43) makes a similar assertion, claiming that the “[Lebanese] 
Christian could easily accept the West” and join “the vanguard of an Arabic literary revival,” unlike the [Lebanese] 
Muslim who had to abandon much that “was fundamental to the Moslem heritage” in order to westernize. Cf. 
Hourani. 
Badawi’s example neglects to consider whether and how a conversion challenges such presumably clear 
distinctions. Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq (1804-1887) was born into a Maronite family, converted to Protestantism in 
1820 and then to Islam in 1860, when he took the name Aḥmad.  
87 See A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine (London: Macmillan, 1969), esp. 
140-47; and idem, “Some Misconceptions,” 15-22. For an extensive examination of the American mission in 
particular, see idem, American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: A Study of Education, Literary and Religious Works 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
88 Tibawi, Modern History, 145. Regarding the latter point, he names several influential Syrian Muslim literary 
figures absent in accounts of the region’s development, such as Aḥmad al-Barbīr (d. 1811), ʿUmar al-Bakri al-Yāfi 
(d. 1818), and Amīn al-Jundi (d. 1841). His inclusion of these figures very intentionally predates 1798. 
 Further, he criticizes studies of the nahḍa for their exaggerated and incorrect emphasis on the impact of 
foreigners upon those few Muslims from the next generation they do mention, such as Maḥmūd Ḥamzah (d. 1887), 
Yūsuf al-Asīr (d.1889), and Ibrāhīm al-Aḥdab (d. 1890). Tibawi, A Modern History, 145-46; “Some 
Misconceptions,” 18-19, 21-22. 
89 Tibawi, “Some Misconceptions,” 17-21. Tibawi does not claim the American missionaries played no role in the 
nahḍa, but refutes Antonius’ view that they awakened love for the Arabic language and literature. Rather, the 
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stake in his refutation is the question of who generates and develops modernity in Syria, as well 
as the degree and nature of Western influence on, and intervention in, the region. 
Those who follow Tibawi tend to modify his assertion that the Protestant mission had 
little to no impact on the nahḍa by demonstrating ways Arabs appropriated information the 
mission provided and used it for their own needs and benefit, often against the mission’s 
intentions. For example, Marwa Elshakry investigates Protestant missionaries’ use of science in 
their proselytizing efforts in Beirut.90 She demonstrates both the effectiveness of their 
educational program and its limitations. Focusing on the Syrian-Protestant College, she describes 
how the mission taught sciences in order to facilitate conversion. Arab Christians and Muslims, 
however, were able to use what they learned in ways that resisted conversion and were 
compatible with their own faiths. Not only this, but students at the college even came to impact 
the mission, which, responding to local needs and demands, was made to offer an education that 
became increasingly technological and vocational and less concerned with spreading the Gospel. 
She does not differentiate between Muslim and Christian reactions to the mission’s work at the 
College, but emphasizes their common response.  
It remains far more common, however, to maintain the separation between Christians and 
Muslims, usually in order to explain how and why “secular thought” first emerges among 
Christians in Syria as part of the region’s nahḍa. At the root of the matter is the belief that 
                                                                                                                                                       
missionaries left their mark by providing the market for a simplified neo-classical style, by commissioning Arabs to 
produce textbooks for use in the their schools. Tibawi, A Modern History, 144. 
 Tibawi reproduces information demonstrating that no Catholic or American press published classical 
Arabic texts during the nineteenth century. Up until the last quarter of the nineteenth century they only printed 
religious materials and textbooks, of limited interest and distribution. On the other hand, native presses in Istanbul 
reproduced Arabic works from the beginning of the nineteenth century, and at Bulaq in Egypt from 1820 (which 
were extensively circulated in Syria during the Egyptian occupation). By mid-century Syrians began their own 
“secular” presses. It was these that first printed major works of Arabic literature. Tibawi, A Modern History, 141-42, 
143-44; and “Some Misconceptions,” 16-17. 
90 Marwa Elshakry, “The Gospel of Science and American Evangelism in Late Ottoman Beirut,” Past and Present 
196 (2007): 173-214.  
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secular thought is Western in origin and that is was transmitted to, and then adapted by, Eastern 
Christians. Several questions then arise, which recent scholars have taken up: how did it come to 
be that Christians transmitted Western thought into the region? Did they shape this thought as 
they absorbed and adapted it, and if so, how, and in response to what? 
In her recent survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Contemporary Arab Thought 
(2010), Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab points to Christians’ distinct role in the nahḍa. In a sentence 
whose many qualifications speak to the challenge of accurately and sensitively describing the 
matter, she points out how “Christian Lebanese thinkers from the mid-nineteenth century onward 
offered nonreligious, though not antireligious (but sometimes anticlerical) and certainly not anti-
Islamic, views of progress and identity.”91 She relays how Christians’ position in Ottoman 
society and their contacts with the West, led them to experience “particular advantages” over 
Ottoman Muslims (e.g., they were more familiar with European languages, and able to respond 
to Western ideas without religious defensiveness) as well as “distinct inconveniences” (e.g., they 
were a minority in a Muslim majority, but were also disempowered as “Easterners” in the face of 
Western Christians and Western Christianity).92 Through this differentiation, Kassab explains 
why “a number of Arab Christians” advocated “more pronounced secularism,” through which 
they came to imagine “a vision of identity based on the Arabic literary heritage and common 
Arab history, as well as a solidarity around this identity across religious divisions.”93 Her 
portrayal maintains “secularism” as an idea transmitted to Christian Arabs through their contacts 
with the West, even as she refutes the view that Christian Arabs felt a greater affinity to Western 
                                                
91 Kassab, 31. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 31-32. 
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Christians than they did to Arab Muslims. She argues that it was their closeness to the latter that 
explains why Christian Arabs would use Western ideas to build a new “secular” sense of Arab 
identity, through which they could improve their disadvantageous minority position within 
Ottoman society. 
The most prominent name among Syrian pioneers is Buṭrus al-Bustānī, a Maronite who 
was among the few to convert to Protestantism.94 Several writers (Makdisi 2008; Sheehi 2004; 
Zachs 2005) have recently treated al-Bustānī as a case study to illustrate the “interactions” and 
“exchanges” between Arab Christians and Protestant missionaries, and in order to suggest how 
and why Christians were among the first to articulate secular and nationalist ideas in Syria. Both 
Stephen Sheehi and Fruma Zachs argue, albeit in significantly different articulations, that 
secularism in Syria emerged as a reaction against the mission’s teachings and practices, and not 
as its legacy. For example, Zachs argues al-Bustānī appropriates the missionaries’ vision, 
transforming their “idea of [a Christian] Syria” into “a secular [Arab] one,” which better suited 
his needs and context.95 Sheehi, on the other hand, describes how al-Bustānī’s “secularism” 
developed “hand in hand with his nationalism,” as he came to distance himself from the 
Protestant mission because of its prejudiced policies which denied Arab congregations 
independence and refused converts leadership positions.96  
According to Sheehi, Syrian Christians were not drawn to secular Arab nationalism 
through some Christian affinity with the West, but rather the opposite.97 The lack of affinity they 
                                                
94 Sacks, 37; Levy, 92; Kassir, 45; Massad, 8; Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity; and Fruma Zachs, The 
Making of a Syrian Identity (Boston: Brill, 2005), esp. 145-48.  
95 Zachs, 171; Cf. 127.  
96 Sheehi, Foundations of Modern Arab Identity, 16-18. 
97 Sheehi expresses this in strong terms in his “Failure, Modernity, and the Works of Hisham Sharabi.” 
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experienced through their interactions with missionaries compelled them to realize an “Arab” 
identity as more meaningful and unifying than a Christian one.  
Shifting Paradigms  
The previous section observed two trends in recent studies of the Ottoman East, which 
react to and correct earlier misconceptions of the Orient as passive, and as awakened by the 
West, heralding modernity. The nahḍa, whose story is entwined in narratives of the West’s 
impact and the region’s modernity, is shaped by these shifts.  
Whereas scholarship had once approached the nahḍa, whether literary, political, 
scientific, etc., though a lens attuned to its emulation of Western models, it is now increasingly 
common to seek local or indigenous articulations, in order to correct the Eurocentric biases of 
earlier research. Scholars whose groundbreaking research focused on Western hegemonic forms, 
whether or not named as such, have come to question or modify their earlier work. For example, 
in the preface to the 1983 reissue of Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, Hourani reflects upon 
how he could have written a very different book. In 1962 he focused on exploring breaks, not 
continuities, and as such he worries he may have overly emphasized the “modern” [i.e. 
“Western] in Arabic thought, at the expense of the “traditional.”98 More recently, renowned 
literary scholar Roger Allen (2007) calls upon “Arabic studies” to investigate “in greater detail 
the balance between…indigenous and imported cultural forces,” advocating a view which is 
open to “continuities” where it had once only imagined “ruptures.”99 Allen announces this 
                                                
98 Hourani, viii-ix. 
99 Allen, “Rewriting Literary History,” 253-54, 259. Allen’s work “The Arabic Novel” published a quarter-century 
earlier, was highly influential in the field of English-language Arabic literary criticism. In that work Allen traces and 
surveys the development of the “Arabic novel” as a genre whose “origins lie in the Western traditions.” Challenging 
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change optimistically, predicting that rectifying former imbalances will eventually enable a more 
accurate and complete understanding of the nahḍa.  
Thanks to the more recent researches considering and revealing indigenous modernities 
well underway before the West’s violent intervention, it is now more commonly accepted that 
the East was already en route to some form of modernity before the West intervened and directed 
it as it would. And yet, 1798 remains pervasive as the starting point from which to narrate 
modern Egyptian and Middle Eastern history.  
In a new introduction to the second edition of his Islamic Roots, Gran ruminates on why, 
despite all amassing powerful evidence to the contrary, the date of the French invasion remains 
the watershed moment in the writing of modern Egyptian history. After a lengthy discussion 
examining the range of possible explanations, Gran proposes the most convincing answer: the 
continued adherence to the “1798 paradigm” is “bound up with the maintenance of various 
contemporary hegemonies,” in particular the cultural hegemony of today’s “crusaderist 
democracies,” such as the United States.100 When modernity is understood as the technological 
and civilizational advances Napoleon is claimed to have introduced to Egypt, imperialist projects 
everywhere may be justified.  
What is most interesting about Gran’s hypothesis, is not that it refutes the significance of 
1798. Rather his observations make this date all the more meaningful, by drawing a direct link 
between the French mission civilisatrice and present imperialisms, less often named as such. 
Instead of arguing that 1798 is insignificant, or perhaps not so significant, it would be more 
                                                                                                                                                       
those who interpret modern Arabic literature as deficient, Allen argues (in 1982) that Arab novelists have admirably 
met the challenge of “catching up,” especially considering their “debt to the West.” The Arabic Novel, 15-17. His 
emendation to this in 2007 reflects a significant shift in his, and the field’s, orientation. Cf. Roger Allen, “The Post-
Classical Period: Parameters and Preliminaries,” in Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period, ed. Roger Allen 
and D. S. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-21. 
100 Gran, Islamic Roots, xii, xxx-xxxv.  
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productive to reexamine how and why it is important and what mechanisms connect it to and 
differentiate it from what precedes and follows it.101 
Reinstating 1798: Colonialism, Orientalism, Modernity  
One consequence of the shift towards investigating indigenous modernities prior to 1798, 
whether intentional or not, is that it may minimize, and at times would seem to seek to minimize, 
the impact of colonialism and imperialism on the Middle East and elsewhere.102 Shaden Tageldin 
presents a compelling challenge to this turn, arguing for the centrality of 1798 to modernity’s 
periodization, and by extension to the entire nahḍa project.  
In her Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (2011), 
Tageldin critiques recent historiographies of “Egyptian-European cultural contact,” which tend 
to “downplay the impact of colonialism on Egyptian interest in European knowledge,” and 
argues that “the significance of the colonial must be exposed.”103 While influential scholars such 
as Hourani portray the first generation of nahḍa writers as precolonial and identify the nahḍa’s 
decline as a response to colonialism, Tageldin argues that the nahḍa—that “Arab ‘awakening’ 
that begins at a French daybreak”—is “(post)colonial” from its very start (110).  
Tageldin dates the nahḍa from Egypt’s “first colonial confrontation with the modern 
West,” because this ruptural event generated a “new crisis and reorientation of Arab-Islamic 
                                                
101 Dror Ze’evi argues that modernity is not what Napoleon brought to the Egypt in 1798, but rather, how he brought 
it. He explains that “what we call ‘modernity’ arose out of a series of very specific and contingent changes which are 
closely tied to Europe’s domination of or major intrusion into the rest of the world.” Dror Ze’evi, “Back to 
Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East,” Mediterranean Historical Review 
19.1 (2004): 86. 
102 This turn can be seen in the growing preference for “early-modern” in place of what had been called “pre-
colonial.” It is worth considering whether and how these two designations functionally differ. 
103 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 108; further citations to this text will be made parenthetically above. 
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consciousness” (110). Those who disregard the unique characteristics and consequences of 1798, 
who present it as just another spike in the “long and painful interaction between two cultures 
with two contradictory world-views,” neuter “the coloniality of the Napoleonic occupation” and 
dismiss “the distinctively (post)colonial cast” that characterizes “Egyptian-European cultural 
contact” thereafter (110).104  
Tageldin describes the reoriented consciousness of nahḍa exponents, who believed they 
could “renew the faded glory of indigenous cultural heritages” by imitating Europe’s literary, 
philosophical, and scientific modes (5). That they did so in Arabic enabled them to imagine they 
were maintaining cultural authenticity, even as they were transporting French or English into 
Arabic. In other words, the nahḍa appeared to “preserve” Arabic, when it was actually 
“translating” and transforming it (5, original emphasis). In this way nahḍa writings are pervaded 
by modernity’s paradox, intelligible in that barely audible whisper (“how do I become 
European?”) underlying the more pronounced and conscious assertion—“Am I not an Azharite/ 
Arab/ Muslim/ Egyptian?”105 This, Tageldin argues, illustrates the (post)colonial condition of the 
dominated, who are seduced by the colonizer’s flattery into imagining equivalency where it does 
not exist, suppressing inequalities that threaten to surface, and refashioning their own culture and 
societies into what the dominator values. 
The colonizing text knows how to mobilize “affect,” what Tageldin describes as “the 
attachment of the colonized to themselves, which…is also an attachment to their lost 
sovereignty,” in order to  “strategically re-present the colonizer as the most flattering ‘likeness’ 
                                                
104 Here Tageldin is citing and critiquing Hafez’s The Genesis of Arabic Narrative Discourse, 38. 
Tageldin argues that writing reflecting this new (post)colonial cast can be seen from the time of the French 
occupation. She presents Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār’s Maqāmat al-Faransīs (c. 1799), whose “subterranean love plot” she 
probes, as a text which “launches the (post)colonial nahḍa” (29, 102). 
105 Tageldin’s introduction (1-2) makes use of ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Kīlīṭū’s Lan Tatakallama Lughatī (Thou Shalt Not 
Speak My Language), which articulates this question. 
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of the colonized” (17). In particular, Orientalism—“a translational form of cultural imperialism” 
(8)—most effected these developments, because it “translated Europe into Arab-Islamic terms” 
(7, original emphasis). Orientalist discourse captivated Egyptians because it sounded “like the 
language of the self” and presented “an illusory footing of ‘equal’ exchange” between the 
European and Egyptian (9). It “appeared to affirm Egypt’s Pharaonic and Arab-Islamic pasts as 
unbroken, still vital—uncolonized” (8). It engendered fantasies of Egypt’s equality, even 
superiority, to Europe, “in a global field that imperial Europe ultimately controls” (9). 
Tageldin’s intervention lies in her observation that modern colonialism, and its 
imperialist afterlives, works most effectively not through domination or imposition, but through 
“love.”106 Orientalism produces “a politics of translational seduction,” which “lures the 
colonized into loving the colonizer as they would themselves” (17, original emphasis). Tageldin 
specifies three forms of translation building this politics: the interlingual, which renders one 
language into another; the intercultural, which transacts “epistemic ‘equivalence’ in economies 
of cultural exchange”; and the intersubjective, which translates “one’s self to resemble an 
Other’s.” Taken together these divert “the language, epistemes, and very being of the dominated 
to approximate those of the dominator” (13, original emphasis).  
A politics of translational seduction “welds rupture to rapture” (26) enticing the colonized 
to willfully “endanger their own culture” (15), contributing to a loss of “cultural integrity” (23). 
Tageldin’s use of this politics connects to why she advocates an understanding of cultural 
imperialism (following John Tomlinson) as “loss rather than…imposition.” Deviating from 
                                                
106 She relates Thomas Trautmann’s study on the British in India, Aryans and British India, to the Egyptian context. 
Trautmann argues that the British employed “the Aryan idea” to establish a kinship between England and India, 
which he calls “a love story.” The Aryan idea “empowers the colonized to declare themselves as ‘equal to’ or 
‘greater than’ the European,” a thesis made all the more attractive when “issued from the gaze of the colonizer.” As 
in India, Tageldin argues that “French and British Orientalist projections of affinity with Arabic, Islam, and the 
ancient Egyptian engender similar fantasies of modern Egyptian sovereignty…in a global field that imperial Europe 
ultimately controls” (9). 
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Tomlinson, who ascribes this loss to “the failure of the processes of collective will-formation,” 
Tageldin posits loss “as a function of the very will of the colonized to rediscover their 
‘autonomy’ through the colonizer’s I” (17-18, original emphasis). In other words, when 
Orientalists presented Arabs their history and their literature, as they did from 1798 onwards, it 
affected Arabs’ self-conception.  It did this most powerfully, not by exposing deficiencies or 
“self-lack,” but through presenting the “lure of ‘reciprocity’—and the perception of self-value at 
its core” (8, original emphasis).  
Some Closing Remarks on Cultural Imperialism and Loss: 
Given Tageldin’s attention to the importance of self-value, it is surprising that she 
advocates an understanding of cultural imperialism as “loss.” She explains this choice by 
clarifying that what she calls “self-value” is only “perceived,” and that in reality the 
(post)colonial subject loses its true past self, once it comes to see itself through the eyes (and I) 
of the colonizer. “Loss,” then, is Tageldin’s interpretation of what the “perception of self-value” 
supplants. 
The image of “loss,”—much like the charge of “assimilation” discussed at the close of 
chapter 1—is predicated on an underlying sense of cultural authenticity. Had the West not 
intervened as it had, and redirected Egyptian self-consciousness away from its preexisting 
culture, Egypt would have followed a more natural course of development. Mourning “loss” 
assumes that cultures are, or should be, autonomous, and that they can be more or less natural. It 
overlooks that this manifestation of loss, like the notion of culture, is of modern origin.107  
                                                
107 See Tomoko Masuzawa, “Culture,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 70-93. 
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Viewed from a different angle, Tageldin’s observations could more aptly show how 
cultural imperialism works through “[gain] rather than… imposition.” Through Orientalism, the 
dominated gain a history and a culture. This may or may not be the history or culture one would 
have wanted for them or they for themselves, but it is nonetheless acquired. The Orientalist (or 
professor) teaches, and the colonized (or student) learns. This does not mean that Egyptian Arabs 
(or German Jews, for that matter) do not impact and shape what modernity’s agents place before 
and ahead of them, as Elshakry’s example from the Syrian Protestant College above illustrates so 
well. But, as the objects of imperialism and not its agents, they do not set the terms. 
The crisis or paradox of modernity is not caused by replacing one culture for another. It is 
not cultural loss, but the perception of loss, which obfuscates the transformations underway 
through which cultures and histories take shape as part of the reshuffling of peoples and 
emerging nations which characterize a secular globalizing modernity. Modernity’s paradox is a 
consequence of the problem of “Culture” and “cultures” and of “the very conception of the 
autonomy of cultures”108—a problem which afflicts the non-Christian West and the colonized 
East differently and far more coercively than it has the Christian West. 
 
That modernity’s “crisis” appears among nahḍa exponents suggests that emancipation is 
not its only cause, as some Wissenschaft commentators have interpreted. That it emerges among 
Wissenschaft exponents suggests it is not only a response to geopolitical colonialism.  
Allowed entry into the German University, those Jews who found the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums encountered a transforming Europe they believed was moving, or capable of moving, 
or being made to move, beyond Christianity, and saw reason and science as what will equalize 
                                                
108 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, 17. 
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and unite humanity. Like those Egyptians who detached the benevolence of the French from 
their imperialist ambitions and fantasized themselves Europe’s equals, working together and 
alongside Europe to advance themselves, the first generation of Jews trained in the new German 
university believed that science—which bespoke of equivalence and equality across peoples and 
cultures—promised a better and more just configuration for political and intellectual power than 







Reading Science in Leopold Zunz’s Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur (1818) 
 
 
Leopold Zunz (1794-1886) is recognized by a general consensus as the founder of the 
Wissenschaft des Judentums (Science of Judaism), whose beginning is traced to his essay Etwas 
über die rabbinische Litteratur (Some Remarks on Rabbinic Literature).1 Written in 1817, while 
Zunz was a student at the recently founded University of Berlin, and published in May 1818, the 
work has been described as “the opening programmatic statement of Wissenschaft des 
Judentums,”2 and as an “epoch-making manifesto,”3 whose “sudden illumination of the 
                                                
1 See chapter 1, 20n20. This 50-page pamphlet was first published in Berlin by Maurer in 1818. Its complete title is: 
Etwas über die rabbinishe Litteratur: nebst Nachrichten über ein altes bis jetzt ungedrucktes hebräisches Werk 
(Some remarks on rabbinic literature: together with information about an old hitherto unprinted Hebrew work). The 
edition cited throughout the chapter is from Zunz’s Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin: Louis Gerschel 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1875): 1-31, hereafter Etwas. A partial English translation is published in The Jew in the 
Modern World: A Documentary History, eds. Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 221-30. All translations here are my own.  
Appendix I of the dissertation reprints the German text from Zunz’s Gesammelte Schriften, alongside a 
complete English translation of the essay. 
References to Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur will be made parenthetically throughout the chapter. 
2 David Myers, “‘From Zion Will Go Forth Torah’: Jewish Scholarship and the Zionist Return to History” (PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 1991), 4. Others which address this essay as the first formulation of “Wissenschaft des 
Judentums” include: Alexander Altmann, “Jewish Studies: Their Scope and Meaning Today,” in Go and Study: 
Essays and Studies in Honor of Alfred Jospe, ed. Raphael Jospe and Samuel Z. Fishman (Washington D.C.: B’nai 
B’rith Hillel Foundations, 1980), 84; David R. Blumenthal, “Where Does ‘Jewish Studies’ Belong?” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 44.3 (1976): 540; Shmuel Feiner, “Nineteenth-Century Jewish Historiography: The 
Second Track,” in Reshaping the Past: Jewish History and the Historians, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 17-18; Nahum N. Glatzer, “The Beginnings of Modern Jewish Studies,” Essays in Jewish 
Thought (University: University of Alabama Press, 1978), 149; Jacob Haberman, “Some Changing Aspects of 
Jewish Scholarship,” Judaism 35.2 (1986): 183; Michael Maher, “The Beginnings of Wissenschaft Des [sic] 
Judentums,” in The Edward Hincks Bicentenary Lectures, ed. Kevin J. Cathcart (Dublin: University College Dublin, 
1994), 141, 149; Alexander Marx, “Moritz Steinschneider,” in Essays in Jewish Biography (Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1947), 112; Michael Meyer, “The Emergence of Jewish Historiography: Motives 
and Motifs,” History and Theory 27.4 (1988): 171; Ismar Schorsch, “The Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” in 
From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judiasm (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1990), 165; 




unexpected range of ‘rabbinic literature’ ignited a new ‘scholarly agenda.’”4 Its contribution 
towards modern historical research is repeatedly emphasized,5 as is its singular status as marking 
“the actual birth of modern Jewish literary criticism.”6 This piece has been read, praised, and 
critiqued towards various ends, and yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the founding 
and foundational concept of science it articulates. Even when described as a “plan of the science 
which he wished to be inaugurated”7 and one which “has long been justifiably revered as the 
cornerstone of the Wissenschaft edifice,”8 no exegetic effort has been devoted to the meaning 
and function of that rich word: science. Most of the attention given its contents has been 
confined to the essay’s influence on modern Jewish historiography, or summarized through 
erudite references to Philipp August Boeckh (1785-1867) and Friedrich August Wolf (1759-
1824), whose classes Zunz attended while a student at the University.9 These tend to explain 
Zunz’s science as the transposition of Boeckh’s philology onto Jewish texts.  
                                                                                                                                                       
3 Leon Wieseltier, “Etwas über die jüdische Historik: Leopold Zunz and the Inception of Modern Jewish 
Historiography,” History and Theory 20.2 (1981): 135. 
4 Ismar Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness in Modern Judaism,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 28 
(1983): 417; Schorsch, “Ethos of Modern Jewish Scholarship,” 171. 
5 Wieseltier, “Etwas über,” 135; David N. Myers, Resisting History: Historicism and its Discontents in German-
Jewish Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 22. 
6 David Kaufmann, “Leopold Zunz,” in The Jewish Chronicle (August 8, 1884): 6; Samuel S. Cohon offers a similar 
appraisal in his essay “Zunz and Reform Judaism,” Hebrew Union College Annual 31 (1960): 253.  
7 Luitpold Wallach, Liberty and Letters: The Thoughts of Leopold Zunz (London: East and West Library, 1959), 71. 
Emphasis added. 
8 Ismar Schorsch, “Breakthrough into the Past: The Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden,” Leo Baeck 
Institute Year Book 33 (1988): 18.   
9 Michael A. Meyer, “Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums: The Positions of Zunz, Geiger and 
Frankel,” Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 16 (1971): 23. Myers, “From Zion Will Go Forth Torah,” 6-7, 342n48. 
Perrine Simon-Nahum, “Wissenschaft des Judentums in Germany and the Science of Judaism in France in the 
Nineteenth Century: Tradition and Modernity in Jewish Scholarship,” in Jewish Emancipation Reconsidered: The 
German and French Models, eds. Michael Brenner, Vicki Caron, and Uri R. Kaufmann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2003), 45. Wieseltier, 137-38. 
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This chapter elucidates the literature Zunz describes and the science he names. It 
approaches this in two directions. First, it focuses on Zunz’s ambivalence regarding the 
designation and parameters of “rabbinic literature,” drawing out three neglected interconnected 
dimensions of this piece: 1. Zunz’s struggle to name and delineate a literature produced by a 
single people in multiple languages; 2. his effort to defend this literature against Christian 
Hebraists’ attacks upon it; and 3. his intention to depict an object that both describes rupture and 
enables continuity. Second, by focusing on the different types of science present and put to use 
throughout the text, the chapter connects the discussion of “literature” to that of “science,” and 
shows how these both shape each other. 
1818: Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur  
Immediately following its foreword, the essay opens by mentioning the “awe-inspiring 
remains from the blossoming age of the ancient Hebrews,” referring to “the Hebrew canon,” that 
is, the biblical literature. These texts contain the remnants of “the revolutions, which developed 
amidst the Jewish people” and have influenced “the rest of the earth,” and which, Zunz asserts, 
form “the foundation of the Christian states.” After evoking this highpoint, and calling the 
reader’s attention—both Jew and Christian—to how the Jewish people have influenced Christian 
and human life in general, Zunz turns to the subject of this essay: The “later products of the 
Hebrew nation,” which he argues comprise “a circuit of spiritual industry more admirable than 
the Greek,” and yet, have never received such appreciation (3).10  
                                                
10 In this opening Zunz reverses the more commonly drawn distinction between the biblical Hebrews and diasporic 
Jews by referring to post-biblical works as products of “the Hebrew nation” and describing the (biblical) “Hebrew 
canon” as containing the ruins of what came about amidst “the Jewish people.” 
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As its title indicates, the essay provides a partial investigation into “rabbinic literature,” 
an object Zunz works to redefine and defend. Through describing its merits and illustrating its 
mistreatment by both Jews and Christians, particularly since the Protestant Reformation, Zunz 
aims to inspire and direct a neglected field of study he calls “our science.” Among this chapter’s 
central tasks will be to clarify these two entities—rabbinic literature and our science—and 
elucidate their relation to each other.  
What is Rabbinic Literature? 
There are two aspects to Zunz’s portrayal of rabbinic literature which are entirely 
neglected in discussions of the essay: the causes for its emergence and the multiple factors 
indicating its present-day disappearance.11 Instead, his definition is simply likened to all post-
biblical literature, and often only to what is written in Hebrew.12 Such equations overlook the 
difficulty Zunz faces as he works to demarcate and designate a new literature. This omission has 
led scholars to neglect certain dimensions of the essay, overly emphasize others, and misread 
important points. A significant example of the latter is the statement that Zunz believes the 
Jewish people and their history have ended, when what he announces (and aims to effect) is the 
closure of “rabbinic literature,” not Jewish history.13 This misreading obscures how a central aim 
                                                
11 Among the multiple factors described below, German Jews’ neglect of Hebrew is often the only one discussed. 
12 Glatzer, “Beginnings of Modern Jewish Studies,” 156-57; David N. Myers, “The Ideology of Wissenschaft des 
Judentums,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, eds. Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman (New York: Routledge, 
1997), 630; Schorsch, “Emergence of Historical Consciousness” 418; Wieseltier, 136-37. 
13 Zunz’s claim (which will be examined below) that the formation of “rabbinic literature” is ending or has ended is 
repeatedly interpreted as his viewing “Jewish history” to be ending or having ended. For example: Meyer, 
“Emergence of Jewish Historiography,” 171; David Biale, Gershom Scholem: Kabbalah and Counter-History 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 33; Max Wiener, “Jewish History and Historians,” Contemporary 
Jewish Record 7.3 (1944): 261; Wallach, 18; Wieseltier, 148-49. 
 
99 
of the piece is to propose and explain a program precisely in order to prevent the Jewish people’s 
disappearance. 
From where does the “rabbinic” emerge? Zunz describes the flourishing and decline of 
the ancient Hebrew nation, whose intellectual powers of reproduction also decreased following 
its loss of political sovereignty. This, however, did not remain the case: 
As the shadows of barbarism gradually lost ground from the darkened earth, and light 
spread over everything, likewise over the Jews who were dispersed everywhere, a new 
foreign learning tied itself to the remains of the ancient Hebrews; minds and centuries 
worked both into that literature, we call rabbinic. (3) 
Zunz describes when rabbinic literature came to be, and provides a partial explanation for its 
emergence.14 It originates following an encounter between “the remains of the ancient Hebrews,” 
preserved among the dispersed Jews as the Hebrew canon, and a foreign learning or culture 
(Bildung). It develops out of a two stage process: first a foreign element ties itself to the ancient 
Hebrews’ remains; then, both that learning and those remains (i.e., the external and the internal) 
are transformed together through time and the activity of people into a new entity, called the 
“rabbinic.” Two points from this passage are significant for understanding how Zunz intends to 
use this object: First, the Jews precede the rabbinic, indicating that the rabbinic does not equal 
the Jews’ collective existence. Therefore its disappearance need not signal the end of the Jewish 
life.  
Second, the rabbinic is the consequence of a profound transformation, impelled by a 
coming together of two different elements. Both of these—the foreign and the Jewish—are 
                                                
14 Zunz’s presentation here and in subsequent works suggests that major transformation within peoples is impelled 
by encounters (be these peaceful or violent) with other peoples. In his Etwas, Zunz does not elaborate upon what 
characterizes this “new foreign learning” (neue fremde Bildung).  
In several subsequent works, Zunz develops more detailed periodizations (which vary somewhat from each 
other) for Jewish, and also world, history and literature. See for example his Zur Geschichte und Literatur (Berlin: 
Veit und Comp., 1845), 22-28; “Jüdische Literature,” (reprinted entry from the 1845 Brockhaus’ 
Conversationslexicon) Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1 (Berlin: Louis Gerschel Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1875), 101-11; 
Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden, historisch entwickelt (Berlin: A. Ascher, 1832), 304-308.  
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transformed through the interaction and shaped into what the exchange produces. His use of the 
word “Bildung” to describe the non-Jewish entity in this meeting resonates with his present 
context, where Jews are enrolling in non-Jewish universities, and encountering German Bildung. 
Zunz calls attention to the conditions surrounding the beginnings of rabbinic literature because 
he sees a similarly profound change underway in the present. 
At this, its first use apart from the essay’s title, Zunz inserts a footnote, instructing his 
reader how to understand “rabbinic”: 
One should understand by this term only those works whose authors or whose content is 
rabbinic; fundamentally “rabbi,” which courtesy imparts to everyone, has less 
significance than “doctor.” Why not neo-Hebraic or Jewish literature? (3) 
Zunz defines the “rabbinic,” and then asks whether it is the best name for what he describes—a 
question he poses but does not answer. While he suggests these two alternatives as possibly 
better suited for what he means by “rabbinic,” throughout the work he continues to employ 
“rabbinic” with the greatest frequency.15  
Why does Zunz propose “Jewish” and “neo-Hebraic” as alternatives and then rarely use 
them? Several factors contribute to this choice, connected to the specificities of the object he 
works to build and describe in this particular essay. As presented above, “Jewish” is an 
inaccurate term, since in Zunz’s own description the Jews precede the emergence of rabbinic 
literature. “Neo-Hebraic” (neuhebräische) is a word that had been used by biblical scholars to 
                                                
15 Zunz uses “Jewish literature” only once more (10), also in a footnote, and “neo-Hebraic” one more time in the 
body of the essay (4) referring to literature (and twice when specifying post-biblical Hebrew language), whereas he 
employs “rabbinic literature” an additional seven times in the body of the essay (4 [twice], 5, 14, 23, 25, 31) and in 
its title. A term used more often than neo-Hebraic when modifying literature, is “Hebrew,” (even when referring to 
post-biblical literature), which appears twice in the body of the text (22, 26) and three times in the footnotes (22, 24, 
29). Additionally, Zunz describes this literature as the: literature of the Jews (5 [twice]); literature of the people (5); 
literature of a nation (6); literary products of the Jewish people (7); and works of the Jewish nation (30).  
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distinguish post-biblical from biblical Hebrew (hebräische).16 Zunz, however, rarely maintains 
this differentiation as he uses “neo-Hebraic” only once more in the essay and refers to post-
biblical works throughout as “Hebrew.” Two characteristics of the literature Zunz names make 
“neo-Hebraic,” or “Hebrew” for that matter, unacceptable categorical designations: First, both 
Hebrew and neo-Hebraic designate only a portion of that object identified as rabbinic, for Zunz 
provides examples throughout of rabbinic works written in other languages. Second, as will be 
clarified below, recent writings in Hebrew exist, which Zunz argues are most definitely not 
rabbinic.  
Aside from the limitations of his suggested alternatives, why does Zunz use “rabbinic 
literature” most often? There are several interconnected factors informing this: First, Zunz aims 
to defend “rabbinic literature” against Christians’ attacks on it. Throughout the essay Zunz 
denounces Christians’ investigations into “rabbinic literature.” He repeats this in its closing 
paragraph, explaining how he hopes this work will “help dispel the bias generally set against 
[rabbinic literature]” by illuminating its better parts (30-31). To this he inserts a note explaining 
that “the sound Friedrich Rühs condemns [this literature] too generally and too strongly” (31n1). 
Ismar Schorsch has even suggested that one should read Zunz’s essay as “an inspired response” 
to his “academic adversary” Rühs, whose ancient history course Zunz enrolled in and withdrew 
from in the winter semester 1815-1816, because, as Zunz notes in his diary, “[Rühs] writes 
against the Jews.”17  
                                                
16 An interesting consequence of German scholars having coined “neo-Hebraic” to refer to post-biblical Hebrew, is 
that Hebrew as it developed from the twentieth-century, in German, is called “Iwrit,” a German transliteration of the 
Hebrew word for the language (ivrit). Thus in German today one distinguishes between Hebräisch (biblical 
Hebrew), Neuhebräische (post-biblical Hebrew), and Iwrit (modern Hebrew). 
17 Schorsch, “Breakthrough into the Past,” 19-20, citing Zunz’s diary, in Das Buch Zunz, introduced and published 
by Fritz Bamberger (Berlin: 1931), 19. Schorsch notes Zunz’s comment as responding to Rühs Ueber die Ansprüche 
der Juden an das deutsche Bürgerrecht (On the Claims of the Jews to German Citizenship), published in 1815 and 
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Zunz takes the term “rabbinic” from Christian scholars, because this is the tradition he 
engages with and is the main focus of his critique. This would shift later, once the Wissenschaft 
des Judentums develops. In fact, in an essay published in 1845 and significantly titled “Jewish 
Literature,” as a corrective no doubt to his terminological choice from this first essay, Zunz 
explains how “rabbinic literature” is a Christian misnomer for “Jewish literature,” and has been 
used by theologians to whom the Jews only ever appeared as “Church material.”18 This 
observation, however, should not be understood to equate the two concepts in 1818. What Zunz 
describes as “rabbinic literature” in 1818 is not the same thing he describes in 1845 as “Jewish 
literature.” 
Zunz prefers the designation “rabbinic” in his Etwas because it is especially well-suited 
to a central aim of the work. Zunz reflects on his current environment and observes that a 
massive change is underway. From this vantage point “rabbinic literature” appears as what can 
be made to speak to the discontinuity between the present and what has preceded it. By naming 
his object “rabbinic” Zunz challenges Christians’ attacks upon a literature they have defined, at 
the same time that he insists that the rabbinic no longer describes the Jews’ present. This name 
assists Zunz to defend the rabbinic and rebel against it at the same time.  
In this essay, “rabbinic” designates a periodization with both a starting and end point. The 
Jews existed before it began and will, hopefully, continue after it ends. What Zunz would 
subsequently call “Jewish” literature includes the biblical literature, as well as what Jews 
produce in the post-rabbinic present. 
                                                                                                                                                       
reissued in 1816. In Zunz’s footnote (31n1) he cites Rühs’ Handbuch der Geschichte des Mittelalters (1816) to 
illustrate Christian bias. 
18 Zunz, “Die jüdische Literatur,” in Zur Geschichte und Literatur, 20-21. 
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The End of Rabbinic Literature 
Zunz observes how German Jews are presently undergoing profound collective 
transformation, similar in degree to what birthed the rabbinic. What are the conditions that led to 
this development?  
Zunz begins by describing the decline of rabbinic literature. He traces this to a twofold 
process whereby European literature came to flourish as, and partially through, its attacks on the 
rabbinic. Zunz dates this from the Reformation, when Christian Europe undertook “a lively study 
of the biblical books,” accompanied by “a curious zeal for rummaging through the Orient.”19 
These comparative ventures led its scholars to reflect on their own lands and take a new interest 
in the “fatherland’s [i.e., Europe’s, as opposed to the Orient’s] more amiable products,”20 an 
occupation which coincided with attacks upon “rabbinic wisdom” (4).21 These circumstances 
came to shape the inverse relation that developed between the two, especially over the past 
hundred years:  
…rabbinic literature declined to the extent that European [literature] flourished, and the 
Jews began connecting themselves to it. Even what still belongs to the former from the 
last fifty years, has borrowed only the language from [rabbinic literature] as an accessible 
learned garment for ideas that must prepare for a time when rabbinic literature will have 
ceased to live. (4) 
                                                
19 It is no coincidence that Zunz dates this from the Reformation. This moment marked a change in Hebraism from a 
venture aimed at converting Jews, to one where Christians turned to the biblical word in their efforts to challenge the 
authority of the Church.  
20 The “fatherland” is not specified, although Zunz’s identification of two literatures—the European and the 
rabbinic—which connect to “the fatherland’s more amiable products” and “rabbinic wisdom” respectively, suggests 
“European” as a fitting designation. 
21 Zunz does not use the phrase “rabbinic literature” but “rabbinic wisdom,” differentiating between Christian 
scholars’ attacks on the rabbis, and that new more comprehensive term Zunz calls “rabbinic literature”—about 
which those scholars are largely ignorant.  
Zunz’s observation is remarkably similar to one of Edward Said’s arguments about “modern Orientalism,” 
namely, that “European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient.” Orientalism, 
3. Before a “secular” Orientalism exercised its knowledge of and over the Orient in the nineteenth-century as part of 
its colonial and imperial ventures, Zunz observes how Christian Hebraists were denigrating post-biblical literature to 
serve their religious and later national interests.  
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Zunz’s observes that the more Christian Europe defined itself against the rabbinic, the stronger 
the European became and the weaker the rabbinic. As this relation grows more pronounced, 
some Jews began to attach themselves to the European, furthering the increasingly inverse 
relation between the two. This change signals the closure of the rabbinic period, which could 
develop in at least directions: 1. Jews could choose to participate in European literature at the 
expense of the rabbinic and relinquish any attachment to it, and possibly cease to be a part of the 
people who produced it; or 2. Jews’ attempts to engage the European—and the impact of that 
upon them, and vice versa—may effect their productions such that “rabbinic” no longer applies 
to what they produce.  
In the passage cited above, Zunz presents a highly significant, yet little noted, 
observation, describing the latter development. He argues that literature produced in Hebrew in 
the last 50 years (i.e., since the time of Mendelssohn) may appear to be “rabbinic” because of the 
language in which it is written, but, in actuality, shows how the rabbinic has come to its end.22 
Zunz does not disparage this point, but the opposite. He positively points out how the Hebrew 
language has obtained “a more pure and more beautiful form” in the last hundred years and cites 
many excellent Hebrew prosaists as illustration.23  
                                                
22 His observation evokes Tageldin’s critique of nahḍa exponents for translating French into Arabic language, 
through which it transformed the language and the people’s consciousness. Unlike Tageldin, who focuses on the 
imperial force behind this change, and intimates that this deauthenticates it, Zunz views the influence of the 
European upon the rabbinic as a potentially very good thing. 
23 Examples include (18n2): Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), Isaiah Beer-Bing (1759-1805), Isaac Euchel (1758-
1804), Naphtali Hirz Wessely (1725-1805), Herz Homberg (1749-1841), Samuel Romanelli (1757-1814), Lipmann 
Moses Büschenthal (1784-1818), Isaac Satanaw (1703-1805), Baruch ben Judah Löb Lindau (1759-1849), Moshe 
Chaim Luzzato (1707-1746), and several contributors to the journal Meassef. 
In Zunz’s Zur Geschichte und Literatur, (which no longer speaks of “rabbinic” literature but “Jewish) he 
offers an eleven epoch periodization of “Jewish literature,” beginning from Alexander the Great (330 BCE) through 
to the present. Nearly three decades after his 1818 essay, he offers the following description of the transformation 
characterizing the most recent epoch: “In the year 1755, with which the eleventh epoch begins… two young men 
alone began understanding their course leading to culture and freedom. Led by Lessing and Mendelssohn, European, 
thus also Jewish, humankind is finally reaching consciousness of its mission. Thus, Jewish literature then also 
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Zunz’s optimism, however, is tempered by the alarming observation that at the same time 
that some Jews are beautifying and purifying the Hebrew language, an even greater number of 
German Jews appear to be abandoning it:  
…precisely because in our time we are seeing the Jews–limiting this to the German ones–
with greater seriousness seizing upon the German language and German learning, 
thereby–perhaps often without wanting to or suspecting–carrying the neo-Hebraic 
literature to the grave, science steps forth and demands an account of that [literature] 
which has closed. (4) 
It is not the closure of the rabbinic that causes alarm; the rabbinic is ending and in fact needs to 
and should end. However, this change also presents a very serious existential threat: the burial of 
neo-Hebraic literature. This is Zunz’s one and only use of “neo-Hebraic literature” in the body of 
the essay, presented here for its juxtaposition against the German language, whose wholehearted 
embrace—when at the expense of Hebrew—Zunz claims, is threatening to cut Jews off from 
their own literature and history.  
 This passage illustrates the advantage neohebräische has over “rabbinic,” namely, its 
connection to the people’s “former collective language,” which constitutes one of the 
fundamental elements making the Jews a people.24 Even though rabbinic literature contains 
writings in multiple languages, Hebrew occupies a unique place among the many languages in 
which Jews have written. If Jews can no longer understand Hebrew, then they will lose access to 
the very texts speaking to their ancient unity as a people. Thus, German Jews discarding Hebrew, 
threatens not only to sever them from some portion of rabbinic literature, but far more 
significantly from the origins of their collective existence.  
                                                                                                                                                       
gradually took greater interest in the general activity; at that time the institutions, the sources and the history of 
Judaism were researched and its science was introduced into the field of total knowledge” (27-28). 
24 See Leopold Zunz, “Grundinien zu einer künftigen Statistik der Juden,” Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des 
Judenthums (1823): 525-26. Reprinted in GS I, 134-141. 
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The danger is imminent: without intervention, this literature, together with the people 
who have produced it, will disappear. There is, however, a way to prevent this from 
materializing: this crisis requires heeding the demands of “science.”  
The Intervention: “Our Science”  
It is in response to an existential crisis, that science “steps forth and demands an account 
of what has closed.” How is its demand to be met? The answer comes through the first mention 
of one particular science in the text: “our science” (unsere Wissenschaft).  
Before explaining what “our science” is, Zunz jumps to describe a use for it, highlighting 
how the crisis of the present is political as it is existential:  
Now, we believe, working on our science on a grand scale becomes an obligation, and an 
even weightier one, because the complicated question about the fate of the Jews, seems to 
be able to be answered, in some paragraphs, through it. (4) 
The question of emancipation has been widely and heatedly debated in German states beginning 
from 1781 and the publication of Christian Wilhelm Dohm’s famous treatise On the Civic 
Improvement of the Jews.25 Most public discussion has been furthered by Christian writers 
focusing on the rights and duties of citizens and the state to each other, and whether Jews can be 
made into productive citizens, and if so, under what conditions and limitations. Zunz argues that 
proposals aiming to answer the “question about the Jews’ fate” have been fundamentally flawed 
due to misunderstandings regarding the nature of the Jewish people. It is for this reason that “our 
science”—a field open to Jews as well as Christians, and benefiting both, albeit differently—may 
be able to help contribute to a just resolution to this question.  
                                                
25 See Jonathan M. Hess’ Germans, Jews and the Claims of Modernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) 




Zunz explains that for reforms to be considerate and effective, they must follow from 
thoughtful and serious investigation. Too hasty innovations confuse the old and the antiquated, 
and sometimes even value the latter more highly (5)!26 Zunz instructs: 
In order to know and to classify the old as useful, the antiquated as harmful, and the new 
as desirable, we must thoughtfully and seriously commence with the study of the people 
and its history, of the political as of the moral. Precisely what produces the greatest harm 
is that the matter of the Jews is handled just like their literature. One pounces upon both 
with biased ardor, and has them assessed either too low or too high. (5) 
“Our science”—here suggested to be “the study of the [Jewish] people and its history”—would 
contribute to shaping effective reforms, because it would enable the classification of what from 
the Jews’ political and moral history is useful (the old), harmful (the antiquated), and desirable 
(the new). The second sentence of the quotation points to the two parties Zunz views as 
especially responsible for furthering misunderstandings about the Jews through incorrectly 
judging their literature: rabbis, who rate the Jews’ literature too high; and Christians, who assess 
it too low.27 The problem, as Zunz describes it, is not that “the Jews’ matter” and the “Jews’ 
literature” are handled in the same way, but that incorrectly knowing and appraising the latter 
results in misunderstanding the former.  
Zunz presents this digression from “the literature of the people to its civic existence” in 
order to explain the interplay between the two, and also to emphasize why the condition of “our 
science” should concern the Christian reader as well as the Jewish one. It is only after presenting 
this use for “our science,” that Zunz takes up the task of explaining how to proceed to be able to 
                                                
26 Zunz alludes to Dohm’s 1781 treatise on the Jews’ civic improvement (Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der 
Juden), when he claims that “the askewed outcome takes revenge on every inconsiderate so-called improvement 
(jede rücksichtslose sogenannte Verbesserung),” before noting that “hasty innovations grant the old, and—what is 
most dubious—the antiquated, a higher value” (5). 
27 Zunz would later add two more segments (not necessarily distinct) to those he critiques: those Jews “who offer to 
sell their antiquity in exchange for Emancipation” and those (Reform) theologians from whom “our science should 
first of all emancipate itself.” Zunz, Zur Geschichte und Literatur, 17, 21. 
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give “an account of [that literature] which has closed,” as science demands. His explanation 
begins with a set of provocative questions, which he addresses throughout the remainder of the 
essay: 
How is it, one could ask, that at a time when a magnificent complete view spreads its 
clear rays over all sciences, over all human activity when the furthest reaches of the earth 
are visited, the most unknown languages studied, and no material that serves to build 
wisdom is disdained—how is it that our science alone languishes? What prevents us from 
knowing entirely the contents of rabbinic literature, from properly understanding, 
successfully explaining, correctly judging, and comfortably surveying it? (5)  
Our science is not the only particular science for it shares a relation to all sciences, and yet, it 
suffers uniquely from all others. Why, Zunz asks, in this age of reason and advancement, is only 
“our science” neglected? What prevents us—and here Zunz begins to describe what this science 
needs to do—from correctly knowing, understanding, explaining, judging and surveying 
“rabbinic literature?” Zunz does not name those and what is responsible for this obstruction until 
after he himself surveys the research done thus far on rabbinic literature, in order to substantiate 
its current deficiencies. 
In the above passage, at the word “judging” (beurtheilen), Zunz inserts a footnote: 
We do not fear being misunderstood: Here the entire literature of the Jews, in its greatest 
extent, is assembled as the object of research, without our caring whether its entire 
contents should or could also be a norm for our own judgment. (5n1) 
Zunz explains the proper posture the researcher must take when investigating rabbinic literature, 
in order to make it into the object of a science. It must be treated objectively without regard for 
the potential outcomes and consequences of research. Zunz does not claim that outcomes should 
not affect society and social norms. In fact, he argues that they should and that they must. 
However, science and research must direct norms; norms cannot be permitted to direct research. 
Here, Zunz specifically instructs his Jewish reader, for whom rabbinic literature provides, or has 
provided, models and guidelines for behavior. It is worth noting that in this directed aside, which 
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differentiates the requirements of a present held to the standard of science from those of the 
preceding era, Zunz defines the object of this science as “the entire literature of the Jews, in its 
greatest extent,” his most expansive definition. Here he would even seem to be describing a 
different object from what he calls the rabbinic, by omitting any beginning or end to this corpus 
of texts. In this aside directed at his Jewish readers, he comes closer to what he would 
subsequently name “Jewish literature.”  
How Should “Our Science” Be Researched? 
Zunz describes two types of preliminary works which are currently missing, but 
necessary to be able to think of “our object in question” in clarity (6). While works such as good 
translations, biographies, correct manuals, etc., are beneficial and needed, Zunz views research 
that is comprehensive, systematic, and diachronic, taking on the literature of hundreds or even 
thousands of years as of a higher rank. Even these researches, for example, the explanations of 
philosophical systems or histories of individual doctrines, however, would fail to meet the 
“higher demand,” if the scholar neglects to “see the forest for the trees” (6). Zunz advises: 
Whoever examines the literature of a nation as the entrance to the complete knowledge of 
its course of culture (ihres Culturganges) through all times–how, in each moment its 
being takes shape from the data and the addenda (i.e., from the internal and the external); 
how fate, climate, manners, religion and chance take hold of one another amicably or 
hostilely; and how, ultimately the present stands here as the inevitable result of all 
existing phenomena–truly that person steps with awe before this temple of the gods, and 
may modestly lead himself into the entrance hall, and from the gable enjoy the exalted 
view below, once he is more worthy of it. (6-7)  
The researcher must remain aware of the bigger picture as he deeply and thoroughly investigates 
his subject matter. When investigating the literature of a nation, of which “rabbinic literature” is 
one example, this means that any works examined connect to the greater whole of which they are 
a part, that is, to the nation’s “course of culture.” Were all the works of a people’s literature from 
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all times and places known and understood, then together the perfect whole these form would 
show the development of the people’s being, its singularity, throughout time. 
One cannot approach the whole, however, except through its parts. Thus, to achieve this 
higher view “our science” must be turned into “a complete compartment of sciences.” This will 
enable “each part is to be tended, so that the whole should not become disfigured by substantial 
flaws” (7). Zunz illustrates what this entails through a bibliographic survey of “the literary 
products of the Jewish people.” He introduces this section as wanting to “set in order the more 
distinguished material from this directory of sciences for the reader’s review” (7). 
Zunz moves through this directory categorically. He begins by addressing “what is 
subject to the church” (theology, mythology, religion) (7-8) before moving onto “that of the 
state” (legislation, jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence) (9-10) and then “ethics” which is a 
“source of both the religious and the juridical principle (10-11). He next examines man “as 
denizen of the earth,” highlighting those sciences which pertain to his “knowledge of nature” 
(astronomy, geography, mathematics, natural science, medicine) (11-14) before considering 
those pertaining to the “use of nature” (industry, trade, technology, architecture) (14-15). The 
survey culminates in two final categories: those sciences which engage the “universal life of the 
nation,” where “history” (Geschichte), identified as transient, is distinguished from “knowledge 
of antiquity” (Alterthumskunde), which is enduring (16); and those sciences (poetry, rhetoric, 
grammar, lexicography) (16-21) which investigate language, itself described as “the lever for 
handling and assembling this mass of materials” (16). 
All the sciences in this directory connect to “man,” how he perceives his world, and how 
he collectively engages with it. Zunz aims to demonstrate that “our (particular) science” is a true 
science, no less legitimate than any science of any other people’s literature, by drawing out its 
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composite sciences. These exist across it and connect it to others’ sciences. Just as Zunz instructs 
his reader to approach “our (singular) science” through examining its parts, it appears possible 
that “our science,” while a whole unto itself, may also be subsumed within a greater one. 
What is the Method of Science? 
How does one investigate these materials? As an answer Zunz sketches out the 
“theoretical bones of [philological] criticism” (30): 
If we now look upon this immeasurable material somewhat more attentively, in order to 
research, to order, and to produce under the aegis of criticism, then we behold this [aegis] 
helping us triply in our work, which is to say that we will be able to perceive and to 
appraise the given thought, the communication [of it], and the modality of our knowledge 
[of it]. Regarding this we accordingly divide criticism theoretically into three parts: the 
doctrinal, encompassing the ideas; the grammatical, encompassing language; and the 
historical (die historische), encompassing the account (die Geschichte) of these ideas 
from the moment of communication until they reach our knowledge in the present. (7) 
Operating under the aegis of criticism means researching, ordering, and producing. This project 
is investigative (works are to be uncovered and discovered), it is systematizing (works are to be 
arranged in relation to other works so as to contribute towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of the whole of which each is a part), and it is creative (the researcher produces 
studies that illuminate their object, thereby transforming one’s cognizance of the materials “our 
science” treats). Those events whose perception and appraisal is sought are threefold: 1. the 
thought (the doctrinal) which is given (as ideas); 2. the communication (the grammatical) of that 
thought (in language); and 3. the manner (the historical) through which one comes to know of it 
(as an account). The “given thought” or the “idea” is what links criticism’s three interconnected 
parts (the doctrinal, grammatical, and historical) together. 
Zunz’s description of these divisions connects particulars (ideas; languages; accounts) to 
their universals (the doctrinal; grammatical; historical). Communication (in language) is the 
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moment when the account of an idea commences, thus an account of ideas begins in language. 
Original ideas—what is given, i.e., the data—themselves precede language and thus history. The 
task of the researcher when examining the literature of a people, is to employ all the tools of 
language to trace the history of ideas as evident in texts.  
Language is an enigmatic, yet invaluable, dimension of criticism. It is able to trace the 
history of ideas, in part, because it carries its own history within itself. Zunz describes language 
as the “lever for handling and assembling this mass of materials.” And yet he also depicts it as 
crossly withholding its higher treasures from the researcher, who must endure its tenacity 
because of its unique function:  
For language is the first friend, who descending, leads us onto the bridges to science, and 
the last, to whom we longingly return—it alone can tear down the veil of the past—it 
alone can prepare minds for the future. For that reason one researching must bear its 
obstinacy, since what centuries begot can only be made more perfect by centuries. (17) 
Language initiates the researcher’s investigations and is the bearer of the knowledge he seeks. It 
is the thread that carries ideas from the origin into and through history, connecting them to the 
present and the present to the past. It alone can reveal the past for what it was and, more 
importantly is. Language can fulfill this unique function because it bears its own development 
within itself, and yet it is this very attribute that frustrates the researcher and demands patience 
and diligence. 
While Zunz’s depiction of language seems to propose that the veil separating the past 
could be removed so as to reveal events as they once were, he elsewhere suggests that unaltered 
retrieval is unattainable:  
…even equipped with all requisite foundations, knowledges and aids, we always generate 
new ideas and new material when treating ideas; bibliography, criticism of treatment, and 
history, are produced, not merely by science but also again by history itself. And just as 
already found matter [pl.], which we weave into science as something that can be 
perceived objectively, are originally the subjective treatment of an older idea, so too is 
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the particular art, through which we appropriate science, turned into new material to be 
processed by us and by posterity. (26-27) 
The cycle of criticism constantly propels itself forward as the researcher generates new ideas, 
expanding the doctrinal and initiating language and history into new creative processes. The 
objective understanding of an ancient idea is irretrievable, because all that exists in language is 
already, by necessity, a treatment of an idea whose origin precedes language. Still, Zunz argues, 
while it is not possible to recover the past unmitigated, were one to treat materials as subjective 
and not objective, and to do so objectively not subjectively, then it would be possible to move 
closer to a more accurate knowledge of what was and came to be. 
The preceding citation stands out from the rest of Zunz’s essay, because of the activity 
and passivity of science it presents. Here, history’s unfolding is responsible for generating new 
ideas which estrange one from the past. It suggests that if bibliography, criticism of treatment, 
and history were produced only by science and not also by history, then these would be 
recoverable. After all, science—unlike history, whose very nature is transient and self-
perpetuating—is already fully formed. And yet, another “science” appears in the second half of 
the passage—one which the researcher makes by weaving material into it [science], thereby 
treating and appropriating it.  
How should one make sense of these two different descriptions of science? To do so 
requires separating two entities, both of which the above terms “science”—one which acts and 
one which is acted upon. One exists outside of human activity. And then there is what humans’ 
create when they attempt to treat “science,” weaving materials into it, thereby coming to 
appropriate, possess, and create a science.  
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Why Does “Our Science” Alone Languish? 
Once Zunz illustrates the insufficiencies of research thus far on rabbinic literature, as well 
as the existence of resources and texts which promise to yield fruitful results if investigated 
according to the rigor and standards of science and criticism, he turns to directly answer (23-26) 
his previously posed question (5): Why, of all sciences, does only ours languish? He explains 
that all sciences suffer “the misfortune of human imperfection,” but only “our science” also faces 
“completely peculiar prejudices” which at least partially explain its decline and have partly 
caused its defects (23). Zunz holds both Christians and Jews responsible for this state.28  
Practical considerations, such as meager or absent opportunities for gainful employment 
and the great linguistic skills required, equally deter both Jews and Christians from taking up the 
task of “our science.” However, when it comes to the ideal of objectivity, Jews and Christians 
face different obstacles. Zunz bemoans how most often Christians have approached this study 
“not out of love, but rather out of hate,” deploring the partisanship through which “everything 
that even only superficially looked like evidence against the Jews and Judaism was a welcome 
find.”29 Christian “scholars culled together half-understood scraps from the corners, in order to 
publicly shame their eternal adversary” (24). Jews, however, have not been more successful at 
achieving objectivity, for there exists also “a domestic (einheimischer) fanaticism, accompanying 
                                                
28 Christians have primarily developed the field Zunz describes and it is their works he largely relies upon. The vast 
majority of Zunz’s bibliographical citations are taken from the catalogs compiled by Giulio Bartolocci (1613–1687), 
Carlo Giuseppe Imbonati (c.1696), Johann Christoph Wolf (1683–1739), and Giovanni Bernardo de Rossi (1742–
1831). Added to this are a few researches by Jews: Azariah de Rossi (c. 1513-1578), Moshe Chaim Luzzato (1706-
1746), Uri Zebi Rubinstein (c. 1806), and Chaim Joseph David Azulai (1724-1807). 
29 Christian authors, whose studies Zunz mentions and critiques, include: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–
1494), Johannes Reuchlin (1455–1522), Guillaume Postel (1510–1581), Johann Buxtorf the Elder (1564–1629), 
Andreas Sennert (1606–1689), Johann Christoph Wagenseil (1633–1705), and Jacopo Gaffarelli (1601–1681), 
Jacques Basnage (1653-1725), Johann Andreas Danz (1654-1727), Johann David Michaelis (1717-1791), Johann 
Ulrich Roeder (1739-1816), Friedrich Christian Rühs (1781-1820), Wilhelm Gesenius (1786-1842), and Wilhelm 
Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780-1849). 
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alongside the foreign (fremden) one.” A carelessness (eine Sorglosigkeit) due to familiarity, has 
caused the destruction of important works and “robbed otherwise good minds of their 
impartiality,” preventing them from viewing “their material with just eyes” (24).30 Where there 
was good will, there lacked classical learning (klassische Bildung) and where scholars were 
learned, they failed to make themselves “native in the Hebrew spirit” and learn how to “feel with 
the author” (25).  
“Our Science,” “The Science,” and the Most Worthy Aim of all Research  
Zunz describes several goals of “our science.” Is there a single most worthy aim of all 
research? Zunz addresses this question towards the end of the essay, where he connects and 
differentiates “our science” and “the science”—one human, one immortal—at the same time that 
he binds them together. He assigns “philosophy” a particular role linking one to the other.  
“Our science,” like all sciences, is located among the “stomping ground of human 
activity,” while [the] “science” is elevated physically above. Philosophy mediates between the 
two. Philosophy is “the essence of wisdom” and also the “higher historical knowledge” of how 
that wisdom has proceeded through centuries and been recorded, handled, and mishandled, in 
texts (27). It is due to its dual nature that philosophy can play the mediatory role it does, moving 
between the “stomping ground of human activity,” (the sphere of “sciences” and history) and 
what is elevated eternally above (the sphere of “science” and wisdom).  
Zunz describes philosophy as “the highest guide, whenever we take it upon ourselves to 
apprehend the intellectual magnitude (Grösse) of the people and to render what is discerned” 
                                                
30 Zunz cites examples of this fanaticism (24n4): He criticizes “a senseless rabbi” who allowed the single existent 
manuscript of M. C. Luzzato’s psalms to be burned “out of zeal for the Davidian ones,” as well as the writings of 
baptized Jews, who “often sought to ingratiate themselves through fanatic persecution,” for example, Friedrich 
Brentzius’ (formerly Samuel) Jüdischer adgestreifter Schlangenbalg (Jewish snakes skinned).  
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(27). This aim, however, is not the highest or most worthy of all research, though it is a requisite 
one on the way to realizing that achievement:  
In this way, [i.e. by discerning the intellectual greatness of the people] every historical 
datum…becomes a contribution to the knowledge of man, which alone is the most 
worthy aim of all research. But also only this higher view is suited to science, which 
survives exalted above all earthly pettiness, lands and nations; only it can one day lead us 
to a true history of Jewish philosophy, in which the minds’ course of ideas is determined 
and understood. (27-28) 
That knowledge which is the most worthy aim of all research, of any and every science, is not 
knowledge of a nation, but contributing to the “knowledge of man,” (i.e., what man knows and 
what is known about man). Through investigating a particular collectivity one may be led to 
universal knowledge. This may be the most worthy aim, but it is not the final one. When one 
ascends to realize some “knowledge of man,”—towards which “our science” may contribute—
acquiring that knowledge may lead the researcher (back) to “a true history of Jewish 
philosophy.” 
“What is Science?”   
Unlike “rabbinic literature,” which Zunz works to found anew, delineate, and explain, 
“science” is taken for an understood term throughout the essay, presented without clarification. 
However, when focusing on its use, it becomes clear that Zunz refers to different things by the 
same term “science.” There is: 1. universal science; 2. the sciences of people’s literatures (i.e., 
philologies), of which “our science” is one example; and 3. the sciences which exist within and 
across those of the second category (e.g., theology, jurisprudence, astronomy, mathematics, etc.). 
This section aims to differentiate and describe these three categories of science and elucidate the 
connections between them.  
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The sciences of the third category never act, but are acted upon, as illustrated by the 
transformation of “our science” into a whole compartment of sciences. Their use furthers Zunz’s 
arguments in several ways: First, the presence of these within the materials of rabbinic literature 
legitimize that literature as an object worthy of being made into an object of research. These 
sciences connect the literatures of different peoples, enabling comparison because the same 
concepts (theology, jurisprudence, astronomy, mathematics, etc.) are present across them. 
Additionally, they model the importance of investigating the whole through its parts. Figure 1 







Sciences of literatures and the sciences 
within and across them 
2. A science of a people’s literature (e.g. 
“our science”) 
3. A science within and across those of 
peoples’ literatures (e.g. astronomy) 
 
Figure 1: Interconnecting sciences 
The connection between the sciences of the third category and those of the second 
mirrors, in certain respects, the relationship between the sciences of peoples’ literatures and the 
universal singular science. Thus, Zunz’s methodological assertion that all sciences of the third 
type should be investigated so as to ensure the accuracy of the investigation of a science of the 
second type, foretells the universal implications for “our science” regarding humankind’s 
cognizance of the knowledge connected to the science.  
As much as this essay advocates striving for the “knowledge of man,” it is also about 
doing so through the particular collectivities of humankind known as peoples or nations. This 
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essay is built upon the relation and connection between “our science” and “the science,” 
dynamics which can be generalized to exist between all sciences which make the literature of a 
nation into an object of research and the universal science which itself outlives all nations. It is 
thus that Zunz identifies the view which seeks to contribute to “the knowledge of man” as the 
most worthy aim of all research, towards which “our science,” like others’ sciences, may be 
made to contribute. Figure 2 below illustrates the relation between the three categories of 
science, including the bi-directional movement of philosophy as mediator between (the) science 








1) Black circle: (The) Science 
2) Blue circles: Sciences of peoples’ 
literatures 
3) Pink lines: Sciences running through and 
across peoples’ literatures (e.g. 
astronomy, medicine, religion) 
Green arrows: Philosophy  
 
Figure 2: On the relation of the three categories of science to each other, including philosophy’s role in their connection 
Unlike the interconnected structure between sciences of the second and third type which 
requires no mediation, an agent is needed to connect the sciences of the second type to the 
universal sublime science above and beyond them. Philosophy is suited to this task because it 
contains within itself characteristics of both spheres: wisdom and history. The crux of Zunz’s 
essay is the relation between the science and sciences of peoples’ literatures.  
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As the survey of sciences above begins to reveal, the first and second categories of 
science are strikingly contrasted. To begin, only the singular universal science is fixed. No action 
effects a change within it, though humans’ perception and awareness of it may vary. It is also the 
only category of science which acts. It is this science which “steps forth” (auftreten) and 
“demands” (verlangen) an intervention at the moment rabbinic literature disappears (4). It is 
“mute” (stumm) because it precedes language, which initiates ideas into history (1). It is a thing 
for which a “battalion of representatives take to the field” (zu Felde ziehen) through writing (1). 
This singular and universal science serves as a goal, as an aim towards which one is lead, and as 
a foundation. And finally (the) science “survives exalted above (überleben erhaben) all earthly 
pettiness, lands and nations,” which produce the materials that particular sciences treat (27).  
Contrasted against the fixed immortal science elevated above, “our science” 
(representative of all sciences of the second category, i.e., those which investigate peoples’ 
literatures) is affected through its treatment. It is created by humans’ attempts to treat rabbinic 
literature in accord with the ideal of science. Works may “enrich” (bereichern) it by important 
discoveries, or may “reform” (umformen) it through new perspectives (6). Each of its parts (i.e. 
the sciences of the third category) should “be cultivated” (sein gepflegt) so that the entirety (i.e., 
a science of the second category) is not “deformed” or “disfigured” (werden verunstaltet) (7). In 
contrast to the physical and temporal location of the singular universal, outliving all earthly 
matters, independent and elevated above all human activity, “our science” languishes, (literally, 
“lies on the ground,” daniederliegen), its unfortunate state the result of humans’ mistreatment 
and imperfection (5).  
And yet, these two categories (i.e., the universal science and the sciences of peoples’ 
literatures) are not only contrasted against each other. Taking “our science” as an example, Zunz 
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claims it can lead to the most worthy aim of all research, which is not knowledge of the nation, 
but contributing towards the universal knowledge of man. Still, the only path to approach that 
sublime universal is by investigating its constituent elements (i.e., through investigating peoples 
via their literatures). Not only does Zunz link the particular to the universal, but the reverse as 
well. For only this highest view can lead one back to better realizing the aims of particular 
sciences.  
When one ascends to capture a glimmer of the universal, one’s awareness of the 
particular below becomes more complete. Thus, the channels between sciences and science move 
in both directions. In other words, one who has gained knowledge through the ascent (to science) 
may also gain additional knowledge when descending (to sciences), that is from “man” to “the 
nation.” 
On History, Literature, and Science: Rupture, Continuity, Transformation  
As much as this piece aims to defend rabbinic literature against Christians’ denigration of 
it, it also seeks to produce a present that is no longer rabbinic. Zunz describes and seeks to effect 
rupture, and at the same time aims to build continuity between the past and present. The tools he 
uses to break with the rabbinic past and strengthen the Jewish nation are history, literature, and 
science.  
The question of the Jews’ survival is dependent upon Christians in a present where a 
“complicated question about the fate of the Jews” exists. After all, what is this question but a 
continuation of the Christian prejudices and biases that Zunz goes to great lengths to show have 
afflicted the study of rabbinic literature over the past three hundred years? This is why he 
suggests that were “our science” developed, and Jewish literature objectively investigated, then 
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this complicated question may be resolved. When Zunz bemoans the unique prejudices “our 
science” alone suffers and praises how “such times are past” (24) due to the “greater culture” (4), 
he is urging his Christian reader to live up to the present’s ideals.  
The way for Jews to continue past the rabbinic and into the present is as a people. What 
this means is that they have a literature and a history, recognized and valued by other peoples. 
This explains the bibliographic survey comprising half the essay’s length. In addition to Zunz’s 
stated aims of proving the deficiencies of past research and illustrating the fruitful possibilities 
that the study of rabbinic literature promises to yield, he also divides these materials into 
universal disciplines. Zunz aims to demonstrate to his Christian reader that rabbinic literature is 
of human universal value, and with it the Jews. The survival of the Jewish people—at stake in 
the question of the Jews’ fate—will depend on the recognition that its literature is as legitimate 
as others’ literatures and that its investigation can be just as beneficial to humankind. 
Zunz reflects on the present, and expresses great optimism. He portrays the dawn of a 
new age underway, characterized and distinguished from the preceding one by the ideal and 
practice of science. Science has now stepped forth and shown the Jews how to continue their 
existence as a collectivity through their literature. Further the structure of sciences shows how 
the matter of any people’s literature is a concern to all peoples. In this “more liberal age,” Zunz 
is hopeful that both Jews and Christians will overcome their theological biases. In the new 




CHAPTER 4  
Reading Science in Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīẓ 
 
 
This chapter presents a new reading of a seminal text, Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ 
al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīz (The extrication of gold towards the summation of Paris).1 This text, 
first published in Cairo in 1834, describes al-Ṭahṭāwī’s sojourn in Paris (1826-1831), where he 
accompanied a mission of students sent to study by Egypt’s governor Muḥammad ʿAlī.2 The 
group’s purpose was to learn European sciences so as to reduce Egypt’s reliance upon costly 
European instructors and facilitate the governor’s modernization projects.3  
                                                
1 All citations in this chapter are to the first edition: Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīz aw al-Dīwān al-Nafīs bi-Īwān 
Bārīs (Būlāq, 1834), hereafter Takhlīṣ.  
A second edition, revised by al-Ṭahṭāwī, was published in 1849. It was reprinted in 1861, and then again 
in1905. The work’s next publication was not until 1958, during the United Arab Republic (UAR). In the 1970s it 
appeared in volume 2 of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s complete works (1973) as well as in a work on “the roots of modern Arabic 
thought” in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s writings (Usūl al-Fïkr al-ʿArabī al-Ḥadīth ʿind al-Ṭahṭāwī), by Mahmūd Fahmī Hijāzī, in 
1974 and reissued in 1994. Readers of the Arabic text seem to have increased from the 1990s, as suggested by 
several printings in that decade (1991, 1993, 1994), and in the one that followed (2001, 2002, 2005, 2007).  
It was first translated into Turkish, in 1839 (which coincides, not coincidentally, with the start of the 
Tanzimat reforms), commissioned by Muḥammad ʿAlī, and disseminated to officials throughout the Ottoman 
Empire. It was well over a century before the work was again translated: In 1988 both a French version (by Anwar 
Louca, titled L'or de Paris) and a German one (by Karl Stowasser, titled Ein Muslim entdeckt Europa: Die Reise 
eines Agypters im 19. Jahrhundert nach Paris) were printed. In 1993 a new Turkish translation was published, by 
Cemil Çiftçi. Daniel L. Newman published an English translation, An Imam in Paris: Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Visit to France 
(1826-1831), in 2004 (2nd edition, 2011). In 2009, V. N. Kirpichenko published a Russian translation (Izvlechenie 
chistogo zolota iz kratkogo opisaniia Parizha, ili, Dragotsennyi divan svedenii o Parizhe). 
Appendix II, at the end of the dissertation, contains translated excerpts alongside the Arabic (1834), which 
are cited at length in this chapter. All translations are my own. 
References to Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīz will be made parenthetically throughout the chapter. 
2 In his preface (3-4) al-Ṭahṭāwī mentions his mentor Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār’s suggestion to observe and record everything 
he sees and encounters in Paris that is strange and wondrous. Al-Ṭahṭāwī presents this work as following that 
advice. 
3 On the mission, see Alain Silvera, “The First Egyptian Student Mission to France under Muhammad Ali,” in 
Modern Egypt: Studies in Politics and Society, eds. E. Kedourie and S. G. Haim (London: Frank Cass and Company 
Ltd, 1980); Daniel L. Newman’s introduction in An Imam in Paris: Account of a Stay in France by an Egyptian 
Cleric (1826-1831) (London: Saqi Books, 2004),  esp. 15-28. 
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Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s account is didactic, introducing his readers to Parisian society and teaching 
them about those sciences presently perfected by “the Franks,”4 which Egypt and “the lands of 
Islam” should develop.5 The work is comparative throughout, shifting between equations of 
equivalence and difference, as al-Ṭahṭāwī compares the lands of Islam to those of the Franks, 
and Paris to Cairo, in terms of languages, peoples, and sciences.  
The literature on al-Ṭahṭāwī is extensive. The vast majority describes his time in Paris 
and his studies there as having had a formative impact upon the development and modernization 
of his social and political thought: Paris modernizes al-Ṭahṭāwī; then, al-Ṭahṭāwī, contributes to 
the modernization of Egypt, especially through his role as translator of European books, 
concepts, and institutions into Arabic.6 He is identified as a, if not the, forerunner or earliest 
pioneer of the nahḍa, a term which comes to reference a period or movement characterized as an 
                                                
4 The mission travels to France, whose people are the French. The French are among the Frankish peoples, as France 
is among the “lands of the Franks” (bilād al-ifranj). The sciences the French master are primarily identified as 
“Frankish” sciences.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses the terms “Franks” (al-ifranj) and “the lands of the Franks”—for the most part—as he 
explains the Ottomans use “ifranjistān,” namely to refer to non-Ottoman European territories and peoples. When he 
references the French (al-fransīs or al-fransāwī), he specifies the people of Paris or France. See Takhlīṣ, 12-13.  
This chapter retains al-Ṭahṭāwī’s designations, rendering “ifranj” as “Franks,” and “fransīs” as French. 
Examples of those he terms Frankish (ifranjī) include the French, Dutch, English, and Italians, who, perhaps not 
insignificantly, were all, or would all become, colonizers of Islamic lands. 
5 With regards to sciences, those of the Franks are most often contrasted against those present in “the lands of Islam” 
(bilād al-islām). Elsewhere, al-Ṭahṭāwī references Egypt (and occasionally the Ottomans), for example, when 
comparing a scene or a custom between Paris and Cairo, but seldom when discussing sciences. 
6 This view has not passed unchallenged, the most well-known critique being that of Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of 
Capitalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979).  Against those who credit Paris with shaping al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
“progressive intellectual outlook,” Gran argues this was already formed by the time the 24-year-old sheikh stepped 
foot outside of Egypt. Gran does not dispute that Ṭahṭāwī was “progressive,” but challenges at what point in his life, 
and by which influences, this outlook became formed. Cf. Peter Gran “Ṭahṭāwī in Paris,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 
January 10-16, 2002.; Juan Ricardo Cole, “Rifāʿa al-Ṭahṭāwī and the Revival of Practical Philosophy,” Muslim 
World 70.1 (1980); and Shaden Tageldin “The Sword and the Pen: Egyptian Musings on European Penetrations, 
Persuasion, and Power,” Kroeber Anthropological Papers 87 (2002): 196-218. 
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Arab literary and cultural “renaissance” or “awakening” during the latter part of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.7   
Accounts and references to the nahḍa trace its beginnings to al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ.8 This 
work has been called “the most influential and widely read text” which al-Ṭahṭāwī wrote,9 and is 
heralded as “the landmark publication” of the early nahḍa.10 It represents “the most important 
literary record” from the first half of the nineteenth century in Egypt11 and is one of “the greatest 
                                                
7 See, for example: Roger Allen, “Rewriting Literary History: The Case of the Arabic Novel,” Journal of Arabic 
Literature 38 (2007): 251; Tarek el-Ariss, “Tracing the Nation in French and Arabic Travel Narrative from Late 
Eighteenth to Mid Nineteenth Century” (PhD diss., Cornell University, 2004), 17; J. Brugman, An Introduction to 
the History of Modern Arabic Literature in Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 24; Anwar Chejne, “Travel Books in 
Modern Arabic Literature,” Muslim World 52.3 (1962): 210; Roxanne L. Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: 
Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 90; Richard 
Jacquemond, “Towards an Economy and Poetics of Translation from and into Arabic” in Cultural Encounters in 
Translation from Arabic, ed. Said Faiq (Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2004),118-19; Samir Kassir, Being Arab, 
trans. Will Hobson (New York: Verso, 2006); Newman, An Imam in Paris, 11; Myriam Salama-Carr, “Negotiating 
Conflict: Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭawi and the Translation of the Other in Nineteenth Century Egypt,” Social Semiotics 
17.2 (2007): 216.  
 Increasingly, the orientation of nahḍa studies has shifted to critiquing the pervasive nationalist reading of 
the movement and period. These reappraisals argue that characteristics associated with the nahḍa traversed linguistic 
and ethnic divides throughout the Ottoman Empire (and elsewhere in the non-European world). This was a central 
theme at a recent symposium at Tufts University: “Seeds of Revolution: The Arab “Nahda” reconsidered: the 19th 
and early 20th century Arab cultural renaissance in a global comparative frame,” April 8, 2011.  
8 Naṣr Abū Zayd, al-Marʾa fī Khiṭāb al-Azma (Cairo: Dār al-Nuṣūṣ, 1994), 47; M. M. Badawi, “Introduction I,” in 
Modern Arabic Literature, ed. M. M. Badawi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 16; Waïl S. Hassan, 
Tayeb Salih: Ideology and the Craft of Fiction (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 1; Elizabeth Suzanne 
Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 22; Kassir, 45; Salama-Carr, 215. 
9 Kamran Rastegar, Literary Modernity Between the Middle East and Europe: Textual Transactions in Nineteenth-
century Arabic, English, and Persian Literatures (New York: Routledge, 2007), 82. 
10 Kassab, 22. 
11 Muṣṭafā Nabīl, “Taqdīm,” in Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz aw al-Dīwān al-Nafīs bi-Īwān Bārīs (Cairo: Dār al-
Hilāl, 2001), 5; Cf. Yūnān Labīb Rizq, “Muqaddima,” in Takhlīs al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-l-




intellectual monuments” of the entire century.12 It is frequently mentioned as the first “modern” 
Arabic account of Europe.13 
This chapter deviates from the “modern v. traditional” dialectic (and the related “secular 
v. religious”), typically used to contextualize and understand al-Ṭahṭāwī’s text—a  binary which 
has too often shaped accounts of this text in particular and the nahḍa in general, and one which is 
fortunately beginning to appear less and less suited to either. Instead, the discussion below takes 
science as a departure point for investigating what this text does and how it does it.  
Legitimizing the Mission 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī links the mission’s aims and practices to values esteemed by the ʿulamaʾ and 
rooted in the Quʾran and the hadith. Beginning in his preface, al-Ṭahṭāwī invokes praise for 
“ʿilm” (the abstract infinitive noun of the verb ʿalima, in the sense of acquiring or becoming 
aware of true knowledge) as grounds for the mission’s pursuit of “al-ʿulūm” (“sciences” or 
“knowledges,” a post-Qurʾanic pluralization of ʿilm, once this term also comes to function as a 
simple substantive). For example, he describes the unanimous view of the ʿulamaʾ that after the 
Qurʾan and the hadith, “the best of all matters is knowledge (al-ʿilm) and it is the most important 
of all that is important.” He offers this statement to explain why he went as an envoy to Paris, 
accompanying the effendis learning the sciences and arts (al-ʿulūm wa-l-funūn) there (3).14   
                                                
12 ʿAwad, 30. 
13 For example: Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 88; Daniel 
Newman, “Myths and Realities in Muslim Alterist Discourse: Arab Travellers in Europe in the Age of the Nahda 
(19th c.),” Chronos 6 (2002): 7; Tageldin, “The Sword and the Pen,” 202. 
14 While the relation between the singular ʿilm and the plural ʿulūm may be one of simple multiplication (for this 
relation does come to exist), the singular meaning of  “a science” or “a particular knowledge,” is different from, 
even if connected to, that abstract concept represented by the ʿilm the ʿulamaʾ unanimously praise. 
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Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses specific hadith in support of traveling to non-Islamic lands. For 
example, he immediately follows the claim that Frankish scholars are the greatest in terms of the 
“positive sciences” (al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya), with a hadith encouraging the acquisition of wisdom 
(al-ḥikma), implying that the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya are the means through which to acquire ḥikma, and 
ḥikma should be sought, “even among the polytheists” (9). While the adjective ḥikmiyya is 
formed from the noun ḥikma, how al-Ṭahṭāwī uses the “ʿulūm ḥikmiyya” (which will be 
elaborated below) dissociates the phrase from ḥikma, even as this hadith links these (Frankish) 
sciences to it. He immediately follows the hadith on ḥikma with another—“seek knowledge (al-
ʿilm), even in China”—even though, he points out, it is well-known that the people there are 
idolaters (9).15 The logic of presenting these two hadith one after the other rests upon a 
correspondence between ḥikma (wisdom, science, philosophy) and ʿilm (knowledge, learning, 
science)—two terms which may be considered synonymous,16 though their pluralizations are 
not.17 To praise al-ḥikma as justification for pursuing sciences (al-ʿulūm)—even when qualified 
as ʿulūm ḥikmiyya—uses language to construct an Islamically sanctioned foundation for the 
missions’ endeavors. This justification reflects al-Ṭahṭāwī’s anticipation of criticism from the 
ʿulamaʾ, precisely for traveling to “lands of unbelief and obstinacy” in pursuit of sciences (5).  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī further justifies the mission’s pursuits by presenting its goals as able to 
strengthen empire and Islam. Expressing the hope that Muḥammad ʿAlī will “unfurl the banners 
of might and justice, and perfect dignity and benefit upon all Egyptian regions and the Hijazi, 
                                                
15 The use of traditions sanctioning the pursuit of “ʿilm” in order to legitimize “modern sciences” would become a 
common trope of subsequent nahḍa figures, especially those identified with Islamic reform. 
16 See for example the entries on “Ḥikma,” (377-78) and “ʿIlm,” (1133-34) in the Encyclopedia of Islam, New 
Edition, vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1986).  
17 For example, Lane’s Lexicon from the mid-nineteenth century indicates no pluralization for ḥikma, and Hans 
Wehr in the mid-twentieth presents a pluralization (ḥikam), meaning aphorisms or maxims. 
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Sudanese and Syrian areas,” al-Ṭahṭāwī praises the governor as one who has already “vitalized 
the sciences through his exertion (bi-ijtihādihi) and raised the marks of Islam through his warring 
and his struggle (bi-ghazwihi wa-jihādihi)” (2). He links these two merits (i.e., vitalizing 
sciences and raising the marks of Islam) in a single sentence, emphasizing that the mission’s 
goal—that of pursuing sciences in non-Islamic lands—intends to strengthen Islam. He connects 
these through the sentence’s parallel structure and by the words themselves, for the verbal noun 
used to describe each contains the same root—j-h-d—expressing a sense of striving, toiling, and 
exerting, whether this is a primarily intellectual activity or also embodied in speech and action.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī becomes more candid regarding the relationship between certain sciences, 
military conquest, and spreading religions. He describes the absence of Islam in America, where 
the Franks converted many of its people to Christianity after conquering them. This is not a 
consequence of the Frank’s religion, but of their sciences: He explains that Islam is not found 
there because of the Franks’ strength in the science of seafaring and their knowledge of 
navigational sciences (16). Were the Islamic countries to learn from the Franks’ example and 
cultivate these sciences, they would empower themselves to conquer lands and spread Islam.  
The Franks are not the only model to follow. Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses the history of the Islamic 
lands as a paragon for greatness. He imagines the present as the dawn of a new age in which the 
lands of Islam will again achieve the eminence they once held a millennium ago (7-8, 195-96, 
210). In this vision, Muḥammad ʿAlī embodies the qualities of the greatest Abbasid caliphs 
under whom sciences flourished, and Cairo replaces Baghdad as the center from which 
sciences—and translations—emanate (195). Al-Ṭahṭāwī states: “in the time of the caliphs we 
were the most perfect of all lands.” Even the Franks presently “admit to us that [at that time] we 
were their teachers in all sciences and were more advanced than them.” And, is it not so that 
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“credit goes to the predecessor” because “one who comes later takes from what [his predecessor] 
left behind and is shown the way by his guidance?” (7). 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī presents his acceptance of the Franks’ instruction as a reciprocated act: we 
were their teachers then; therefore there is no shame in learning from them now. In fact, 
accepting their instruction would be like learning from our own past selves.18 Al-Ṭahṭāwī states 
as much in the conclusion, where he summarizes the work’s intention to “urge the people of our 
countries to import that which brings them strength and valor, and which enables them to achieve 
perfection, for we are those people—in short—as it was in the time of the caliphs” (210). The 
Abbasids built the most advanced empire by incorporating ideas and technologies from non-
Muslim peoples. We should follow their, which is also our, example and again import and 
incorporate sciences from non-Islamic lands.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s narration reflects the audience for whom he writes and the collectivity/ies 
within which he positions himself. In places he references “us” (usually ʿindanā) or refers to 
“our lands” (bilādnā), most often juxtaposed against either “the Franks” or “the French,” though 
far more often the former. Occasionally, this voice appears to refer to us, in Egypt, but it more 
often points to us, in Islamic countries. Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses various designations for this larger 
Islamic collectivity: the lands (bilād, 17,73), countries (diyār, 17,73), and nations (umam, 5) of 
Islam; the Islamic lands (al-bilād al-islāmiyya, 7); and our lands (bilādnā, 124). Were one to 
question whether his imagined audience resides only where Arabic is spoken, al-Ṭahṭāwī 
clarifies that even though this text is in Arabic, he is addressing all nations of Islam—both Arab 
and non-Arab (sāʾir umam al-islām min ʿarab wa-ʿajam)—in the hopes that a positive reception 
of his book will awaken them from the sleep of negligence (5). 
                                                
18 This interpretation is shaped by Shaden M. Tageldin’s discussion of the “lure of reciprocity” in her Disarming 
Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
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The Franks’ Christianity 
Islam features prominently when describing the lands and people contrasted against the 
Franks. Does al-Ṭahṭāwī similarly identify the Franks’ or their lands collectively with 
Christianity?  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī dissociates the Franks’ commendable qualities and their sciences from the 
Christianity with which he associates them. This distinction first appears in the work’s 
introduction, where he claims that those who criticize Muḥammad ʿAlī for welcoming and 
accepting assistance from Christians are ignorant, and explains that the governor’s interest in the 
Franks is “due to their human nature and their sciences, and not due to their being Christian (lā 
li-kaunihim naṣārī)” (8). His defense asserts that what is Christian, and particular, can be 
separated from the Franks’ human nature (insāniyyatihim) and sciences. By making this division, 
al-Ṭahṭāwī suggests that what is human and is science is potentially universal, and can be learned 
from and emulated by Islamic lands without incorporating any Christian aspects or influence. 
When praising elements of the Franks’ human nature al-Ṭahṭāwī employs a noteworthy 
comparison to assure his (Muslim) reader that the positive attributes he commends are not the 
product of the Franks’, or French, Christianity: he compares them to those Christians with whom 
he, and his Egyptian reader, is most familiar—the Copts.19 When he admiringly describes the 
Franks’ cleanliness, al-Ṭahṭāwī points out that this quality is absent among the Copts of Egypt. 
He even notes the irony that “cleanliness is a part of faith and yet [the Franks] do not have a drop 
[of it]” (25-26)! Similarly, when he distinguishes the Parisians “from other Christians” on 
account of their sharp intellect, their precise understanding, and the way they delve into recondite 
                                                
19 These comparisons clarify that al-Ṭahṭāwī writes envisioning a Muslim reader (and certainly not a Coptic one!). 
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matters, he again contrasts these qualities against “the Coptic Christians,” who are “inclined 
naturally towards ignorance and stupidity” (49). 
These two examples show that al-Ṭahṭāwī’s imagined reader is not Christian. They also 
point to his discomfort, be it personal, political, etc., with seeking knowledge from Christians, 
and the resultant need to defend this choice, whether to himself, to his readers, or both. One way 
he undertakes to do this, is to distance the Franks, and the French in particular, from Christianity 
by erecting a distinction between them and Christians in Egypt, at the same time that he draws 
the lands of Islam and Egypt closer to France through emphasizing their common humanity and 
shared characteristics. He uses his own and imagined readers’ presumption of what a Christian 
is, to affirm that the Franks are more human than Christian, and learning from them does not 
threaten Islam, but the opposite. Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s use of the ‘Coptic comparison’ to separate the 
Franks from Christianity rests upon the presumption that Western Christendom and Coptic 
Christianity should be expected to be one and the same Christianity. The comparison also serves 
al-Ṭahṭāwī because through it he asserts authority over Christians in Egypt at the same time that 
Christians abroad are exerting authority over him, the mission, and the Islamic lands.20 
                                                
20 Al-Ṭahṭāwī was in Paris when the French invaded Algeria in 1830. He discusses this briefly in his fifth essay, 
when describing the French revolution of 1830, where he contrasts the wishes of the French people against those of 
their political and religious leaders. He refutes a false statement given by the French archbishop who claimed 
Algeria’s fall as a great victory of the Christian community (al-milla al-masīḥiyya) over the vanquished Islamic one. 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī clarifies that “the war between the French and the peoples of Algeria is merely [due to] political matters 
and trade disputes, disagreements and quarrels, which are produced by pride and arrogance” (173). He projects this 
view onto the French people, recounting their rebellion of 1830 against King Charles X as retribution against the 
government which only days earlier had invaded Algeria. In particular, he relishes in the people’s destruction of the 
archbishop’s home, as though the people were punishing the archbishop for the falsehood of his proclamation (173). 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī acknowledges, however, that the victory of the French people over their government monopolized the 
news and their attention, such that the matter of Algeria was forgotten entirely, intimating that al-Ṭahtāwī’s 
portrayal of the people’s motivations is his willful and wishful projection.  
His narration here is exceptional: elsewhere in the Takhliṣ, when al-Ṭahṭāwī describes the transfer of power 
over lands, he consistently mentions when a particular land was either conquered by Muslims, or by Christians, or 
by one and then the other. He does this when describing the change of hands over al-Andalus (8), Naples (30), and 
Sicily (26-27), and when describing the absence of Islam (and presence of Christianity) in the Americas (16), and 
the reverse in Java and in Indonesia (where Islam is present and Christianity rare) (18). It is only in the present case 
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While at times al-Tahṭāwī emphasizes the Frank’s universal human nature over and 
above their Christianity, in other places he affirms that they are “Christian,” but empties the term 
of content. He describes the people of Paris as Christians “in name only,” and not in either deed 
or belief (19, 119-20).21 Even when challenged on this point, al-Ṭahṭāwī is insistent. In his third 
essay, in the section headed “on the religion of the people of Paris,” al-Ṭahṭāwī presents 
Orientalist Silvestre de Sacy’s reaction to his manuscript. While largely positive, de Sacy 
instructs him to reconsider the statement that the French have no religion and are Christian in 
name only. Al-Ṭahṭāwī reprints de Sacy’s criticism and dismisses it (120), explaining that the 
Frenchman holds this opinion because he is one of the few who are religious; however, their 
numbers are so small that they have no authority! Unlike the preceding examples in which al-
Ṭahṭāwī argues that it is possible to incorporate and emulate certain admirable qualities and 
sciences of the Franks because these are not particular to their Christianity, here he describes the 
French as unbelievers entirely—though designates them Christian, nonetheless.  
One way al-Ṭahṭāwī reconciles the Franks’ irreligiosity, of which he is critical, with his 
admiration for their sciences, is by explaining why many are Christians in name only: the French 
do not follow their religion, nor respect their priests, because their religion and priests commit 
moral and theological errors. Practices such as celibacy for the clergy, confession, and 
transubstantiation are all foolish (120-21). This can explain why the French experience an 
incompatibility between reason and religion, which causes them to reject religion. Such is not the 
                                                                                                                                                       
that he clarifies that this was not a Christian victory, and that France’s actions were driven solely by political and 
avaricious motives.  
21 Al-Ṭahṭāwī makes a noteworthy revision in the second edition: When discussing the geography of the world 
(1849: 16) al-Ṭahṭāwī explains that “the majority among the lands of Europe (bilād urubbā) is Christian.” The first 
edition (1834: 15), however, reads “the majority among the lands of the Franks is Christian or unbelievers” 
(aghlabuhā naṣārī aw kafara).  
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case in the Islamic lands, where Islam is no enemy to light or to knowledge, as Christianity is in 
France. 
Tracing Science 
This chapter aims to distinguish between al-Ṭahṭāwī’s use of ʿilm as an abstract 
substantive without pluralization (hesitantly and imperfectly translated here as “knowledge”) and 
ʿilm as the singular of ʿulūm (rendered as (a) “science”). Delineating these two can be 
challenging, especially because—as will be clarified shortly—al-Ṭahṭāwī’s concept of “sciences” 
differs from his perception of what the Franks term “science.” Thus, ʿilm varies based on 
whether al-Ṭahṭāwī is portraying his own view, his perception of how the Franks perceive 
“science,” and whether he is mediating between the two. The section below focuses on al-
Ṭahṭāwī’s employment of the term “science” itself—what it does, what is done to and with it, 
and what it is made to do—in preparation for the comparison of structures of sciences that 
follows.  
The actions of sciences are few. They “spread” (nashara: 9, 20, 155), “advance 
themselves” (taqaddama: 124), and “increase” (zāda: 124). Far more often, human agency drives 
and impacts their condition or activity. They are “spread” (intashara) through the assistance of 
the ruler to his people (8). People may “vitalize” (aḥyā) sciences through their exertions (2). 
Sciences are “cared for” (ʿanā) and “strengthened” (qawwaya) (4). Students seek to “acquire” 
(ḥaṣṣala) them (141). 
How do sciences spread? One “teaches” (darrasa) sciences, as is done in the colleges in 
Paris (132, 133). People “participate in” (shāraka fī) certain sciences (7); they “research” 
(baḥatha ʿan: 192), “inspect” (ṭālaʿa: 122), and “learn” (taʿallama: 19, 94, 132, 133, 134) them. 
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With proper training and aptitude, one may gain “mastery of” (tamakkana min) sciences (123). 
Sciences may be “sought-after” (maṭlūba), as are those the mission aims to acquire while in Paris 
(4, 10).  
A science may be “known” (maʿrūfa: 11) or “absent” (mafqūda: 19) among a people, just 
as a people can possess “knowledge” (maʿrifa: 121) of sciences, or come to “know” (ʿarafa: 
124) a science. By extension, a people may “advance in” (taqaddama fī: 121,122) sciences and 
“surpass” (faḍala fī: 124) others in them. Islamic lands, for example, “neglect” (ahmala) some 
sciences, but “excel” in (baraʿa fī) others (7). Likewise, there are presently sciences in which the 
Franks excel beyond all others (7, 18, 55). Comparison shows one use to which sciences are put, 
namely as a means to measure and contrast individuals and peoples. Just as students can be 
examined and comparatively ranked based on their demonstrated competency in a particular 
field, so too can different peoples and their societies’ be contrasted and their development 
ordered, through evaluating the general condition of sciences across them. 
Sciences are not only spread and developed, but they can also be shaped. They may be 
made “sound” (atqana), as the Franks have done for the mathematical, natural, theological, and 
metaphysical [sciences] (18). One may “beautify” (taḥsīn) and “perfect” (takmīl) a science (131). 
Such has been the case with arithmetic (ʿilm al-ḥisāb), a science to which different peoples over 
time have successively contributed, by “delving deep into” it (tabaḥḥara fīhi) and building on 
the work of their predecessors, “diversifying” (tanawwaʿa) it and becoming possessed of various 
“acquirements in” (tafannana fīhi) it, until achieving its perfection (192). This example 
illustrates what could be described as a transnational and transhistorical view of progress, 
whereby various peoples work across time and place on a common endeavor, building on the 
advances that came before until a science is completely known. 
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An activity may be turned into a science. This is a particular strength of the French, 
whose wealth, for example, is explained as a result of their “making” economizing and managing 
expenses “into a science” (jaʿalūhu ʿilman: 118). The French have turned even “the base 
[activities] (al-danīʾa),” such as cooking, into sciences that may be studied and acquired in 
schools devoted to their instruction (61). Al-Ṭahṭāwī admiringly proclaims how the French 
“mine sciences from a field of non-existence” (163). These sciences categorically differ from 
others al-Ṭahṭāwī describes, because the “object” of these is a verb, that is, a human action. It is 
not a found object made to reveal its truth (as will be described below), but a method that 
transforms and improves an act into something systematic, collective, replicable, teachable, and 
efficient. 
How do sciences work? Individual sciences are suited to particular purposes. For 
example, the subject of the science of geometry is designated as measuring the length, width, and 
depth [of things] (192). Regarding the “science of logic” (ʿilm al-mantiq), “analogy” (al-qiyās, a 
source for the determination of law in Islamic jurisprudence) is its foundational goal (188). 
Through the science of “grammar” (ʿilm al-naḥw) one comes to know the correct use of speech 
and writing in a particular language (178).22 As regards rhetoric (ʿilm al-balāgha), its greatest 
use is “for accessing knowledge of the secrets of revelation and its inimitability” (186). In these 
examples, a science is the means through which to acquire certain knowledge. 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s elaboration of the relationship between eloquence (al-balāgha) and the 
“science of eloquence” (ʿilm al-balāgha), that is, “what in Frankish languages is called rhetoric” 
                                                
22 In this instance, al-Ṭahṭāwī argues for using ʿilm al-naḥw as a translation for grammar: “Every language must 
have rules controlling it, in terms of writing and reading. These rules are called “aghramātīqā” in the Italian 
language, and “aghramīr” in the French language. It means the arrangement of speech, meaning the science of 
regulating language through its syntax. Thus, nothing prevents one from intending with “al-nahw” (syntax) the rules 
of language as such, which is how we intend it here” (177-78).  
 In a different passage (discussed in detail below) al-Ṭahṭāwī suggests the “sciences of Arabic” as a better 
equivalent to what the Franks’ call “grammar.” 
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(185), offers insight into how one science works. Al-Ṭahṭāwī describes the connection and 
distinction between an object and the science of that object: “The relationship of the ‘science of 
eloquence’ to eloquence is like the relationship of prosody to poetry” (186). Much as prosody 
investigates poetry’s attributes, “rhetoric” investigates eloquence. And just as one who is skilled 
in prosody may not be poetic, and vice versa, so too can one be a master of rhetoric and not of 
eloquence. More important, however, is the distinction al-Ṭahṭāwī makes between the purpose of 
eloquence and the purpose of its science. Eloquence is an attribute of linguistic expression. Its 
greatest use is in poetry, speeches, and in books of literature and histories because of its impact 
on the reader, listener, and reciter. The greatest use for rhetoric, however, is entirely different: It 
is to reveal the inimitable eloquence of the words of God (186). In other words, rhetoric, as “the 
science of eloquence,” is a tool applied to a text in order to appraise and understand the effects 
and use of eloquence within it. Eloquence must pre-exist the science that takes it as its object.  
Science then, according to this example, appears as a method applied to an object, which 
enables one to better perceive, understand, and benefit from the knowledge of that object. A 
science does not have a use apart from the object whose investigation is its purpose. The 
exception to this is when a science’s aim is to enable another science to actualize its highest 
purpose. According to al-Ṭahṭāwī’s depiction, any singular “science” is always a particular 
science. The only singular universal in his vision is the abstract “knowledge” (al-ʿilm), namely, 
what one seeks to arrive at through the practice of sciences. 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Depiction of the Franks’ Sciences  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses a particular phrase to refer to all the Franks’ sciences together: the ʿulūm 
ḥikmiyya. Across and within different translations of the Takhlīṣ there are a range of 
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interpretations for this expression. For example, Daniel Newman, in his An Imam in Paris 
(2004), fluctuates between translating ʿulūm ḥikmiyya as “philosophical sciences” (109, 251-52) 
and “intelligible sciences” (125, 130), and he once renders these the “philosophical branches [of 
the rational sciences]” (105). At its first use Newman includes a footnote, informing his reader 
that “al-ʿulūm al-ḥikmiyya can also be translated as ‘positive sciences,’ though he does not 
employ this translation elsewhere in his text (105). Karl Stowasser, in his German translation Ein 
Muslim entdeckt Europa (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988), prefers “philosophical” when he employs 
an adjective at all, translating these once as “philosophichen Disziplinen” (14), twice as 
“philosophischen Wissenschaften” (17, 146), and twice simply as “Wissenschaften” (29, 33), 
without qualification. This last suggestion, that of rendering ʿulūm ḥikmiyya as “sciences” or 
even “science,” while seeming to deviate most significantly from the text, does follow a certain 
logic. After all, to read the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya as “sciences” is to represent this concept from the 
point of view of the Franks, as al-Ṭahṭāwī relays their view. What is lost in such a translation, 
however, is the specificity of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s inserted qualification, and his critique, on the Franks’ 
concept. 
What does al-Ṭahṭāwī intend through this phrase? Why does he use it? Translating the 
ʿulūm ḥikmiyya as either philosophical or intellectual sciences may incorporate a generally 
accepted sense of the word ḥikma, however, neither option accurately describes what 
characterizes the group of sciences al-Ṭahṭāwī means by this term. In the Takhlīṣ, the ʿulūm 
ḥikmiyya only ever refer to those sciences in which the Franks excel beyond all others (7, 18); it 
is never used to describe sciences currently present in the Islamic lands (though these are 
sciences they should acquire and may once have known). Al-Ṭahṭāwī mentions mathematics, 
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natural sciences, metaphysics, and theology as fields within this category.23 Further, he presents 
philosophy as contained within the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya (and hence not the total of it). He warns his 
reader to be cautious when studying those sciences the French have mastered, because some of 
their “philosophical beliefs” (iʿtiqādāt falsafiyya) are outside the laws of reason. He specifies 
that their “books of philosophy are completely filled with many of these heresies” (122). Given 
this critique alongside the fact that the whole Takhlīṣ speaks to the mastery of the Franks and the 
French in the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya, it is clear that al-Ṭahṭāwī does not intend ḥikmiyya to mean 
philosophical. 
Further, as opposed to the long-standing use of ḥikma which pertains to more speculative 
thought, al-Ṭahṭāwī later explains that the Franks use “science” to refer to what one reaches via 
demonstrable proofs (barāhīn). This (Frankish) definition, together with examples of sciences 
comprising the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya, suggests that these are closer to something like “positive 
sciences” then they are to speculative, philosophical, or intellectual sciences. While philosophy 
may aptly be termed a speculative science and not a positive one, it is precisely because the 
Franks treat philosophy as a positive science, in which their erroneous claims are established as 
fact via proof that they err. They are masters of the positive sciences and they err in those 
speculative sciences which they treat as positivist. What is lost, however, in the translation 
“positive sciences” is al-Ṭahṭāwī’s effort—evident from the phrase’s first appearance alongside 
                                                
23 Al-Ṭahṭāwī fluctuates as to whether metaphysics and theology are different names for the same field or whether 
these refer to separate sciences within the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya. The first citation (7) elaborates the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya as 
mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics (al-ʿulūm al-riyāḍiyya wa-l-ṭabīʿiyya wa-mā warāʾ al-ṭabīʿa), while 
the second citation (18) adds a fourth category to the aforementioned three: theology (al-ilhīyāt). In the work’s sixth 
and final essay, when describing “the Franks’ method” of dividing the sciences and arts (see figure 1 below), al-
Ṭahṭāwī explains that theology is also called the metaphysics. This would seem to be al-Ṭahṭāwī’s rendition of the 
Franks’ method, and not necessarily his own, though the passage on 18, raises ambiguity as to whether al-Ṭahṭāwī 
considers this a single or separate fields. 
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hadith encouraging the acquisition of ḥikma—to familiarize or Islamicize these “Frankish 
sciences” for his Muslim reader. 
A distinction between al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view and his perception of the Franks’ view is 
discernable as well in the differentiation in use, or lack thereof, of certain terms. For example, 
the second section of the introduction has the subheading “Concerning the sought-after sciences 
and arts” (al-ʿulūm wa-l-funūn al-maṭlūba).24 Its first sentence then announces it will describe 
the “sought-after trades” (al-ṣanāʾiʿ al-maṭlūba), so as to acquaint the reader with their 
importance.  The next refers to “these arts” (hādhihī al-funūn), while the third separates the 
curriculum’s general subjects (arithmetic, geometry, geography, history, and drawing) and those 
specializations—each of which are identified as a science (al-ʿilm al-awwal, al-ʿilm al-thānī, 
etc.)—in which different students focused (10). Thus, from this section’s opening paragraph the 
same concepts are referred to first as “sciences and arts,” then “crafts,” then “arts,” then 
“sciences.” 
This is different from how the Franks’ classify and differentiate knowledges. The first 
section of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s sixth essay, “On the division of sciences and arts, according to the 
Franks’ method,” opens with the following: 
Know that the Franks have divided human knowledges into two divisions: sciences and 
arts. Science is the sound achievements mentioned above, [attained] through manifest 
proofs. As for art, this is knowledge of the craft of something, according to specialized 
rules. (176)  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī relays the Franks’ view of the division of knowledges, qualified here as human. He 
describes their most basic subdivision, that between sciences and arts—ʿulūm and funūn—which 
he then defines through the singular ʿilm and fann (though his explanation of “science” switches 
                                                
24 See Appendix 2b for the Arabic and my translation of this section, and of the section “On the division of sciences 
and arts, according to the Franks’ method,” discussed below. 
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to the plural). The Franks’ divide knowledges from arts, based on method and occupation. 
“Science,” for them, is the positive knowledge acquired through a verifiable replicable 
methodology  (barāhīn). “Art” refers to how one practices a craft. His fluctuation between the 
singular and the plural when defining “science” points to the disjuncture between the plurality of 
sciences which govern his own view (described below) and what he observes through his studies 
in Paris.  
Within these two categories there are subdivisions. The arts are separated into the 
“intellectual” (ʿaqliyya) and the “practical” (ʿamaliyya), again distinguished based on method 
and occupation: “The intellectual arts are frequently close to sciences…because they require 
scientific foundations. As for the practical arts, they are trades (al-ḥiraf)” (177). Al-Ṭahṭāwī 
provides examples to illustrate what is meant by intellectual arts, naming several “sciences,” for 
example, “the science of purity and rhetoric [of language],” and “the science of grammar, logic, 
poetry, drawing, sculpture, and music” (177). That he calls these sciences and not arts, reflects a 
classification of knowledges, not based on the Franks’ method, but according to his own.  
He provides greater elaboration of the Franks’ sciences, which are divided based on 






Figure 1: on the Frankish division of the sciences and arts, according to al-Ṭahṭāwī (taken from Takhlīṣ, 176-77, 191) 
This chart shows how the Franks’ sciences, qualified as human, emanate out from a 
single point, with the potential for its branches to continually expand outward as new sciences 
are discovered and created. Every science classified by the Franks falls within what al-Ṭahṭāwī 
groups as the ʿulūm ḥikmiyya. 
At the end of this section, al-Ṭahṭāwī describes a difference between the Franks’ 
classification of knowledges and that which is present “among us” (ʿindanā):  
This is the division among the Franks’ sages. However, among us the sciences and the 
arts are generally one thing, and the distinction is between whether the essence of an art 
is an independent science in itself, or a tool serving another. (177) 
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While the Franks divide arts from sciences based on method, and then within sciences based on 
the object of investigation (for all sciences share the methodology of demonstrable proof), 
among “us,” distinctions are drawn not based on method, but on use. Sciences and arts are, for 
the most part, one unified thing (shaiʾ wāḥid). When a distinction is drawn it appears between 
those independent sciences, whose ultimate purpose is a goal unto itself, and those that are 
auxiliary, and whose greatest use is to assist another science in achieving perfection.  
This is one of the two ways that “we” distinguish sciences. The second is examined in the 
next section, which considers al-Ṭahṭāwī’s strategy for situating and assimilating the Franks’ 
sciences into his own. 
The Structure of Sciences, according to al-Ṭahṭāwī:  
The “positive sciences” are not the only grouping of sciences in this work. Elsewhere, al-
Ṭahṭāwī employs two categories which together comprise what he presents as the entirety of 
sciences: the “transmitted sciences” (ʿulūm naqliyya), also referred to as the ʿulūm sharʿiyya; 
and the “intellectual sciences” (ʿulūm ʿaqliyya). These first appear in a narrative opening the 
text’s introduction which describes the development of human societies from the earliest man to 
the most advanced societies. This account can be seen to frame the entire Takhlīṣ, justifying the 
mission’s travels to “lands of unbelief and obstinacy,” and setting up certain comparative 
dynamics which run throughout the work.25  
The story opens with primitive man, who is guided by only instinct and emotions. Then, 
“a number of knowledges” (ʿiddat maʿārif) appear to some people—by chance or be 
revelation—and either the [human] intellect (al-ʿaql) or the [ordained] way (al-sharʿ) determine 
                                                
25 Appendix 2a contains the Arabic and an English translation of this opening narrative. 
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them as useful and consequently preserve them (5). This introduction helps explain how it is that 
the two most expansive categories of sciences come to exist: When one’s intellect identifies 
knowledges as useful, one will develop the intellectual sciences; when the [ordained] way 
determines them valuable, one develops the transmitted sciences. 
People, once they begin acquiring and developing knowledges and skills, come together 
to form societies. All societies progress forward, through three successive stages: The most 
primitive is that of “the savage nomads (al-hummal al-mutawaḥḥishīn),” who know nothing 
about “matters which provide for this life or for the hereafter.” This second stage is of “crude 
berbers (al-barābira al-khashnīn),” who “know how [to distinguish] the permissible from the 
forbidden” but their degree of progress in “matters of subsistence, civilization, human crafts, and 
intellectual and transmitted sciences” is incomplete. Finally, the third and most advanced is “the 
stage of people of manners, elegance, sedentariness, civilization, and extreme urbanization 
(martabat ahl al-ādab wa-l-ẓarāfa wa-l-taḥaḍḍur wa-l-tamaddun wa-l-tamaṣṣur al-
mutaṭarriqīn)” (6). Humans’ awareness of the transmitted and intellectual sciences begins in the 
second stage of development, though it is only in the third that they perfect these.26 
All “nations” (al-umam) in the most advanced stage are masters “of sciences and 
industries” and “of ways [of belief and practice]” (the term al-Ṭahṭāwī uses is sharāʾiʿ, the plural 
of sharīʿa) (7). Nonetheless, the greatest variation exists in this stage, whose lands differ from 
each other in “their sciences and their arts,” as well as in the degree to which they “adopt a 
                                                
26 While al-Ṭahṭāwī’s depiction of the stages of civilizational development shares much with that of Ibn Khaldūn 
(whom he read with Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār at al-Azhar—see Gran, Islamic Roots, 185), he deviates from Ibn Khaldūn in 
seeing both the “transmitted” and the “intellectual” sciences as universal. Ibn Khaldūn finds only the latter in all 
societies because the intellect (al-ʿaql) is a human faculty, whereas the foundations of the transmitted sciences are 
the shariʿyāt in the Qurʾan and the sunna, and these sciences, therefore, are particular to Islamic societies. —See Ibn 
Khaldūn, Muqaddima, 549 ff).  
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shariʿa from the shariʿa (taqlīd sharīʿa min al-sharīʿa)” (7).27 Through this variation al-Ṭahṭāwī 
presents both Islamic lands, including Egypt, and Frankish lands, including France, as examples 
of the third most advanced stage, while accommodating the differences between them.  
Al-Ṭahtāwī counterbalances the Islamic lands’ deficiency in the positive sciences (in 
which the Franks excel) with their superiority in other sciences (in which the Franks are 
deficient): 
The Frankish lands have already reached the greatest degree of proficiency in 
mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics [i.e. the positive sciences], their 
foundations and their branches…On the other hand, the Islamic countries have excelled 
in the ʿulūm sharʿiyya and their application, and in the intellectual sciences. They 
neglected the positive sciences completely and for that reason needed the Western lands28 
to acquire what they do not know. (7)  
This passage illustrates an inversion between Western and Islamic lands, while the 
developmental narrative preceding it also posits the two as equals. Thus, when al-Ṭahṭāwī 
explains that the Islamic countries need the Western ones (al-bilād al-gharbiyya) because they 
are presently deficient in some portion of sciences the Franks are masters of (i.e., the “positive 
sciences”), he implies the corresponding weakness of the Franks’ lands’ in those sciences in 
which the Islamic lands excel.29 This passage brings to culmination the different roles the 
opening narrative fulfills. It justifies the mission’s pursuit of certain sciences in Paris, at the same 
                                                
27 This formulation emphasizes the singularity of the shariʿa (which no society adopts), by keeping the second 
definite noun in the singular. Al-Ṭahṭāwī often uses this construction to refer to one of a plurality, for example “ayy 
ʿilm min al-ʿulūm,” to mean “a/ny science” (lit. any science from the sciences) or “ayyat lugha min al-lughāt” to 
mean “a/ny language.” Here he emphasizes that there are many sharāʾiʿ (as followed by different societies), but 
only one shariʿa (adopted by none). 
28 Abu-Lughod highlights that this instance of “bilād gharbiyya” is the first time in Arabic literature that the phrase 
is used to connote “the West” in contrast to “the lands of Islam.” He read this as the first sign of the developing 
dichotomy between the spiritual East and the materialist West. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Arab Rediscovery of Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 153. 
29 Al-Ṭahṭāwī assures his Muslim reader that the Islamic lands are proficient in both categories of sciences, i.e., in 
the intellectual and the sharʿiyya sciences. It is perhaps not coincidental that he neglects to mention here that their 
advancements in the intellectual sciences are restricted to a number of sciences (as he clarifies elsewhere), nor is he 
explicit (as he is later on) that the “positive sciences” are examples of intellectual sciences.  
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time that it refuses inferiority. It explains the different, equally valid, ways in which humans may 
arrive at knowledge and shows the foundations for the two greatest groupings of sciences. Lastly 
by claiming inversion and equality at the same time, it lays out the foundation for al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
critique of the Franks’ conception of sciences—not for the absence of Islam within it, but for the 
their ignorance of those sciences that form the Frankish counterpart to the Islamic lands’ ʿulūm 
sharʿiyya. 
The intellectual and the transmitted sciences are well-established categories. Ibn Khaldūn 
discusses these in his Muqaddima, and subjects were arranged in these two groupings at al-Azhar 
in the eighteenth century.30 The Takhlīṣ offers little elaboration on the sciences that comprise the 
transmitted (or the sharʿiyya) sciences, though it does provide several examples of intellectual 
sciences (e.g., mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics, in which the Franks excel, as well 
as the sciences of Arabic and logic (124), in which the Islamic lands excel). It is possible that al-
Ṭahṭāwī does not specify transmitted sciences because these were understood by his reader, or 
because their absence in France provided no opportunities for comparison, and hence 
elaboration. It is also possible that al-Ṭahṭāwī may have chosen to avoid naming these, because it 
would have been either controversial or difficult, though not impossible nor entirely without 
precedent, to de-Islamize these.31  
                                                
30 On the separation between the ʿulūm ʿaqliyya and naqliyya, and the sciences within them, see Newman, An Imam 
in Paris, 103n3; J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac 
and Co., 1939), 41-42. 
31 Heyworth-Dunne lists the ʿulūm naqliyya as taught at al-Azhar at the start of the nineteenth-century as including: 
“tajwīd (the art of Koranic recitation); qirāʾāt (the knowledge of the accepted readings of the Quran); tafsīr (Quranic 
exegesis); ḥadīth (prophetic traditions); fiqh (jurisprudence of the four schools); uṣūl al-fiqh (doctrine of 
fundamental principles); farāʾiḍ (or mīrāth) (the laws of inheritance); tauḥīd (or kalām) (theology); and taṣawwuf 
(mysticism).” An Introduction, 41. 
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The following figure represents al-Ṭahṭāwī’s incorporation of the Franks’ sciences into 
his worldview, allowing them mastery over a segment of the intellectual sciences, while showing 
their complete deficiency in the transmitted sciences: 
 
 
Figure 2: Situating the “positive sciences” within the structure of transmitted and intellectual sciences 
In al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view there is not a single category at the apex of sciences, but two 
complementary and connected categories: the transmitted sciences and the intellectual sciences. 
The universality of the entire structure enables him to insert the ever-expanding positive sciences 
among the intellectual ones, incorporating the Franks’ advances without altering the system’s 
governing categories. That the entire structure is universalized enables al-Ṭahṭāwī to critique the 
Franks’ view as partial, while acknowledging their superiority in a portion of sciences. Although 
the Islamic lands presently excel in the transmitted sciences, these are not exclusive to them. Just 
as the lands of Islam can learn from the Franks regarding the positive sciences, al-Ṭahṭāwī 
implies that the Frankish lands should cease their neglect of the transmitted sciences and attend 
to investigating all aspects and dimensions of their (Christian) sharīʿa.  
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This phrase—“the Christian sharīʿa”—appears in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s discussion of the French 
term “scholar.”32 Following his section “on the religion of the people of Paris,” al-Ṭahṭāwī 
devotes a chapter to their advancements in the arts and sciences. There, he emphasizes a 
distinction between his imagined reader’s understanding of the term “scholar” (al-ʿālim) and 
what the French intend by the term. He instructs: 
Do not presume that the scholars of the French are priests, because the priests are 
scholars in religion only. Among the priests there may be someone who is also a scholar, 
but what the title “scholars” designates is one who has knowledge in the intelligible 
sciences. The knowledge of scholars in branches of the Christian sharīʿa is very 
insignificant. (124). 
The Christian sharīʿa33 is the object the Franks’ transmitted sciences would investigate. Thus, 
their scholars’ ignorance of its branches amounts to their ignorance of these sciences. Unlike in 
Egypt where the ʿālim is versed in both intellectual sciences and those sciences that treat the 
(Islamic) sharīʿa, in France the scholar is split into two distinct personages: the “scholar” (al-
ʿālim) whose expertise is limited to intellectual sciences, and the “priest” (al-qass), who knows 
about religion (and perhaps about the Christian sharīʿa).  
Looking to recent translations of the Takhlīṣ one finds significantly divergent 
interpretations of the phrase “the Christian sharīʿa,” ranging from “Christian theology” to the 
“canonical law of the Christians” to the “Christian religion.”34 None of these capture the 
                                                
32 See Appendix 2c for this Arabic passage and translation. 
33 Clearly, al-Ṭahṭāwī does not intend sharīʿa in the problematic yet pervasive sense in which it has more recently 
come to be used, as referencing “Islamic law.” His usage is more akin to what Wael Hallaq identifies the sharīʿa to 
have meant in premodern societies where it “represented a complex set of social, economic, cultural, and moral 
relationships that permeated the epistemic structures of the social and political orders.” Wael B. Hallaq, “What is 
Shariʿa?” Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 151 (2005-2006): 155. 
34 Newman reads: “Their scholars are not very conversant with the branches of Christian theology.” Newman, An 
Imam in Paris, 255. Emphasis added. 
Stowasser’s Ein Muslim entdeckt Europa (150) reads: “Ihre Gelehrten sind sehr wenig im kanonischen 
Recht der Christen bewandert.” Stowasser, Ein Muslim entdeckt Europa, 150. Emphasis added. 
Louca reads: “Et les gens de science sont très peu versés dans les études de la religion chrétienne.” Anour 
Louca, L’Or de Paris (Paris: Sindbad, 1988), 188. Emphasis added. 
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dimensions of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s critique, for the Franks’ scholars’ neglect of their sharīʿa equates to 
their neglect of the transmitted sciences. This move illustrates how al-Ṭaḥtāwī acknowledges and 
incorporates differences across lands and peoples while situating this variation within a universal 
structure of knowledge. Both Christianity and Islam represent a sharīʿa. The transmitted sciences 
are universal though they take particular sharāʾiʿ as their object. This universality serves a two-
fold purpose: It allows al-Ṭahṭāwī to advocate for the incorporation of universal intellectual 
sciences from the Franks, because these are isolated and distinct from the Islamic lands’ 
transmitted sciences and from the Franks’ Christianity; and it enables him to critique the Franks’ 
worldview as partial, for it neglects the transmitted sciences entirely. 
On Sciences and Language 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s discussion of the correspondence between “grammar” and the “Arabic 
sciences” illustrates how it can be more challenging in certain areas to forge conceptual 
equivalencies across Arabic and French.35 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī first mentions the Arabic sciences (al-ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya) in his introduction 
where he describes them as a specialty of the lands of Islam. There he offers little elaboration 
aside from noting that a few Franks have “gained access to their intricacies and their secrets,” 
although they “were not rightly guided to the straight path nor did they ever set foot on the path 
to salvation” (7). It is not until his third essay, when translating the French concept of grammar, 
that al-Ṭahṭāwī returns to these as a means to familiarize his reader with their French equivalent: 
The foundations of the French tongue and the art of arranging its words and their writing 
and reading is called aghrammātīqā36…and aghrammīr…by the French. It means the art 
                                                
35 See Appendix 2c for the Arabic and translation of passages discussed in this section. 
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of arranging the speech of any language. It is as if one were to use the art of naḥw to 
encompass all that pertains to language. [It is] as we call the sciences of Arabic, by which 
we intend the twelve sciences gathered in the saying of our sheikh al-ʿAṭṭār: 
syntax and morphology metrics after that data 
then etymology poetry verse composition 
likewise semantics figurative expression calligraphy rhyme 
history—this enumerates the science of the Arabs.37 (56) 
In this passage, al-Ṭahṭāwī works to translate and describe the French grammar so that his reader 
may understand what it represents. He offers two Arabic alternatives for the term: The first is al-
naḥw (i.e., syntax). Like grammar it is singular and is not exclusive to a particular language. 
However, to turn “syntax” into the equivalent of grammar requires making it into a substitute for 
the whole of which it is a part. His second suggestion—ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya (the sciences of 
Arabic)—is a plurality and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s preferred rendering in this particular passage. The 
collective “sciences of Arabic” (of which al-naḥw is one component) is better suited to what 
grammar represents (i.e., “all that pertains to language”).  
In attempting to elucidate a concept shared across French and Arabic, al-Ṭahṭāwī 
suggests each term is an imprecise rendition of what both represent. The strength of “grammar” 
is that the concept’s universality is presumably more apparent; the strength of “the sciences of 
Arabic” is that they together offer a more descriptive and comprehensive representation of the 
multifaceted nature of what is described. His preference here is for the translation that would be 
most descriptive and meaningful to his Arabic reader. This enables al-Ṭahṭāwī to suggest at a 
later point (177-78),  (i.e., after having already explained what grammar is) that one can use “al-
                                                                                                                                                       
36 Al-Ṭahṭāwī includes vocalization instructions after each non-Arabic word, so that his reader may know how to 
pronounce them. He instructs that aghrammātīqā is read “with hamza [on the alef], sukūn on the ghain, fataḥ on the 
rāʾ, doubling on the mīm, kasra on the tāʾ, and fataḥ on the qāf,” and aghrammīr “with doubling on the mīm.”  
37 There is one significant point on which Al-Ṭahṭāwī and al-ʿAṭṭār differ: al-Ṭahṭāwī names these the “sciences of 
Arabic,” whereas for al-ʿAṭṭār they form the singular “science of the Arabs.” That al-Ṭahṭāwī makes no mention of a 
distinction between the sciences of a language and the science of a people would seem to be a polite emendation to 
the designation of his mentor, since nowhere else in the Takhlīṣ does al-Ṭahṭāwī reference these as the science, or 
even sciences, of the Arabs. 
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naḥw” as the French use “grammar” to represent “all the rules of language.” These two 
explanations illustrates one of al-Ṭahṭāwī’s translational strategies: Before he can reconfigure al-
naḥw into the equivalent of the French “grammar,” he must explain grammar in an intelligible 
way to his readers so that they do not incorrectly read “grammar” to mean “al-naḥw.”  
In the Takhlīs, al-Ṭahṭāwi twice (7, 56) refers to the Arabic sciences (al-ʿulūm al-
ʿarabiyya ) and twice (56, 124) to the sciences of Arabic (ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya). Were one unsure 
whether these name the same grouping, his description before and after al-ʿAṭṭār’s verse clarifies 
that they do. However, through the process of translating grammar, al-Ṭahṭāwī begins to 
differentiate the two names, showing a degree of discomfort regarding the designation “the 
Arabic sciences,” and the specificity implied by the adjective “Arabic.”  
This becomes visible in the discussion following al-ʿAṭṭār’s verse (56), where he 
addresses the concern that these “sciences” might be better called “fields of investigation of the 
[singular] science of Arabic.” He asks what is meant by including “history” among “the Arabic 
sciences,” even though, he notes, the first to write history were Greek scholars while “Arabs did 
not compose [history] until more recent times” (56).38 He raises this as a challenge to his reader 
whom he worries could mistakenly perceive these sciences as exclusive to Arabic. He highlights 
this tension to warn his reader not to misunderstand what “the Arabic sciences” represent. These 
sciences are not unique to Arabic but universal, and exist in every language:  
                                                
38 Tageldin argues that this passage reveals dimensions of a troubling (post)colonial psychology, showing how al-
Ṭahṭāwī internalizes the French model as the universal, perceiving the Homeric epic as the purveyor of history, to 
which Arab history is epistemologically secondary. Her reading privileges the origin as the epistemological source 
and implies that because Homer wrote “history” before Arabs, al-Ṭahṭāwī must view “history” as “Greek” or as a 
“European” science and not an “Arabic” one, as he should. I read this passage differently. Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses this 
example, not “[to position] France as the new Athens from which modern Egypt must originate,” as Tageldin 
suggests, but to use “precedent” to show his Arabic readers that they should not understand the Arabic sciences as 
exclusive to Arabic. He does not say “history is Greek.” Rather, he explains that “history is not Arabic.” Shaden M. 
Tageldin, “One Comparative Literature? ‘Birth’ of a Discipline in French-Egyptian Translation, 1810-1834,” 
Comparative Literature Studies 47.4 (2010): 431-434. 
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Thus, the French language, like other Frankish languages, has a conventional use 
particular to it, upon which is built its syntax, morphology, metrics, verse, figurative 
expression, calligraphy, composition, semantics—this is what is called “grammar.” Thus 
all languages possessing rules have an art that gathers its rules, regardless of whether it is 
to repudiate mistakes in reading and writing, or to beautify it. This is not restricted to the 
Arabic language, but is found in every language. Truly, the Arabic language is the most 
eloquent of languages, and the greatest, and most extensive and sublime to the ear. (56-
57) 
Reiterating several sciences from al-ʿAṭṭār’s verse, al-Ṭahṭāwī again emphasizes that together 
these describe what “grammar” intends. Through this, he critiques the name “the Arabic 
sciences” because these sciences exist in all languages. Instead, al-Ṭahṭāwī implies that it would 
be better to conceive of “the sciences of language” which investigate Arabic (or French, etc.). 
Concerned that his reader might read his universalizing these sciences as suggesting universal or 
equalized languages, al-Ṭahṭāwī assures his reader that universal sciences of language do not 
threaten Arabic’s singularity. The distinction al-Ṭahṭāwī establishes between universal sciences 
and singular languages is a consequence of his processes of translation. Before translating the 
French “grammar,” the “sciences of Arabic” and the “Arabic sciences” were indistinguishable. 
After translating “grammar,” sciences are universalized and thus Arabic’s singularity must be 
asserted and also distinguished from sciences that had previously defined it.39 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī again asserts Arabic’s greatness at the moment his description of translation 
might be seen to privilege universality over particularities:  
One learned in the Latin language knows everything connected to it. He understands 
syntax in itself, and others, such as morphology. It is ignorant to say that he does not 
know anything on account of his ignorance of the Arabic language. If one delves deep 
into any language then he perforce becomes learned in another language, meaning that if 
something is translated for him in the other language, and is expressed to him, then he 
may acquire it and compare it to his language. Even if he may have known it already, he 
gets to know it better and researches into it and invalidates from it what reason does not 
approve. How [could he not], for knowledge (ʿilm) is the faculty [of all]. A person may 
                                                
39 An example of the former is found in al-Ṭahṭāwī’s description of the science of rhetoric (ʿilm al-balāgha). The 
greatest purpose for this science is unique to Arabic, namely to reveal the eloquence (al-balagha) of the Qurʾan and 
demonstrate its inimitability. 
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be unfamiliar with the large tomes in the Arabic language, but he can come to know 
[what is contained in them] through the French language, if it is translated for him. 
Whereas each language is served and [therefore] has its Muṭawwal, its Aṭwāl, and its 
Saʿd,40 truly, not every liquid is water, nor every roof a sky, nor every house the house of 
God, nor every Muhammad the prophet of God …There is no doubt that the tongue of the 
Arabs is the greatest and most splendid of languages. (57) 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī instructs his readers in several ways through this passage. First he tells them not to 
dismiss what people know simply because they do not know Arabic. He explains that translation 
enables one who is learned in the sciences of language to benefit from the knowledge contained 
in translated texts. And he then advises his reader how to read a translation for knowledge: read 
and learn what is contained in a translation; compare it to what you may have known already on 
the topic from texts in your own language; deepen your knowledge in the process; and eliminate 
what the intellect (al-aql) does not accept. He councils his readers to be open to learning through 
translations and tells them that reading a translation should be comparative, and that one can trust 
the intellect to be able to eliminate any conflicts that arise between the two. This is possible 
because knowledge (al-ʿilm) is the faculty (huwa al-malaka) of all humans.  
 He emphasizes again that knowledge is not the domain of Arabic. A Frenchman can learn 
what is contained in a great Arabic work through translation. This is because the “Arabic 
sciences” exist in all languages; all languages have their masterworks on rhetoric and grammar 
similar in kind to what exists in Arabic. And once more, al-Ṭahṭāwī underscores that even 
though these sciences are universal, languages are singular. This is then his final piece of advice 
to his readers in the above passage: what distinguishes you cannot be sciences, because these are 
not particular. It is possible to proudly proclaim that “Arabic is the greatest and most splendid of 
                                                
40 These are well-known medieval Arabic works on rhetoric and grammar: “Al-muṭawwal” refers to al-Taftāzānī’s 
(d. 1389) work on rhetoric Sharḥ al-takhlīṣ al-muṭawwal, which was a commentary on al-Qazwīnī’s (1268-1337) 
abridgement of al-Sakkākī’s (1160-1229) Miftaḥ al-ʿulūm. “Al-Atwal” is another commentary on al-Sakkākī’s 
Miftaḥ, by al-Asfarāʾīnī (d. 1544). “Al-Saʿd” refers to a grammar treatise by al-Taftāzānī.  See Newman, An Imam in 
Paris, 184n2, 185n3-4. 
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languages,” without making that assertion dependent on its sciences, which, al-Ṭahṭāwī repeats 
are not really “its” but belong to all languages.  
 There is a second reason why what gives Arabic its singularity should not, and perhaps 
cannot, be its sciences. The entire Takhlīṣ confirms the superiority of the Franks, and the French 
in particular, in a great number of intellectual sciences. Al-Ṭahṭāwī suggests this has something 
to do with the clarity of their language and style of writing, at least when it comes to works on 
sciences. He explains that prose (al-nathr) “is the tongue of the sciences” (179), even though 
many Arabic books on sciences are written in verse (al-naẓm). He attributes this exceptionality 
to the vastness of the Arabic language, but also criticizes it for hindering the Islamic lands’ 
progress in non-linguistic sciences.  
Unlike Arabic, French science books are in prose. Whereas someone who studies an 
Arabic book on science must use “all the tools of language” and work hard to decipher and 
understand its words since “expressions carry meanings far from their appearance” (122), a 
reader of a French science book can understand the language “at first sight.” 
Thus, whenever a person commences studying a [French] book on a science he can 
devote himself to understanding the issues of that science and its rules without arguing 
about the words. He can direct all his attention to researching the subject of the science 
and to merely what is said and understood, and to all that may result from it. Anything 
else is a waste. For example, if a person wants to study arithmetic, then he understands 
what concerns numbers without looking at the inflection of terms, and the effect of 
whatever metaphors are included in it. He would not object if an expression was suited to 
paronomasia but devoid of it, nor if the author began in one way when something else 
should have been first, nor if he used the fāʾ in place of the wāw, when the opposite 
would have been better, and so on. (122-23) 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī suggests that an overdevelopment of the sciences of language has hindered the 
advancement of other sciences in the Islamic lands. Instead of writing and reading texts to 
communicate knowledge—which he implies should be the purpose of language in science 
books—Arabic writers and readers argue about rhetoric and grammar instead of furthering the 
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science at hand. The French on the other hand can devote all their energies to learning, acquiring, 
and producing knowledge. They are not quibbling about conjunctions and word choice, nor must 
a student have mastered the sciences of language to be able to make use of the knowledge 
contained in a science book. 
 Throughout the work al-Ṭahṭāwī extols and reveres Arabic for its eloquence, beauty, and 
grace. This passage is unusually critical and passes a “French” judgment on the language. Earlier 
in the text, al-Ṭahṭāwī describes how different languages each have their own use, and therefore 
not everything can be rendered across them (55, 56). While “knowledge” translates, style, taste, 
and aesthetics often do not. He explains, for example, how due to differences between the use of 
French and Arabic, it can be difficult, it not impossible, to translate style across the two. For 
example, because French is devoid of word plays and inflections and does not value oral 
rhetorical embellishments, “what is considered embellishment in Arabic is considered a 
weakness by the French.” Therefore, “the ornamental grace of Arabic is destroyed when it is 
translated” into French (55).   
Some Remarks on al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Critique and Translation 
Al-Ṭahṭāwī advocates for the Islamic lands to learn from the Franks’ sciences, which are 
universal sciences, and to import what will further their development. This closing section will 
return to consider the use and effects of two different translation strategies he employs in order to 
encourage his readers’ to favor the mission’s aims. 
From the opening of the introduction al-Ṭahṭāwī presents a universal narrative of 
progress where all societies will eventually develop the same two overarching categories of 
sciences: the intellectual and the transmitted sciences. He presents the lands of Islam and those of 
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the Franks as equally advanced though inversely related. The inversion explains what the 
mission stands to gain from its studies in Paris—namely those sciences the Franks have mastered 
which al-Ṭahṭāwī translates and qualifies as ḥikmiyya—and what al-Ṭahṭāwī imagines it has to 
teach the French, i.e. the sharʿiyya sciences.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī critiques the Franks’ concept of sciences in two ways: First, he translates 
their total view of science as the “ʿulūm ḥikmiyya,” Islamizing their sciences as he subsumes the 
entire concept within the intellectual sciences. He then critiques the Franks for their ignorance in 
the (Christian) transmitted sciences. By distinguishing the French from Christians, or seeing 
them as Christians “in-name only,” he eases the integration of their positive sciences both 
literally into Egypt and conceptually within the category of the intellectual sciences, while at the 
same time affirming the Islamic lands’ strength, even superiority, in at least a portion of sciences. 
In this way, al-Ṭahṭāwī is able to imagine the Islamic lands as the Franks’ teacher, at the same 
time that the Franks, in reality, are instructing.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī uses a second translational strategy when he twice introduces the French term 
grammar. He first defines the French term, and suggests his reader think of it as “sciences of 
Arabic” (or the “Arabic sciences”). He makes this choice based on intelligibility. He later 
substitutes naḥw for grammar, choosing an Arabic term that better fits the singular universal 
contours of the French, whereas he earlier preferred the term that better fit the meaning of the 
shared abstraction represented by both Arabic and French terms.  
Through his initial efforts to explain “grammar” in Arabic terms, al-Ṭahṭāwī comes to 
question the suitability of the “Arabic sciences” (or “sciences of Arabic”) as a designation for 
what it represents. As a result he reconceptualizes the Arabic term, and divides the sciences of 
language from Arabic. This division however, changes how Arabic is understood, which 
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explains why he asserts Arabic’s singularity and superiority precisely at those moments when he 




CONCLUDING REMARKS:  
Engaging Sciences  
 
 
Leopold Zunz’s Etwas über die rabbinische Litteratur and Rifāʿa Rāfiʿ al-Ṭahṭāwī’s 
Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz ilā Talkhīṣ Bārīz are two didactic works that have been made foundational for 
the Wissenschaft des Judentums and the nahḍa. The programs they advocate are a part of, and 
responses to, Western Europe’s modernity as it develops from the late eighteenth century into the 
nineteenth.  
Edward Said explains how Orientalism “derives from secularizing elements in 
eighteenth-century European culture.” He uses “secularizing” to refer to developments that 
countered ecclesiastical politics, such as expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, and 
classification, emphasizing, however, that these did not remove “old religious patterns of human 
history and destiny” but rather “reconstituted, redeployed, [and] redistributed” them into secular 
frameworks driving Orientalism.1 These shifts and changes likewise enable and shape the 
program Zunz outlines, and the Wissenschaft it develops, as he uses philology to remove 
theological bias from the study of the Jews’ literature and elevate this field to a science. 
“Secularizing elements” also impact al-Ṭahṭāwī’s thought, especially as he works to translate 
concepts from French into Arabic.  
Both texts are interventions, aiming to direct and impact their readers in particular ways. 
Each posits a critique of Europe as it seeks to learn from and emulate what it takes Europe to be. 
                                                
1 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 2003), 120-21. 
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Their proposals vary, based, in part, on how each writer presents Europe’s relation to 
Christianity and what he envisions or wants for his own relation to and within Europe. 
Zunz’s vision of universal Science and a secular Europe 
Zunz, unlike al-Ṭahṭāwī, juxtaposes the scientific against the theological, though two 
aspects of this opposition need to be clarified: First, Zunz counters reading theologically to 
reading scientifically; he does not contrast religion to science. Second, it is clear that “science” 
itself, in the singular universal sense, and in its relation to “sciences,” is a “religious” concept. 
Zunz uses this scientific model of a universal “rational religion,” as a corrective to the 
divisiveness of religions in the plural, especially when one of the many governs over others. In 
Zunz’s imagery, the “literatures” of peoples function in place of “religions,” and each complete 
literature shares an equal relation to others and to the universal whole encompassing and 
outliving them all. The Church, the Enlightenment, and the Nation are all present and a part of 
the model he uses. This connects to his hope for German society, not where the religious is 
opposed to the secular, but where political and social rights are not granted or withheld based on 
whether a person is Protestant, Catholic or Jewish.   
At the same time that Zunz defends the rabbinic, and works to elevate its historical use, 
he wants to separate Jews in the present from it. This reflects his acceptance that what the 
rabbinic has “degenerated” into is irrational, unlearned, and counter to the singular scientific 
spirit of the times. The present requires that Jews integrate with non-Jewish society and allow 
themselves to be impacted and shaped by German Bildung. It likewise demands that Christians 
stop treating Jews and their literature as Church material, and calls on them to value both. 
Science is what makes this vision possible.  
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In a world where science equalizes, or should equalize, peoples, Zunz makes the Jews 
into a historical and textual community, like other peoples. He encounters this model in his 
university studies. In this sense, one could read the “science” he proposes as transposing 
Boeckh’s and Wolf’s philology onto Jewish texts.2 However, this is not only what it is. While his 
teachers’ developed the discipline as the complete knowledge of classical antiquity, historically 
and philosophically, Zunz uses their philology quite differently. His is an Orientalist’s critique of 
Hebraism, through which he aims to expose Christian undercurrents of the tradition he has 
inherited, in the hopes that raising awareness of this lingering bias will eliminate it, and with it 
the inequalities Jews continue to face in German society.  
This is how and why the Wissenschaft des Judentums began, though it is not what it 
becomes. Its battle against Christianity continues, but it is pressed and led through the effort 
from the university into the seminary. And with that relocation, a shift occurs too in who the 
Jews are and what Judaism is. What begins, in part and in places, as an effort to demonstrate to 
Jews and Christians that the Jews are a people like other peoples, possessing a history and a 
literature worthy of being taught in the German university, becomes, more often, directed 
towards modernizing and reforming the Jewish community, making Judaism “into “a modern 
religion in a Protestant sense” even as, and perhaps especially because, it engaged and sought to 
rebel against Christian abuses.3  
                                                
2 See Chapter 3 of the dissertation, 96n9. 
3 Leora Batnitzky, How Judaism Became a Religion: An Introduction to Modern Jewish Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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On al-Ṭahṭāwī’s critique of the Franks and of the Arabic Sciences: 
Unlike Zunz, who rests his program on a common universal that Jews and Christians 
need to work together towards actualizing, al-Ṭahṭāwī presents the Franks as having a 
completely different view of sciences than is found in Muslim countries. Yet, he also posits a 
universal structure for sciences, through which he assimilates the Franks’ sciences and critiques 
them for their partiality. In al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view there is no singular science. Foundationally there 
are two main categories of sciences determined by whether one is led to knowledge by the 
intellect or by revelation. Both lead to the development of sciences, either to the intellectual or 
the transmitted sciences, as humans seek to acquire knowledge and put it to its best uses. There is 
no distinction, let alone conflict, between religion and science.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī explains that the French divide religion and science and perceive an 
incompatibility between the two because their version of Christianity is irrational and anti-
scientific. This is not the case with Islam, which is why Islamic societies have developed both 
the intellectual and transmitted sciences. It is worth pointing out a significant difference between 
al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view of “civilization,” and what appears more often in subsequent nahḍa writings. 
The Takhlīṣ describes how all societies develop through the same stages as they become more 
advanced and civilized. This is markedly different, for example, from the pervasive East:West 
dichotomy seen in Jurjī Zaydān’s Tārīkh ādāb al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya, discussed in chapter 2.  
Al-Ṭahṭāwī’s view of societies’ common development facilitates his two-part critique of 
the Franks’ sciences, whereby he subsumes the whole of their sciences within the intellectual 
sciences and simultaneously critiques the Franks for their ignorance of Christian transmitted 
sciences. He presents Europe as fractured, cut off from its transmitted sciences, able to access 
only a portion of the totality of knowledges. This helps him advocate for Islamic countries to 
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import those sciences the Franks’ have mastered because these do not connect in any way to 
Christianity. Additionally, it allows him to imagine the Islamic lands as the Franks’ teacher, at 
the same time that the Franks, in reality, are instructing. 
And yet, through the process of translating and communicating European concepts into 
Arabic in order to educate his readers about what his French teachers have taught him, al-
Ṭahṭāwī reconfigures the structure of intellectual and transmitted sciences. This is most visible 
when he translates “grammar” into Arabic, explaining that the French term refers to what “the 
Arabic sciences” represent. He warns his reader against presuming that knowing Arabic is 
necessary for understanding these sciences, because they exist for every language. He divides 
Arabic from its sciences, making the language singular and exalted, but not through its sciences 
which are universal. 
The Arabic sciences are intellectual sciences, and many are also auxiliary ones assisting 
transmitted sciences (e.g. fiqh, tafsir, ḥadith, etc.) to reach their highest goals, and connecting the 
two foundational categories of sciences to each other. However, through comparing “the Arabic 
sciences” to “grammar” al-Ṭahṭāwī comes to question first their designation, and eventually their 
use. He critiques Arabic for its overdevelopment of these sciences, which now, when he 
compares Arabic books to French ones, seem to hinder the perfection of many other intellectual 
sciences. Al-Ṭahṭāwī begins to draw a separation between the two unified categories of sciences. 
As a result, the Arabic sciences, which previously traversed the two categories, require 
redefinition and restriction.  
This example illustrates the coercive potential of translation. By suggesting conceptual 
equivalence across languages, Arabic, as the language that seeks to learn from the French, is also 
pressed to accommodate itself into French categories. When al-Ṭahṭāwī warns his reader that one 
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needs to “have mastery over the Qurʾan and the sunna” before “plunging into the language of 
French” because their language itself “contains elements of philosophy” which are heretical, he 
perhaps realizes, to some degree, the unequal exchange between them.4 
 
As foundational as they have been made to be for the Wissenschaft des Judentums and 
the nahḍa, Zunz’s Etwas and al-Ṭahṭāwī’s Takhlīṣ are texts which also tell part of Europe’s 
story, showing the impact and effectiveness of European transformation and instruction on its 
internal and external others. In these beginning works, Zunz and al-Ṭahṭāwī aim to shape and 
impact what they are taught in the University of Berlin, and in the École égyptienne, 
respectively. In this sense Europe does not simply impose modernity upon them. Both writers 
engage, embrace, critique, and direct what they are taught—but what they direct is limited both 
by the starting terms and by how Europeans respond to their efforts and productions. 
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